Regalbuto v. City of Philadelphia

• Decision Date: 12 December 1995
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 95-5629.
• Citation: 937 F. Supp. 374
• Parties: Elizabeth REGALBUTO and Lynne Oliveri, Individually in Her Own Right and as Administratrix of the Estate of Samuel R. Regalbuto v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; Philadelphia Police Department; Philadelphia Fire Department; John Doe Number One, Director of Department of Public Safety, Philadelphia County; John Doe Number Two, Director of Communications, Division of Emergency Dispatch, Department of Public Safety, Philadelphia County.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

937 F. Supp. 374

Elizabeth REGALBUTO and Lynne Oliveri, Individually in Her Own Right and as Administratrix of the Estate of Samuel R. Regalbuto v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; Philadelphia Police Department; Philadelphia Fire Department; John Doe Number One, Director of Department of Public Safety, Philadelphia County; John Doe Number Two, Director of Communications, Division of Emergency Dispatch, Department of Public Safety, Philadelphia County.

Civil Action No. 95-5629.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

December 12, 1995.

Joseph M. Marrone, Jr., Camden, NJ, for Plaintiffs.

Marie C. Lasota, Leon A. King, II, City of Phila. Law Dept., Phila., PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

PADOVA, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This civil rights suit alleges that the City of Philadelphia's "911" service inadequately responded to calls for emergency aid made on behalf of decedent, Samuel Regalbuto (hereinafter "Decedent"). Plaintiffs, Decedent's wife and daughter, allege causes of action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1994), the Pennsylvania Constitution, and state common law against: (1) the City of Philadelphia (hereinafter "the City"); (2) the Philadelphia Police and Fire Departments, which, Plaintiffs allege, implement and execute the 911 service; (3) "John Doe Number One," Director of the Department of Public Safety, Philadelphia County; and (4) "John Doe Number Two," Director of Communications in the Division of Emergency Dispatch Services for the Department of Public Safety, Philadelphia County.

Currently before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), asserting that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendants also move separately for the dismissal of the Philadelphia Police and Fire Departments. For the reasons discussed below, I will grant Defendants' motions.

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs set forth the following factual allegations in their Complaint. On February 18, 1995 at about 8:40 PM, Decedent, who was attending a gathering at a Philadelphia residence, began having difficulty breathing and collapsed to the ground. An individual at the gathering promptly called "911" to request an ambulance. The 911 dispatcher told him that an ambulance would be sent immediately. In the twenty minutes that elapsed between this first call and the arrival of a fire engine and police car, two more calls were made to check on the ambulance's status; each time, the dispatcher assured the callers that an ambulance was en route.

When the fire engine and police car arrived on the scene, these personnel did not enter the house until several minutes later, despite being informed that Decedent was inside and in need of assistance. Upon entering the house, these personnel administered an I.V. and used a defibrillator. However, the defibrillator did not function properly. Approximately five minutes after the arrival of the fire engine and police car, an ambulance arrived and the ambulance personnel entered the residence to assist Decedent. At that point, Decedent was in full cardiac and respiratory arrest. The ambulance personnel administered emergency aid and transported Decedent to Nazareth Hospital, where he was pronounced dead at 9:35 PM.

Plaintiffs advance two theories of liability under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. First, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants maintained certain policies, practices and/or customs in reckless disregard or with deliberate indifference to Decedent's Fourteenth Amendment right to life, property, and due process. Specifically, Defendants did not implement adequate systems and databases, procedures, and supervision to ensure that personnel quickly and adequately responded to emergency calls. Plaintiffs further allege that although Defendants knew of the 911 system's numerous deficiencies, they continued to misrepresent the service's efficacy, causing Philadelphia County residents to call 911 and rely on its services instead of seeking alternative emergency aid that was available to them.

Second, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached their duty of care to Decedent and deprived him of his rights to substantive due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants knew that Decedent and those acting on his behalf would rely on Defendants' representations about 911 services, including the dispatcher's assurances that an ambulance would arrive soon, and this reliance would preclude Decedent from contacting other sources of emergency aid. By their actions and misrepresentations, Defendants created a "special relationship" with Decedent, depriving him of his ability to obtain alternative emergency aid and placing him in danger. This special relationship imposed an affirmative duty on Defendants to provide Decedent with prompt and effective medical assistance.

Plaintiffs allege that these actions and misrepresentations also violated Decedent's right to life, property, and due process under the Pennsylvania Constitution. They seek compensatory damages, for medical, funeral, and estate expenses, lost earnings and benefits, and pain and suffering, damages for loss of companionship, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) is assessed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Nelson v. ARA Food Service, No. Civ.A. 94-4542, 1995 WL 303990, at *6 n. 13 (E.D.Pa. May 18, 1995) (citing Constitution Bank v. DiMarco, 815 F.Supp. 154, 157 (E.D.Pa.1993)). Therefore, in deciding a Rule 12(c) motion, a district court must view the facts and inferences to be drawn from the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. Shepard Niles, Inc., 11 F.3d 399, 406 (3d Cir.1993) (citation omitted). Under Rule 12(c), judgment will only be granted if it is clearly established that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Institute for Scientific Information, Inc. v. Gordon and Breach, Science Publishers, Inc., 931 F.2d 1002, 1005 (3d Cir.) (citing Jablonski v. Pan American World Airways, 863 F.2d 289, 290-91 (3d Cir.1988)), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 909, 112 S.Ct. 302, 116 L.Ed.2d 245 (1991); see also Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Stedman, 895 F.Supp. 742, 745-46 (E.D.Pa.1995) (noting that a court may not grant judgment on the pleadings unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim which would entitle them to relief) (citation omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Claims Against the Philadelphia Police and Fire Departments

Defendants correctly argue that as a matter of law, the suit must be dismissed against the Philadelphia Police and Fire Departments because they are not separate legal entities that can be sued. See 53 Purdon's Pa.Stat.Ann. § 16257 (West 1957)¹; Baldi v. Philadelphia, 609 F.Supp. 162, 168 (E.D.Pa.1985) (holding that police department did not have separate corporate existence from city so as to permit it to be sued for civil rights violations); Philadelphia v. Glim, 149 Pa.Cmwlth. 491, 613 A.2d 613, 616 (1992) (holding that fire department may not be sued as if it were legal entity separate from city; all suits against any city department must be brought against the city itself, because departments do not have independent legal existence). Therefore, I dismiss the police and fire departments from the suit.

B. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 Claim

Section § 1983 provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of an State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1994). Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but instead provides remedies for rights established elsewhere. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2432, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). Therefore, to establish their § 1983 claim, Plaintiffs must allege that Defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived Decedent of a right secured by the Constitution. See Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir.) (citing Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1993)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 165, 133 L.Ed.2d 107 (1995).

In the instant case, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants deprived Decedent of his substantive due process rights, arguing two distinct theories of liability under § 1983. Defendants contend that under either theory, Plaintiffs' factual pleadings, which the Court must consider as true for purposes of this Rule 12(c) motion, do not establish a § 1983 cause of action. I consider each basis for liability in turn.

1. Municipal Policies, Practices, and Customs

A municipality can be sued directly under § 1983 where an action or conduct taken pursuant to municipal policy or custom causes a constitutional injury. Monell v. Dep't of Social Serv. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694-95, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). To maintain a § 1983 action against a municipality, a plaintiff must allege that municipal policymakers, acting with deliberate or reckless indifference, established and maintained a practice, policy or custom which deprived plaintiff of a constitutional right. See Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283, 1292, reh'g, 22 F.3d 1296 (en banc) (3d Cir.1994) (holding that city may be liable under § 1983 for...