Reeves v. State
Decision Date | 05 October 1979 |
Docket Number | No. F-78-13,F-78-13 |
Citation | 601 P.2d 113 |
Parties | Charles W. REEVES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee. |
Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma |
An appeal from the District Court, Muskogee County; Bill Ed Rogers, judge.
Charles W. Reeves, appellant, was convicted of the offense of Burglary in the First Degree, After Former Conviction of a Felony; was sentenced to forty (40) years' imprisonment, and appeals. REVERSED and REMANDED.
Malcolm Oyler, Oyler & Smith, Oklahoma City, for appellant.
Larry Derryberry, Atty. Gen., Mary Kathleen Rhodes, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant, Charles W. Reeves, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was charged by information in Case No. CRF-76-269 with the crime of Burglary in the First Degree, After Former Conviction of a Felony, pursuant to 21 O.S.1971, § 1431. In the District Court, Muskogee County, a jury found him guilty and assessed his punishment at forty (40) years' imprisonment.
At about 10:00 p.m. on September 3, 1976, the complaining witness, Kelly Oliver, alerted police when she heard a scraping noise at the sliding glass door in her apartment bedroom. When she saw the draperies covering the door move, she again called the police. Immediately thereafter, Ms. Oliver saw a patrol car approaching and ran out the front door.
After being apprehended, the defendant accompanied Muskogee Policeman Marshall Helsley and Ms. Oliver to jail. Ms. Oliver was a commissioned police officer who had been working undercover at a local bar, the Cantina Villa, one month prior to the burglary. When questioned regarding the burglary, the defendant answered, "I don't know why I did it," and he further admitted being at the Cantina Villa earlier on the evening of the burglary.
Ms. Oliver's sliding glass door had been opened four inches at the bottom, where a board had been placed to keep it closed, and 18 inches at the top. The arresting officer testified that marks on the door frame could have been made by the defendant's screwdriver, and, although the lab tests were inconclusive, black tar found on the screwdriver resembled that on the door frame. Furthermore, on the evening of the crime, there was no wind to explain the movement of the draperies.
As his first assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting testimony of the confession without having held a Jackson v. Denno 1 hearing and without a proper predicate first having been laid. Insofar as we find the second contention meritorious, we find it unnecessary to discuss the first.
The defendant complains that, over his objection, the officer was permitted to relate what the defendant had said while in custody, without the officer first having established that the defendant had knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In this regard, Officer Helsley testified that the police department has a form which "gives you the Miranda warning" and that he handed the form to the defendant, who handed it back without saying anything. The officer then testified as follows:
The officer further testified that the defendant answered, "Yes" when asked if he understood what was on the form and that he signed the form; but the form was never introduced into evidence, nor were the contents of the warning further elaborated upon at trial.
The warning testified to by the officer falls far short of that required by Miranda, and the State failed to sustain its heavy burden to demonstrate that the defendant had waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel at the time of questioning. Marshall v. State, Okl.Cr., 561 P.2d 1370 (1977); State v. Harp, Okl.Cr., 457 P.2d 800 (1969). We are therefore of the opinion that substantial error was committed when the officer was permitted to testify regarding the defendant's statement.
The defendant next complains that he was denied a fair trial when the District Attorney made improper and prejudicial remarks during closing argument. First, the prosecutor made comments which could be interpreted to mean that the trial court considered the defendant guilty:
In Swenson v. State, Okl.Cr., 525 P.2d 1395 (1974), we held comments in closing argument improper where the prosecutor stated the case would not have been before the jury unless the judge had determined constructive delivery of marihuana had been established. In the instant case, the argument to the jury was technically correct in that the trial court had ruled that the State had established the elements charged sufficient to override a demurrer, but proof of the defendant's guilt was dependent upon the jury's findings of facts. However, we are of the opinion that such a comment could be interpreted by the jury, unschooled in trial procedures, to mean, "The judge thinks we proved the case." As such, while technically valid, the statement could be misleading to the jury as to its role as trier of the facts.
The resulting prejudice was further bolstered by the unobjected to comment at the close of the prosecutor's argument:
". . . And, now, all of my efforts and the police department's efforts, and Judge Rogers' efforts, are in your hands."
In both instances and particularly when viewed together, the prosecutor exceeded the bounds of proper argument by implying that the trial court lacked impartiality and, in fact, favored the State's case.
The District Attorney also commented on the defendant's constitutional presumption of innocence when he stated:
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...511 P.2d 1120 (Okl.Cr.1973). "Counsel generally has the right to discuss fully the evidence and arising inferences." Reeves v. State, 601 P.2d 113 (Okl.Cr.1979). Counsel exceeded the limitations of that right in this Finally, there is merit to the argument that the verdict forms, submitted ......
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