State ex rel. Wilson v. Rainey

• Decision Date: 31 October 1881
• Parties: THE STATE ex rel. WILSON v. RAINEY et al., Appellants.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

74 Mo. 229

THE STATE ex rel. WILSON

v.RAINEY et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1881.

Appeal from Greene Circuit Court.--HON. W. F. GEIGER, Judge.

AFFIRMED. Rehearing Denied.

Thrasher & Young for appellants.

The bonds and coupons on which Davis obtained judgment were void. State ex rel. v. Garroutte, 67 Mo. 445; State ex rel. v. Dallas Co., 71 Mo. 329. The judgment is void for want of jurisdiction in the Federal court. Baker v. Johnson, 41 Me. 15, 24; Weil v. Greene Co., 69 Mo. 281; Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. 329. Greene county can only be sued in the circuit court of Greene county. Wag. Stat., 408, § 4. Davis' judgment is not in legal effect a judgment against the defendants to this suit. They have had no opportunity to be heard in defense of the same, no day in court; and are not individually bound by such judgment as to any matter affecting their rights as individuals. Rees v. City of Watertown, 19 Wall. 122; Emeric v. Gilman, 10 Cal. 408; Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 211; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472; s. c., 23 Alb. L. J. 29. As a general rule, the Federal courts are bound to follow the decisions of the State court on questions in volving the construction of the statute laws and constitution of a State, but the State courts are not bound to follow the decisions of the Federal courts, except in cases where they have been reversed by the Federal court, on appeal or writ of error, in suits involving a Federal question. Adams v. Nashville, 95 U. S. 19; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black 599; Christy v. Pridgeon, 4 Wall. 196; Peik v. Chicago, etc., R'y Co., 94 U. S. 164; Town of South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260, 267; Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black 428; Allen v. Massey, 17 Wall. 351; Townsend v. Todd, 91 U. S. 452. Taxes in this State can only be assessed, levied and collected by the State and municipal officers in the manner and to the extent provided by the statutes of the State, and no court has power to assess, levy or collect taxes independent of said laws or officers. U. S. v. Clark Co., 95 U. S. 709; State v. Shortridge, 56 Mo. 126; State v. Macon Co. Ct., 68 Mo. 29; Hilliard Taxation, § 22; Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107. The act of March 28th, 1879, repealed the law under which the tax in controversy in this case was levied; the tax is, therefore, no longer collectible. Meriwether v. Garrett, supra.

Botsford & Williams for respondent.

Greene county, as a municipal corporation or political subdivision of the State of Missouri for municipal purposes, is a citizen of the State, and as such liable to suit in the United States circuit court on demands arising against it in favor of citizens of other states. Cowles v. Mercer Co., 7 Wall. 121; Lyell v. Lapeer Co., 6 McLean 450; McCoy v. Washington Co., 3 Wall. Jr. 381. Having jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter, the judgment rendered in Davis' suit is conclusive of the indebtodness of the county to Davis, and of his right to recover therefor. So long as it remains unsatisfied and unreversed, that judgment cannot be collaterally attacked. Reed v. Vaughan, 15 Mo. 137; McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 192; Kennedy v. Bank, 8 How. (U. S.) 586; Huff v. Hutchinson, 14 How. (U. S.) 586; Voorhees v. Bank, 10 Pet. (U. S.) 449; Bernecke v. Miller, 44 Mo. 111, 102; Perryman v. State, 8 Mo. 209. The judgment not being paid, Davis was entitled to the mandamus to compel the county court to levy the tax. Board of Commissioners of Knox Co. v. Aspinwall, 24 How. 376; 2 Dill. Munic. Corp., § 685; High Ex. Leg. Rem., § 351; Heine v. Levee Comms., 19 Wall. 655; Riggs v. Johnson Co., 6 Wall. 195, 166; State v. Pacific, 61 Mo. 155. And in such proceeding the judgment is conclusive. Supervisors v. U. S., 4 Wall. 435; U. S. v. New Orleans, 98 U. S. 381; Pitts v. Fugate, 41 Mo. 405; Huntington v. Smith, 25 Ind. 486; Supervisors v. Durant, 9 Wall. 415; Mayor v. Lord, 9 Wall. 413; McBane v. People, 50 Ill. 505. Whatever may have been the character of indebtedness of defendant corporation, it merged into the judgment, and its validity cannot be impeached or called in question in this action. Freeman on Judg., §§ 215, 216, 217, and cases cited; U. S. v. New Orleans, 98 U. S. 381; Pitts v Fugate, 41 Mo. 405. The levy of the tax in controversy by the county court in obedience to the lawful mandate of the court establishing this debt, by a valid judgment, was a rightful and proper exercise of the taxing power of the county court, and its action is binding on the inhabitants and tax-payers of the county. Clark v. Wolf, 29 Iowa 197; State ex rel. v. Macon Co. Ct., 68 Mo. 29, 46; McPherson v. Foster, 43 Iowa 43, 62; Railroad Co. v. County of Osceola, 45 Iowa 174; McCoy v. Washington Co., 3 Wall. Jr. 381; Supervisors v. Schenk, 5 Wall. 772, 784; Comm. of Knox Co. v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539; Merchant Bank v. Bank, 10 Wall. 645, 604; Railroad Co. v. State, 8 Heisk. 788; State ex rel. v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 250; Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U. S. 514, 532; Ray Co. v. Vansycle, 96 U. S. 688, 675.

NORTON, J.

Wendell T. Davis, a citizen of Massachusetts, obtained judgment by default against Greene county, in the circuit court of the United States for the western district of Missouri, in the year 1875, in the sum of $13,382.40, for over-due interest coupons issued by said Greene county in favor of the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Company to aid in building the Kansas City & Memphis branch of said road. To enforce this judgment the said United States circuit court issued a mandamus to the county court of Greene county, in obedience to which the said county court duly levied a tax of twenty cents on each $100 in value on all the taxable property in said county for the year 1878, which was duly extended on the taxbooks, which were delivered to relator, as collector of said county, for collection. Defendant Rainey, a duly licensed merchant of said county, against whose goods, wares and merchandise a portion of said tax, amounting to the sum of $11.40, had been levied, refused to pay the same, and said tax remaining delinquent and unpaid, relator, as collector of said county, instituted this suit in the circuit court of Greene county against defendant, upon his bond as a merchant, to recover said tax. Defendants in their answer set up substantially that the judgment, for the payment of which the tax had been levied, was founded on interest coupons detached from certain bonds issued by the county court of Greene county, to the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Company, and that said bonds and coupons were issued without authority of law and were utterly void, and that, therefore, the tax levied was void.

Upon trial the circuit court rendered judgment for plaintiff, from which defendants have appealed; and the error assigned grows out of the action of the court in giving the following instructions, viz: (1) “That the judgment of the United States circuit court in favor of Wendell T. Davis, and against Greene county, is a final determination of the rights of the parties to that action, and is conclusive of every fact necessary to uphold it.” 2. “That the order of the county court of date of February 6th, 1878, is a levy of taxes to pay a judgment of the United States circuit court for the western district of Missouri, regular upon its face, and not for the purpose of paying interest coupons on bonds of the county, and although it is admitted said judgment was rendered upon such coupons, the facts stated in the answer showing that the county was not liable thereon, came too late after final judgment, and cannot be inquired into in this action.” The giving of these instructions over defendant's objection, and the refusal to give instructions asked by him directly the opposite of those given, constitute the error complained of.

1. MUNICIPAL BONDS tax levied to pay judgment of federal courts on; state courts will not interfere.

The fact that the circuit court of the United States had jurisdiction over the subject matter involved in the suit of Davis against Greene county, as well as of the parties thereto, is not seriously questioned by counsel, and if it were, its jurisdiction in such matters is established by the following authorities: Cowles v. Mercer Co., 7 Wall. 12; Lyell v. Lapeer Co., 6 McLean 450; McCoy v. Washington Co., 3 Wall. Jr. 381; Weil v. Greene Co., 69 Mo. 281. The jurisdiction of the circuit court of the United States being thus established both over the parties to the suit and the subject matter of it, the judgment rendered therein is not open to collateral attack, nor have we the power to review it and say that the Federal court committed error in rendering it. This power is conferred alone upon some court having appellate jurisdiction from the judgment of the United States circuit court, and can only be exercised by such appellate tribunal when such judgment is brought before it for review either by appeal, writ of error or certiorari. Bernecker v. Miller, 44 Mo. 111; Reed v. Vaughan, 15 Mo. 137; McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 192; Kennedy v. Bank, 8 How. 586; Voorhees v. Bank, 10 Pet. 449. The cause of action in the case of Davis against Greene county was merged in the judgment, and the effect of the judgment was to establish conclusively against the county a debt which it was bound to pay, and the levy of the tax in question to pay it having been made in obedience to the mandate of the court making the judgment, and in conformity with the laws of the State then in force authorizing county courts to levy taxes for the payment of county indebtedness, the payment of such tax cannot be avoided on the ground that the bonds for the interest on which the judgment was rendered were void, for that question was conclusively determined against the county in the judgment rendered, and will so remain till reversed or annulled by some court having the power to review it. State ex rel. v. Pacific, 61 Mo. 155; 2 Dill. Munic. Corp., § 351, p. 249; ...