Reeves v. Carolina Foundry & Machine Works
Decision Date | 09 July 1940 |
Docket Number | 15121. |
Citation | 9 S.E.2d 919,194 S.C. 403 |
Parties | REEVES v. CAROLINA FOUNDRY & MACHINE WORKS et al. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Donald Russell and Rufus M. Ward, both of Spartanburg, for appellants.
Evans Galbraith & Holcombe, of Spartanburg, for respondent.
By this action, commenced before the South Carolina Industrial Commission on November 3, 1939, respondent seeks to recover from the appellants under the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act, Act July 17, 1935, 39 St. at Large, p. 1231, for an injury received by him under date of April 15, 1939, while he was employed at the shop of the Carolina Foundry and Machine Works in Spartanburg, South Carolina. The appellant American Casualty Company is the insurance carrier of the appellant Carolina Foundry and Machine Works. The action was defended under the following provisions of Section 13 of the Act
The single Commissioner hearing the case, found, as a fact, that the respondent's injuries were not caused by his intoxication or by his wilful intention to injure himself and accordingly made an award in favor of the respondent in the approximate amount of $1,800, together with approximately $850 hospital and medical bills and an additional award in the amount of $2,500 for serious bodily disfigurement. From such award an appeal was taken to the full Commission resulting in the award being affirmed in its entirety.
An appeal was taken to the Court of Common Pleas from the award of the Industrial Commission. In connection with its appeal to the Circuit Court, the appellants contended in oral argument before the presiding Judge that since Section 13 of the Act was the basis of such appeal, the jurisdiction of the Commission was at issue and the Court had the same right to review fact findings as it had to review legal conclusions. Under date of May 13, 1940, an order was handed down affirming the award of the Industrial Commission. From this order and judgment entered or to be entered, this appeal is prosecuted.
While there are five exceptions taken to the Circuit Court order, they raise but two issues: (1) Can fact findings be reviewed by the Court when the jurisdiction of the Commission is at issue? (2) Was there any evidence to support the Commission's findings (a) that the injuries to the respondent were not occasioned by a wilful intention on his part to injure himself, and (b) that the injuries to respondent were not occasioned by his intoxication?
These issues necessarily converge, and as a practical matter become but one issue.
The South Carolina Workmen's Act, appearing as Act 610, Acts of 1936, 39 Statutes at Large, 1231, created an Industrial Commission to administer the Act, and a finding of fact by the full Commission is final.
The Act has eliminated all issues of negligence and degrees thereof on the part of the employer and employee, and provides for compensation to the injured employee within certain limits, and in many instances for a specific injury. However, as aforestated, Section 13 of the Act denies compensation "if the injury *** was occasioned by the intoxication of the employee or by the wilful intention of the employee to injure *** himself ***." When Section 13 is pleaded as a defense, or as a bar to a recovery under the Act, this cannot have the effect ipso facto of ousting the Commission of jurisdiction, although the jurisdiction of the Commission may thereby become a mixed question of law and fact. It is for this reason, we declared hereinabove that the issues raised by this appeal become a single issue.
Neither this Court nor the Court of Common Pleas can review the findings of fact by the Commission except to determine whether there is any evidence to support its findings of fact--in the instant case--that the respondent's injury was not occasioned by his intoxication, and that the injury was not the result of the wilful intention of respondent to injure himself. There is no issue as to the award if the respondent is not barred under the terms of Section 13 of the Act.
Subject to our observation herein that it was a mixed question of law and fact if the Commission had the power to make an award, we quote with approval from respondent's printed brief: ...
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