Reid v. Aubrey's Rest. Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | 2:18-CV-00090-DCLC |
| Parties | NIGEL M. REID II, Plaintiff, v. AUBREY'S RESTAURANT INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
Defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 37] and supporting memorandum [Doc. 38]. Plaintiff responded in opposition1 [Doc. 40]. Defendant replied [Doc. 42]. This matter is now ripe for resolution.
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Plaintiff worked for Defendant Aubrey's Restaurant as a dishwasher beginning on or about December 1, 2017 [Doc. 1, pg. 9]. On January 3, 2018, he made a complaint of sexual harassment to his district manager. He states that another employee "came behind [him] and made contact on me and follow[ed him] for 30 sec[onds] to a minute long on security footage." [Doc. 1, pg. 5]. He alleges that Jason Ward, the employee, had "harassed the other employees that night." [Id. at 5]. He alleges that Ward was "drunk" at the time and was not even working when Ward touched Plaintiff's shoulders.
Ten days later, on January 13, 2018, Plaintiff left work early and went to the emergency room for treatment. He sent a text to his supervisor at 5:00 p.m. that day advising him that he had to leave work early to go to the ER because "I think I pulled a muscle?" The next day, on January 14, 2018, Plaintiff was scheduled to work, but was a no show, and he did not call in advance to advise of his anticipated absence. When Plaintiff did show up for work on January 15, 2018, Defendant terminated his employment for not showing up for work the day before and not calling in.
On April 13, 2018, Plaintiff filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that Defendant discharged him because he had complained of sexual harassment regarding the incident with Ward [Doc. 1-8, pg. 7].2 On April 23, 2018, the EEOC closed its file on this charge, stating that it was "unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes violations of the statutes." [Id. at pg. 6]. Specifically, the EEOC found that Plaintiff did not establish a violation on a discharge issue nor did he establish a violation on the basis of retaliation [Id. at pg. 7].
On June 7, 2018, Plaintiff sued Defendant Aubrey's Restaurant and Jason Ward [Doc. 1]. He alleged Defendant violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for terminating his employment. He also alleged Defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., by discriminating against him on the basis of his race and sex and illegally retaliated against him for making a complaint about being sexually harassed. He also alleged Defendant violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The facts of the case are not in dispute. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that [Doc. 1, pg. 2]. He sued for $20 million dollars.
On August 1, 2018, this Court granted Defendant Ward's motion to dismiss, finding that Plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action against Ward, individually [Doc. 16]. On September 18, 2019, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 37] and supporting memorandum [Doc. 38], arguing there was no genuine issue of material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff responded [Doc. 40].
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ultimately, the court must decide "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). The burden of proving that no genuine dispute of fact exists is strictly upon the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 n.2 (1986). As such, the court must consider the evidence and "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." National Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc., 253, F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
However, once the moving party has presented sufficient evidence to support summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must point to evidence in the record upon which a reasonable finder of fact could find in its favor." Machoka v. City of Collegedale, No. 1:17-CR-203-TAV-CHS, 2019 WL 1768861, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 22, 2019) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The nonmoving party "may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough; the Court must determine whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-movant based on the record. Id. at 251-252.
As Plaintiff brings his claims under multiple statutes, the Court will address each claim and the requirements of the statute in turn.
Simpson-Gardner v. City of Southfield, 2017 WL 1021067, *1 (S.D. Mich. March 16, 2017) (citing Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 2003); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999)).
"Section 1983 does not, as a general rule, prohibit the conduct of private parties acting in their individual capacities." Lindsey v. Detroit Entm't, LLC, 484 F.3d 824, 827 (6th Cir. 2007). However, a private party may be liable under § 1983 if their conduct is "fairly attributable to the state." Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 231-32 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982)). "There are three tests employed by the courts to determine whether the challenged conduct is fairly attributable to the state: (1) the public function test, (2) the state compulsion test and (3) the symbiotic relationship or nexus test." Id. at 232 (citing Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331 (6th Cir. 1992)) In this case, Aubrey's Restaurant is what its name suggests, a restaurant. It is a private party, not a state actor. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would suggest that Defendant's conduct is in any way fairly attributable to the state. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot succeed on his claim under § 1983 and that claim is DISMISSED.
Title VII states that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1). A claim under Title VII must be supported by direct evidence of unlawful conduct or by circumstantial evidence that raises an inference of unlawful conduct. Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 864-65 (6th Cir. 2003). Direct evidence, if believed, requires no inferences to conclude that unlawful conduct was a motivating factor in the challenged action. Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537, 542 (6th Cir. 2003). If the plaintiff relies upon circumstantial evidence, the Court utilizes the burden shifting paradigm established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under this framework, the plaintiff is first required to establish a prima facie case of unlawful conduct and, if that is done, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged conduct. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). If the defendant articulates such a reason, the presumption drops from the case, and the plaintiff must then show that the reason offered by the defendant is a pretext for unlawful conduct. Id. at 508. Whatever method of proof is used, theultimate burden is on the plaintiff to show that he or she suffered unlawful conduct under Title VII. Id. at 518.
Plaintiff has alleged that he believes Defendant discriminated against him on the basis of his sex and his race when it terminated his employment on January 15, 2018. Defendant did not discriminate against him on either basis. In his recitation of the facts of this case, Plaintiff makes no indication of how his race or his sex had any effect on his termination. Plaintiff states that he "was the only man touched that was black there under color of ... law," [Doc. 4, pg. 3], but fails to allege any facts for the Court to reasonably infer that Defendant discriminated against him "because of [his] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin...." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). An off-duty co-worker touched his shoulder on one occasion, which offended Plaintiff, but he does not even attempt to establish a causal connection between his race or sex and his termination. He only makes the conclusory allegation of discrimination. That is insufficient. See Tucker v. Victor Gelb, Inc., No. 98-4070, 1999 WL 801544, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 28, 1999) ().
But even assuming Plaintiff has made a ...
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