Reed v. Vaughan

• Decision Date: 31 October 1851
• Citation: 15 Mo. 137
• Parties: REED v. VAUGHAN.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

15 Mo. 137

REED

v.VAUGHAN.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1851.

ERROR TO ST. LOUIS COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.

This was an application to the Chancery Court for an injunction against a judgment at law. This suit was originally begun in the St. Louis Circuit Court, but was subsequently transferred to the Common Pleas Court. The grounds for the injunction, as set forth in the bill, were, that the petitioner had, on the 2nd of March, 1843, made application to the United States District Court at Washington City, for the benefit of the bankrupt law, and that on the 3rd of July, 1843, a decree was rendered in his favor, and a certificate of discharge duly granted. A certificate of discharge of the Circuit Court of the United States, for the District of Columbia, was filed and made a part of the bill. The bill further stated, that the judgment, against which he sought relief, had been included in his schedule, and that his certificate discharged him from payment. On a demurrer to the bill being filed by the defendant, the court below sustained the objections taken to the bill and dissolved the injunction. The case was brought to this court (10 Mo. R. 447), and the judgment of the court below reversed. The case being returned to the Common Pleas Court, the defendant filed his answer, requiring proof of the complainant's having been discharged under the bankrupt act, and that such a discharge was granted; that the same is illegal and void; that the judgment sought to be enforced was not included in complainant's schedule, and was recovered after the application for the benefit of the bankrupt act; and because said Reed, at the time of said application, did not reside or have his place of business in the District of Columbia; and that he also withheld property and effects of his, existing at the time of his application, from the operation of said bankrupt act, and never surrendered the same, as required by said act A replication to the answer was filed, and at the hearing of the cause, the complainant offered, subject to the defendant's objection, first, the certificate of discharge, filed with the bill, and next, without objection, read in evidence a certified transcript of the record of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, showing the petition of the complainant; a schedule of his debts, in which is included a debt of Joshua Vaughan, the defendant, of Madison county, Illinois, for $560; his property, effects, notice to creditors by publication, &c., and a final decree of discharge, under the seal of said court, from all his debts.

Defendant then proved, by John M. Krum, that he has known Reed since 1837 or 1838--in 1838 he had a saw-mill at Chippewa, in Madison county, Illinois. He removed thence to Rock Island and was appointed surveyor-general in 1841. He then resided with his family in St. Louis till lately (1848). Witness also stated, that Vaughan has resided in Madison county, Illinois, for the last fifteen years. In 1842 witness was in Washington City, and found Reed there, and in March, 1843, left him there. His wife was somewhere in the east. Witness understood that Reed had an office in St. Louis, and did not know that he had any other place of business, after he came to St. Louis.

F. R. Conway, had known Dr. Reed since he was appointed surveyor-general, in 1841: witness succeeded Dr. Reed in the office; the first place he knew his residence, was on Market street, in St. Louis: did not know his family, but they were in St. Louis when he went into the office of surveyor-general. The office was kept at St. Louis--that was its place of business; was (witness) surveyor-general four years, and the business was done at St. Louis; the business of the office never required him to go to Washington City. The business of that officer is to appoint deputies; let contracts, superintend the making of plats, &c. He was appointed in 1845; never had to go out of the State to attend to the business of his office; never knew of a surveyor-general going to Washington, or out of his district to attend to the business of his office. Surveyor-generals are sometimes absent from their offices on business, but not out of their districts.

William Wilburn, had known Reed since 1841; his family was in St. Louis before 1843; St. Louis is the place of business of surveyor-general for Missouri and Illinois. Witness was surveyor-general between two and three years before Reed's appointment; he had been clerk in the office since 1818, the duties have also been discharged at the same place; never knew it necessary for surveyor-general to be present at Washington on the business of his office, has never known Reed to have his residence or place of business out of St. Louis, since his appointment to that office.

A. Renard, another witness, stated that he had known Reed since 1841; Reed was appointed in 1842, and held it till May, 1845; witness was clerk under him; his family resided in St. Louis, and that was his place of business; knew of no other while Reed held said office; he (Reed) had made several trips to the City of Washington; at one time he remained there three or four months, but does not know on what business.

To the introduction of all this evidence the plaintiff objected, but his objections were overruled; to which he at the time excepted. The court, after due consideration, decided against the reading of the certificate of discharge aforesaid, filed with the bill, to which the plaintiff also excepted, and decreed that the bill be dismissed; to which decision of the court, in dismissing the plaintiff's bill, complainant excepted, and filed his bill of exceptions, and has brought the case to this court by writ of error.

A. H. BUCKNER, for Plaintiff. 1. The evidence introduced by defendant and admitted by the court, and which led to the dismissal of complainant's bill, was not alone and of itself admissible to prove a fraud, within the meaning of the 4th section of the Bankrupt act, and thereby nullify the certificate. 5 Story's Laws, 444. 2. Fraud is not to be presumed, and something more than evidence that the bankrupt had his residence different from that stated in his petition, is required to make out a fraudulent intention; but it is not fraud per se. 3. The answer of defendant is not such notice of fraud, growing out of a want of residence in the district, as to let in this evidence, for the purpose of making out a fraud, within the meaning of the 4th section of the Bankrupt act. The evidence was not admissible, for the purpose of showing a want of jurisdiction in the United States Court for the District of Columbia. These courts are courts of general jurisdiction, and, by the bankrupt act, had jurisdiction of bankrupts in their districts. A proceeding in bankruptcy is in the nature of a suit of a debtor against his creditors, and must be governed by the same rules, as to its effect and operation, as the judgments and decrees of these courts in other cases. It is conclusive against the creditor, unless impeached for some fraud. 5 Story's Laws, 444; 10 Mo. R. 447; 5 Cranch, 185; 10 Wheat. R. 192; McCormick v. Sullivant. The United States District Court had a general jurisdiction of the subject matter of bankruptcy, and having such jurisdiction, its judgments are binding and conclusive upon all the world. 3 Peters, 203; 10 Wheat. R. 192; 2 Salk. R. 674; 17 Wend. R. 484; 7 Bac. Abr. 170; 3 Ham. R. 305. If a record and judgment, which does not show jurisdiction, cannot be impeached in a collateral proceeding and treated as a nullity, for that cause a fortiori oral evidence cannot be permitted to be introduced to falsify the record. 2 McLean's R. 473; 4 Mass. R. 284; 6 Mass. R. 328; 4 Mo. R. Lindell v. Bank.

TODD, for Defendant.

I. The certificate of discharge was properly excluded, because of its variance with the allegations of the bill.

II. But the record shows, that the plaintiff in error has no ground of complaint by reason of the court's excluding the certificate of discharge, in the first instance; because, during the trial, the plaintiff in error introduced, without objection or exclusion, the entire record of his proceedings in bankruptcy, including the final decree for his discharge, and the court, in finally making up the decree, considered the certificate of discharge as if properly in, and passed upon its effect under the evidence.

III. The Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, had no jurisdiction over the application of Reed therein, for the benefit of the Bankrupt act, unless Reed, at the time he filed his petition, resided in said District or had his place of business therein. See section 7, Bankrupt act; 9 Ala. R. 795. Reed filed his petition in said court, on the ground that he resided in said District. The answer denied this, among other things, or that he there had his place of business, and by the replication this was put in issue as one of fact, and tried and found by the court trying the issue for the defendant. That this issue was properly made, the following authorities are referred to: 7 Johns. R. 75; 10 Johns. R. 161; 1 Cowen, 316; 3 Wend. 247; 20 Johns. R. 208. These decisions were made upon questions arising upon pleas of discharge, under the insolvent acts of New York. The tribunals authorized under said acts, to entertain petitions for their benefit, being decided to be of inferior and limited jurisdiction, it is decided by these cases that a plea of a discharge, under said acts, must set forth the facts requisite under the acts to give the particular tribunals chosen, jurisdiction in the given cases. Of these facts, one was that the applicant should have been a resident in the county, in which the application was made, for a certain length of time next prior to his application. Now what it is necessary to allege in a plea, to make a defense available, it is competent to deny and traverse, and therefore to require proof of and to...