Regnier v. Territory Oklahoma
| Decision Date | 06 September 1905 |
| Citation | 1905 OK 81,82 P. 509,15 Okla. 652 |
| Parties | WILLIAM L. REGNIER v. THE TERRITORY OF OKLAHOMA. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
¶0 1. MURDER-- Manslaughter In the First Degree. Where the indictment charges the crime of murder, and the evidence shows the crime to have been committed by lying in wait and shooting the the deceased, and the defense is that of an alibi, and no evidence is introduced on the trial by the defendant other than in support of his defense of alibi, and the testimony on behalf of the Territory shows a wilful and deliberate shooting, resulting in death, it is error in the instructions of the court to submit to the jury the question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant of the crime of manslaughter In the first degree, included in such indictment.
2. EVIDENCE--Res Gestae. Where in the trial of a person charged with the crime of murder it is shown that he was shot from ambush by some person about 175 yards distant, and shortly after the shooting the deceased said to his brother who was present at the shooting: "Do you know who did this?" The brother answering stated: "One of them was Will Regnier"; and the deceased replied: "Yes, and the other one was John Labrier." Held, such conversation was inadmissable as res gestae.
Error from the District Court of Beaver County; before J. L. Pancoast, Trial Judge.
Francis C. Price and O. T. Toombs, for plaintiff in error.
P. C. Simons, Attorney General, for defendant in error.
¶1 The plaintiff in error, William L. Regnier, was, in the district court of Beaver county, indicted and tried for the crime of murder in causing the death of W. A. Rowan, April 15, 1903. The jury trying the cause returned a verdict against him, finding him guilty of manslaughter in the first degree; and on the 20th day of October following, after motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment had been heard by the court and overruled, the court rendered judgment against plaintiff in error, sentencing him to fifteen years' confinement in the territorial prison. From this judgment and sentence the defendant (plaintiff in error) brings the case to this court, alleging error.
¶2 The facts in this case show that the deceased, W. A. Rowan, at the time of the shooting was engaged in the act of cutting a wire fence which separated two ranges in Beaver county. He was accompanied by his brother Charles Rowan, who was standing a short distance away from him. It appears that this line fence had been the subject of controversy between the settlers theretofore. While the deceased was in the act of cutting this fence with a pair of nippers, he was shot by some person who was ambushed behind some rocks on the side of the hill to the west of him, at a distance of about 175 yards. From the person so ambushed the deceased received two wounds, one a slight flesh wound in the side, the other through the arm, which caused his death. The brother who was with the deceased was shot at the same time through the leg, and one of their saddle horses was killed. Whoever fired the fatal shot was evidently lying in wait for the deceased, and fired it with the intent of killing or doing him great bodily harm. Upon the trial of the cause no defense was offered other than that of an alibi, and at the conclusion of the testimony the court in instructing the jury included in his instructions the following:
"The homicide to which the evidence may be applied in this case is either murder or manslaughter in the first degree."
¶3 To the giving of this instruction the defendant at the time excepted, and excepted to any instruction defining and authorizing the jury to consider the crime of manslaughter in the first degree.
¶4 Manslaughter in the first degree is defined by the statute of Oklahoma as follows:
"First, when perpetrated without a design to effect death by a person while engaged in the commission of a misdemeanor; second, when perpetrated without a design to effect death, and in a heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner, or by means of a dangerous weapon; unless it is committed under such circumstances as constitute excusable or justifiable homicide."
¶5 The instruction objected to was given by the court because of the language of the second subdivision of the statute above quoted: "When perpetrated without a design to effect death," the court remarking at the time sentence was pronounced as follows:
"The only reason in this case why the verdict should be manslaughter in the first degree instead of murder was a question as to whether or not the intent was absolutely to kill or simply to wound and maim."
¶6 We are of the opinion that the facts in this case do not submit to the jury the question of such intent.
¶7 A man is presumed to intend the natural and consequent result of his own act, and in this case there is a lying in wait showing a deliberate and premeditated purpose, and the shot fired from such a distance with the wonderful accuracy shown by the evidence in this case, precludes any idea other than that they were fired with a murderous design.
¶8 The statute of Oklahoma, sec. 2168 Wilson's Ann. Stat. provides:
"A design to effect death is inferred from the fact of killing, unless the circumstances raise a reasonable doubt whether such design existed."
¶9 No circumstances were shown in evidence in this case intended or tending to show that the design with which the fatal shot was fired, was other than to effect death. The guilty party was lying in wait, no words were or could be spoken, and no fact or circumstance is shown in evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to what the design or purpose was when such shot was fired. To submit to the jury under such circumstances the right to determine the intent, motive or purpose in firing such shot, would be equivalent to nullifying the statute, and permitting the jury to conclude at will, and not by force of the evidence, that there was a design to maim simply, and not to kill.
¶10 We think it was error under the circumstances of this case to submit to the jury for their consideration in arriving at a verdict any degree of homicide other than that charged in the indictment, which was murder. A majority of the judges of this court hold that this error is one the defendant cannot complain of, but the writer of this opinion cannot agree with them in such conclusion. (Sparf & Hanson v. U. S., 156 U.S. 51, 39 L. Ed. 343, 15 S. Ct. 273; Stevenson v. U. S., 162 U.S. 313, 40 L. Ed. 980, 16 S. Ct. 839; State v. Robinson, 41 P. 51; State v. Cale 17 N. W. 183; State v. Cantieny, 24 N.W. 458; State v. McPhail, 81 P. 683; Dickerson v. State, 4 N.W. 321; Talbirt v. State, 47 S. E. 544; Davis v. U. S., 165 U.S. 373, 41 L. Ed. 750, 17 S. Ct. 360.)
¶11 There is one other ground of error submitted in the assignments of error in this case which we will notice.
¶12 During the trial of the case, and while evidence was being taken on behalf of the Territory, Charles Rowan, a brother of the deceased, who was present at the time the fatal shot was fired, testified with reference to the occurrence, and after detailing the circumstances of the shooting of his brother testified as follows:
¶13 It is insisted that the admission in evidence of declarations of the deceased shown in the foregoing testimony, wherein a conversation is detailed between the witness and his deceased brother, "When my brother got off my horse and before I started back after his horse he laid down on the ground, and as he laid down he says, 'Do you know who did this?' and I says, 'One of them was Will Regnier'; my brother says, 'Yes, and the other one was John Labrier'", is material error. This declaration was admitted by the court as a part of the res gestae.
¶14 In point of time at which the declaration was made with reference to the firing of the fatal shot, there is no objection, and it is shown to have been made so soon afterwards that the occurrence must have been the one thing uppermost in the minds of the parties,...
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Regnier v. Territory
... ... defendant at the time excepted, and excepted to any ... instruction defining and authorizing the jury to consider the ... crime of manslaughter in the first degree. Manslaughter in ... the first degree is defined by the statute of Oklahoma as ... follows: "First, when perpetrated without a design to ... effect death by a person while engaged in the commission of a ... misdemeanor. Second, when perpetrated without a design to ... effect death, and in a heat of passion, but in a cruel and ... unusual manner, or by means of a ... ...