Reid v. Modern Roofing & Metal Works, Inc.

• Decision Date: 02 December 1953
• Docket Number: 2,Nos. 1,No. 34693,34693,s. 1
• Citation: 79 S.E.2d 31,89 Ga.App. 285
• Parties: REID v. MODERN ROOFING & METAL WORKS, Inc
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 31

79 S.E.2d 31

89 Ga.App. 285

REID v. MODERN ROOFING & METAL WORKS, Inc.

No. 34693.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division Nos. 1, 2.

Dec. 2, 1953.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The petition set out a cause of action against the plaintiff in error, and the court did not err in overruling his demurrer thereto.

2. The evidence authorized the finding that the negligence of the employee of the

plaintiff in error was the proximate cause of the damage complained of, and the court did not err in refusing a new trial.

Modern Roofing & Metal Works, Incorporated, sued Charlie Reid, doing business as Paramount Cab Company, and Paul Hammond Anderson for damages to its automobile, allegedly caused by the negligence of the defendants. The petition alleges substantially: that on or about August 4, 1950, at 10:45 p. m., the plaintiff's automobile was being driven by John Locker eastward along U. S. Highway No. 78 just west of its intersection with Golden Camp Road in Richmond County, Georgia; that the plaintiff's automobile was second in a procession of three automobiles; that the automobile just in front of the plaintiff's was being operated by Mrs. Elizabeth R. Hill; that the automobile just behind the plaintiff's was being operated by the defendant Anderson; that these three automobiles were proceeding eastward along highway No. 78 at a speed of about 35 miles per hour when Mrs. Hill signalled to make a left turn; that John Locker thereupon slowed down the plaintiff's automobile, and as he did so, an automobile being driven by the defendant Reid's servant, Thomas Murray, passed him at a high rate of speed and crashed into the left-hand side of Mrs. Hill's automobile; that the two automobiles involved in the collision completely blocked the highway and compelled John Locker to apply his brakes to avoid running into the two wrecked automobiles; that the defendant Anderson failed to stop his automobile and collided with the rear of the plaintiff's automobile; that the cause of the collision was the careless and negligent manner in which Thomas Murray operated the defendant Reid's automobile as alleged above; that Murray by said acts of negligence set into motion a chain of events which resulted in the damage to the plaintiff's automobile; that the defendant Anderson was operating his automobile in a careless and negligent manner, in that he was following so closely behind the plaintiff's automobile he did not have his automobile under control and was unable to bring his automobile to a halt prior to running into the rear of the plaintiff's automobile. The defendant Reid's demurrer to the petition was overruled, and he excepted pendente lite. On the trial, the judge trying the case without the intervention of a jury found in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant Reid and relieved the defendant Anderson from any liability in the action. The defendant Reid's motion for a new trial was denied, and he assigns error on that judgment and on his exceptions pendente lite.

H. A. Woodward, Augusta, for plaintiff in error.

Claud R. Caldwell, Augusta, for defendant in error.

SUTTON, Chief Judge.

1. The plaintiff in error contends that his demurrer should have been sustained because the petition shows on its face 'that the damage to the plaintiff's car was the result of a negligent act of a third party, which negligent act intervened between the negligence of the defendant and the injury and was in fact the proximate cause of the injury.' We do not agree that the petition shows this to be the case. Where a defendant's negligence sets in operation other causal forces which are the direct, natural, and probable consequences of that negligence, he may be held liable for injuries caused by the other forces; and where two concurrent causes naturally operate in causing an injury, there may be a recovery against both or either of the actors, even though the degree of care owed by them to the injured person be different. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ellis, 54 Ga.App. 783, 785(2), 189 S.E. 559, and cases cited. Except in clear and indisputable cases, questions of negligence, proximate cause, intervening efficient causes, etc., are questions for a jury and are not to be resolved on demurrer. Wilson v. Ray, 64 Ga.App. 540, 543, 13 S.E.2d 848. This is not such a clear and indisputable case. Under the pleadings, depending on the evidence, a jury may have been authorized to find that both defendants were negligent and that their negligence combined naturally and causally to produce the plaintiff's injuries, or that the negligence attributable to Reid alone was the proximate cause of such injuries.

2. We are of the opinion that the evidence authorized the finding that the negligence of the driver of the defendant Reid's taxicab was the proximate cause of the damage to the plaintiff's automobile. John Locker, who was driving the plaintiff's automobile, testified: 'I am employed by the Modern Roofing and Metal Works, Inc. I was driving a Buick automobile belonging to my employers on the Milledgeville Road on August 4, 1950, at about 10 p. m., traveling east toward Augusta, Georgia. The car just ahead of me going east belonged to Mrs. Elizabeth R. Hill, and the car to the rear of me going east belonged to Paul Hammond Anderson. The lady in the car in front of me gave a hand signal indicating that she intended to turn her car to the left to cross the Milledgeville Road. I slowed down and held out my hand. Mrs. Hill was about sixty feet in front of me. She had already begun turning left when the taxicab of the defendant Reid passed me going very fast, and when the lady turned her car to the left, the taxicab ran into her car. The taxicab went off the road onto the shoulder of the road as it struck the car driven by the lady. The taxicab's right front fender struck the left front fender of the lady's car. The impact sent her car down the road about 100 feet. As soon as I saw that there would be a collision, I stopped my car. The car in my rear belonging to Paul Hammond Anderson plunged into the rear of my car, and that is how my car was damaged. * * * I don't know what distance there was between my car and the car driven by the lady--maybe 50 or 60 feet. There was ample space between my car and the lady's car for me to stop my car without running into the wreck just ahead of me, and I did stop my car before reaching the place where the two cars had collided. My attention was first attracted to the danger ahead of me when the taxicab passed me going very fast. I had begun to apply my brakes before he hit Mrs. Hill's car. * * * I had ample time to stop my car before reaching the place of accident. My car was hit in the back by the car in the rear of my car. Paul Hammond Anderson was driving that car. He said that he could not stop his car in time. My car is equipped with those red stop lights on the rear of it. They come on and flare up with a bright red light when the brakes are applied. They were in good order.'

Paul Hammond Anderson, one of the defendants, testified: 'I was coming from Atlanta to Augusta on Highway 78, and was five or six miles from Augusta when this accident occurred. When the accident occurred, I was driving immediately to the rear of the plaintiff's car. I had been following the plaintiff's car since we left the gate at Camp Gordon. There were several cars in front of it. Just before the accident, the taxicab of the...