Reeves v. Southern Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 27 January 1905 |
| Citation | 49 S.E. 674,121 Ga. 561 |
| Parties | REEVES v. SOUTHERN RY. CO. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. A foreign corporation doing business in this state and having agents located therein for this purpose may be sued and served in the same manner as domestic corporations upon any transitory cause of action, whether originating in this state or otherwise; and it is immaterial whether the plaintiff be a nonresident or a resident of this state, provided the enforcement of the cause of action would not be contrary to the laws and policy of this state.
2. The case of Bawknight v. Insurance Company, 55 Ga. 194 upon a review thereof, is overruled.
Error from City Court of Atlanta; A. E. Calhoun, Judge.
Action by H. N. Reeves against the Southern Railway Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed.
Andrews & Skeen, for plaintiff in error.
Dorsey Brewster & Howell and Sanders McDaniel, for defendant in error.
This was an action in the city court of Atlanta, by a plaintiff whose place of residence does not appear, against a foreign railroad corporation which is doing business in the city of Atlanta. The defendant was duly served with process according to the law of this state. The cause of action alleged is a tort to property committed in the state of Alabama, the tort consisting of an injury to a horse which was being transported from Harrisonville, Mo., to Atlanta, Ga., in a car of the defendant company. The petition did not allege that the contract of transportation was made by any officer or agent of the corporation in Georgia, or that the tort was connected in any way with orders issued by a Georgia officer, or from a Georgia office of the corporation. The court dismissed the petition on demurrer for want of jurisdiction, and the plaintiff excepted.
The fact that a corporation has no existence except in legal contemplation gave rise to the conception that its existence could not be legally recognized outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the lawmaking power which created it, and that, therefore, it was impossible for a corporation to migrate beyond the bounds of its creator. This conception resulted in the courts holding that the corporation could not be sued in a jurisdiction foreign to that which gave it existence. While, under this view, as a matter of theory the corporation did not migrate, yet as a matter of fact its officers and agents did; and contracts were made in its name and wrongs committed by its officers and agents, in territory far remote from that in which it was supposed to have its only legal existence. Great hardship and inconvenience resulted oftentimes from the application of this rule, which had the effect of compelling those who sought redress for breaches of contract and other legal wrongs against the corporation to bring their actions in the courts of the jurisdiction creating the corporation; the expenses of the remedy in many cases amounting to more than what would have been the fruits of recovery. The recognition of the hardship resulting from this rule brought about a modification of the rule to the extent that, where a foreign corporation located an agent and actually transacted business in a foreign jurisdiction, it so far acquired a residence in that jurisdiction as to make it amenable to the processes of the courts thereof on all causes of action originating within that jurisdiction. The rule was then further modified to the extent that, where the corporation had an agent and was doing business in a foreign jurisdiction, it might be sued upon any transitory cause of action by a citizen of the state in which the corporation was thus doing business. And in this country it followed from this rule that, if a resident was allowed to bring this suit, any citizen of the United States would, under the Constitution of the United States, have a similar right to bring suit. South Carolina Railroad Co. v. Nix, 68 Ga. 572 (2), 580; Barrell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 113, 114, 10 S.Ct. 269, 33 L.Ed. 538. There are many years and manifold changes in economic conditions between the old rule, which denied the right to sue a foreign corporation in personam outside of the jurisdiction of its creation, and the modern doctrine that the question of jurisdiction and suability is not so much one of citizenship as one of finding. See Williams v. Ry. Co., 90 Ga. 522, 16 S.E. 303; Dearing v. Bank, 5 Ga. 497, 48 Am.Dec. 300. The development of the principle was by gradual steps, and necessarily involved the overturning of many old cases. The case of Bawknight v. Insurance Company, 55 Ga. 194, was decided during the transition period, and before the modern doctrine had been firmly established. It denied the right to sue a foreign corporation on a foreign cause of action. This decision seems to have been followed in Central Railroad Co. v. Carr, 76 Ala. 388, 52 Am.Rep. 339. In the Bawknight Case it is to be noted that the original record shows that the plaintiff was a resident of the state of Florida, and at that time the fact of the nonresidence of the plaintiff was by several courts considered important; some holding that on a cause of action arising in another state a nonresident plaintiff could not sue a nonresident corporation, while others held that it was within the discretion of the court to allow or refuse such right to a nonresident. The true test of jurisdiction is not residence or nonresidence of the plaintiff, or the place where the cause of action originated, but whether the defendant can be found and served in the jurisdiction where the cause of action is asserted. A corporation can be found in any jurisdiction where it transacts business through agents located in that jurisdiction, and suits may be maintained against it in that jurisdiction if the laws of the same provide a method for perfecting service on it by serving its agents. From 1845 to the present time the law of Georgia has provided that service of process necessary to the commencement of "any suit against any corporation in any court," with certain exceptions, which are not material to this discussion, may be perfected by serving any officer or agent of such corporation, or by leaving a copy of the process at the place of transacting the usual and ordinary business of such corporation, if such place shall then be within the jurisdiction of the state in which the suit is commenced. Civ. Code 1895, § 1899. The language of this section is sufficiently broad to authorize the service of process in a suit against a foreign corporation that has a place of doing business in this state. City Fire Ins. Co. v. Carrugi, 41 Ga. 660 (1), 671. There are many cases decided by this court where it either expressly or tacitly recognized that a foreign corporation may be sued in this state in personam if lawful service can be perfected upon it. See Selma R. Co. v. Lacy, 43 Ga. 461; Mayor of Macon v. Cummins, 47 Ga. 326; Nat. Bank v. Mfg. Co., 55 Ga. 36; Dahlonega Min....
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