Reed v. State, 33987

• Decision Date: 10 January 1962
• Docket Number: No. 33987,33987
• Citation: Reed v. State, 353 S.W.2d 850, 172 Tex.Crim. 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 1962)
• Parties: William Everett REED, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 850

353 S.W.2d 850

172 Tex.Crim. 122

William Everett REED, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 33987.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 10, 1962.

Don Wilson, Robert C. Benavides, Dallas, for appellant.

Stanley C. Kirk, Dist. Atty., Stanley M. Vickers, Asst. Dist. Atty., Wichita Falls, and Leon B. Douglas, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

BELCHER, Commissioner.

The conviction is for burglary with two prior convictions for offenses less than capital alleged for enhancement; the punishment, life.

The testimony of the pharmacist who closed the drug store about 9 P.M.; the officers who later discovered the forced-open front door of the building which led them to discover the appellant and his companion in the drug store with the cash register broken open, the narcotics drawer open, the appellant's companion with socks on his hands and two bottles of narcotics in his pockets; the owner who testified that he had given no one his consent to break and enter the building or take any property therein; is sufficient to sustain the conviction for burglary.

Proof was offered of two prior convictions alleged for enhancement, and that the appellant was the same person so convicted.

The appellant did not testify or offer any evidence.

The sole contention presented for reversal is that the trial court erred, at the close of the evidence, by proceeding with the trial in the absence of the appellant.

At his trial, the appellant, who was no bail, entered a plea of not guilty and was present during the presentation of all the evidence. When the evidence closed, about 5 P.M. on March 13, 1961, the Judge announced to all parties, including appellant, that court would recess until 8 A.M., March 14, 1961, at which time the trial would resume.

When the court reconvened the next morning, all parties were present in court except the appellant. About two hours were spent trying to locate him, but to no avail. Following this, the bond of the appellant was forfeited. The court then submitted its charge to the jury, which was followed by the argument of counsel, and the jury returned its verdict of guilty in the absence of the appellant, and the judgment was entered.

Thereafter, the appellant was arrested on April 7, 1961, and appeared in open court to be sentenced on April 11, 1961. At that time, in response to the court's inquiry why he had left during the trial of his case, the appellant stated that when the court recessed about 5 P.M. March 13, he 'knew he had had it', so he went to Dallas where he remained until his arrest. He further stated that his failure to be present at his trial when the court reconvened was voluntarily done; that he was not persuaded...