Reeves v. Sloan

• Decision Date: 18 April 2016
• Docket Number: 5:15CV2063
• Parties: WILLIAM REEVES, Petitioner v. BRIGHAM SLOAN, Warden, Respondent
• Court: United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Ohio

WILLIAM REEVES, Petitioner v. BRIGHAM SLOAN, Warden, Respondent

5:15CV2063

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

April 18, 2016

JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS

(Mag. Judge Kenneth S. McHargh)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

McHARGH, MAG. JUDGE

This 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition is before the magistrate judge pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). Before the court is the petition of William Reeves ("Reeves") for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petitioner is in the custody of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction pursuant to journal entry of sentence in the several cases of State of Ohio v. Reeves, Case Nos. CR-2008-02-0386, CR-2009-07-2200, CR-2012-04-0938, CR-2012-04-1076, and CR-2013-03-0710 (Summit County May 23, 2013). (Doc. 8, RX 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25.) For the following reasons, the magistrate judge recommends that the petition be denied.

The petitioner Reeves has filed a petition pro se for a writ of habeas corpus, arising out of his 2013 convictions for multiple charges of aggravated possession of drugs, resisting arrest, and other crimes, pursuant to a guilty plea, in the Summit County (Ohio) Court of Common Pleas. In his amended petition, Reeves raises a three grounds for relief:

1. Petitioner's guilty plea is void as based on unfulfilled PROMISE of surgery as admitted by STATE'S attorney, and the Trial Judge in violation of law see MACHBRODA V. UNITED STATES, 368 U.S. 487

2. Petitioner's plea not knowing, intelligent and voluntary as it was based upon promises which could not [be] or were not kept.

3. The State of Ohio refuses to give Petitioner has jail time credit for all the days he spent awaiting trial on several criminal charges, this action by the State violates his Fundamental Rights to Due Process of Law and Equal Protection under the Federal law via WORKMAN V. CARDWELL, 339 F. Supp. 893; 471 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1972).

(Doc. 6, Amended Petition, at 20-22.)

The respondent has filed a Return of Writ (doc. 8), and Reeves has filed a Traverse (doc. 9).

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Ohio Court of Appeals provided the following procedural background:

In May 2013, Reeves had five pending cases, and the trial court held a single plea hearing. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Reeves agreed to plead guilty to various charges in exchange for an eight-year prison sentence and the dismissal of the remaining charges. The court conducted a plea colloquy and accepted his plea. After finding Reeves guilty, the court proceeded straight to sentencing.

During the sentencing portion of the hearing, Reeves requested the court delay the execution of his sentence so that he could have surgery to repair his arm, which had been injured by a police dog. The court declined Reeves' request, but informed him that it would order surgery to be "evaluated and performed as soon as possible" within the correctional institution.

Shortly after sentencing, Reeves filed motions to modify his sentence, waive court costs, and have a transcript prepared at the State's expense. The court denied his motions. In January 2014, Reeves, pro se, filed a motion seeking a delayed appeal.

(Doc. 8, RX 35, at 1-2; State v. Reeves, No. 27230, 2014 WL 6677038, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2014).)

The court granted the Jan. 31, 2014, motion for leave to file a delayed appeal (doc. 8, RX 28, 31), and appointed counsel, who presented a single assignment of error:

1. Appellant's plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary as it was based upon promises which could not [be] or were not kept.

(Doc. 8, RX 32.) The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court on Nov. 26, 2014. (Doc. 8, RX 35; Reeves, 2014 WL 6677038.)

While his appeal was pending, Reeves filed a motion pro se for discovery, in order to assist with a motion to withdraw his plea(s). (Doc. 8, RX 40.) The trial court denied his motion for discovery. (Doc. 8, RX 41.)

Reeves appealed the court of appeals' Nov. 26, 2014, decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, setting forth a single proposition of law:

1. The trial court erred to the prejudice of the appellant violating his due process rights guaranteed under the Fou[r]teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article 1 Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution when he was promised surgery as part of his plea agreement.

(Doc. 8, RX 37.) On April 29, 2015, the Supreme Court of Ohio declined to accept jurisdiction of the appeal. (Doc. 8, RX 39; State v. Reeves, 142 Ohio St.3d 1453, 29 N.E.3d 1005 (2015).)

Reeves then filed a timely petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court (doc. 1), which he subsequently amended (doc. 6).

II. HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW

This case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which provides the standard of review that federal courts must apply when considering applications for a writ of habeas corpus. Under the AEDPA, federal courts have limited power to issue a writ of habeas corpus with respect to any claim which was adjudicated on the merits by a state court. The Supreme Court, in Williams v. Taylor, provided the following guidance:

Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied -- the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2002). See also Lorraine v. Coyle, 291 F.3d 416, 421-422 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 947 (2003).

A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent "if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases." Williams, 529 U.S. at 405. See also Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003).

A state court decision is not unreasonable simply because the federal court considers the state decision to be erroneous or incorrect. Rather, the federal court must determine that the state court decision is an objectively unreasonable application of federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 410-12; Lorraine, 291 F.3d at 422.

Reeves has filed his petition pro se. The pleadings of a petition drafted by a pro se litigant are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, and will be liberally construed. Urbina v. Thoms, 270 F.3d 292, 295 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam)). Other than that, no special treatment is afforded litigants who decide to proceed pro se. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (strict adherence to procedural requirements); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108 (6th Cir. 1991); Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 343 (6th Cir. 1988).

III. JAIL TIME CREDIT

The third ground of the petition is:

The State of Ohio refuses to give Petitioner has jail time credit for all the days he spent awaiting trial on several criminal charges, this action by the State violates his Fundamental Rights to Due Process of Law and Equal Protection under the Federal law via WORKMAN V. CARDWELL, 339 F. Supp. 893; 471 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1972).

(Doc. 6, at 22.) The respondent contends that Reeves failed to fairly present this claim in the state courts, and therefore it should be barred as procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 6, at 7.) The respondent also argues that the claim is non-cognizable. (Doc. 6, at 12.)

In the third ground, Reeves concedes that the trial court granted jail time credit for time served awaiting trial, but claims that the court miscalculated the applicable credit. Reeves states that he has received 298 days credit, but claims that he is actually entitled to 1,728 days jail time credit. Reeves does not share the exact basis for his calculation, but it appears that he is arguing that he is entitled to separate jail time credit for the (same?) jail time for each of his criminal cases¹. (Doc. 6, at 22.)

At the sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Reeves to a total term of incarceration of eight years. (Doc. 8, RX 51, Transcript, at 51.) All of the sentences were ordered were ordered to run concurrently, with the exception of the consecutive sentences imposed in case number 0938, which was seven years for illegal manufacture of drugs, plus one year for failure to comply with the order orsignal of a police officer, which have to run consecutively under Ohio law. (Doc. 8, RX 51, at 50-51; see generally RX 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25.)

The court ordered credit for all time served in the Summit County Jail. (Doc. 8, RX 51, at 51, 55.) The court stated that the credit would be put in the judgment entry, and informed Reeves that he should notify the court if he thought it was calculated erroneously. (Doc. 8, RX 51, at 55; see generally RX 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25.) Reeves did not raise this issue on direct appeal. See generally Hughley v. Reid, No. 1:09CV1828, 2010 WL 3069569, at *16 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2010) (alleged errors regarding jail time credit may be raised on direct appeal).

Reeves contends that the trial court's alleged miscalculation of his jail time credit "violates his Fundamental Rights to Due Process of Law and Equal Protection under the Federal law." (Doc. 6, at 22, citing "WORKMAN V. CARDWELL², 339 F....