Reid v. State, 159

• Decision Date: 07 May 1952
• Docket Number: No. 159,159
• Citation: 88 A.2d 478,200 Md. 89
• Parties: REID v. STATE.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 89

200 Md. 89

88 A.2d 478

REID v. STATE.

No. 159.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 7, 1952.

Reargument Denied June 10, 1952.

See 89 A.2d 227.

Harold Buchman, Baltimore, for appellant.

A. T. Hartman, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Hall Hammond, Atty. Gen., John E. Raine, Jr., State's Atty. Baltimore County, John J. Brennan, Asst. State's Atty. Baltimore County, and Frank H. Newell, III, Asst. State's Atty. Baltimore County, all of Towson, on the brief), for appellee.

Before MARBURY, C. J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ.

MARBURY, Chief Judge.

Appellant was convicted of rape before two judges, sitting without a jury, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. He was sentenced to be hanged. The testimony was concluded at 11:15 A.M., and the court recessed. The judges returned forty-three minutes later, rendered a verdict of guilty, and imposed the death sentence. Appellant was then (but not now) represented by counsel appointed by the court, a well-known and capable lawyer of the Baltimore County bar. No request was made for any investigation by the Probation Department, and no such investigation was asked for by the court, nor was there any psychiatric or medical examination asked for or made. On account of these facts, the appellant claims that there was a serious abuse of discretion by the court, that the sentence should be reversed and the case remanded for further investigation and for the imposition of a new sentence after such investigation.

The imposition of sentence in a criminal case in this State is a matter peculiarly within the province of the trial judge who hears the case and sees the witnesses and the accused. It is not cruel and unusual punishment if it is within the statutory limits prescribed for the crime of which the accused is found guilty, and the trial court alone has the right to determine the penalty within these limits. Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 A. 417; Duker v. State, 162 Md. 546, 160 A. 279; Walker v. State, 186 Md. 440, 47 A.2d 47; Taylor v. State, 187 Md. 306, 49 A.2d 787; Weinecke v. State, 188 Md. 172, 52 A.2d 73; Abbott v. State, 188 Md. 310, 52 A.2d 489; Newton v. State, 193 Md. 200, 66 A.2d 473; Heath v. State, Md., 85 A.2d 43. The sentence in the case before us is within the stattuory limit. Code, Article 27, Sec. 544. We have been referred to several cases from other jurisdictions which allow their appellate courts to review sentences. Among these cases are Haynes v. State, 137 Neb. 69, 288 N.W. 382; Guerin v. State, 138 Neb. 724, 295 N.W. 274; Hulsey v. State, 65 Okl.Cr. 382, 87 P.2d 1110; and State v. Spears, 130 Iowa 294, 106 N.W. 746. As we have pointed out, the law in this State is different, and we have no such power, so that the decisions in these cases are not authority for our taking any such action.

Where the punishment is grossly and inordinately disproportionate to the offense, 'so that the sentence is evidently dictated, not by a sense of public duty, but by passion, prejudice, ill will or any other unworthy motive, the judgment ought to be reversed, and the cause remanded for a more just sentence.' Mitchell v. State, 82 Md. 527, 534, 34 A. 246, 247. Apple v. State, 190 Md. 661, 668, 59 A.2d 509; Von den Bosch v. Swenson, Md., 70 A.2d 599. The reports of this court disclose no case in which such action has ever been taken by it. In the case of Coates v. State, 180 Md. 502, 25 A.2d 676, 678, a nineteen--year-old boy was the defendant in nine separate indictments, to some of which he plead guilty, and on others of which he was tried before the court. He was sentenced to ten years in each of the nine cases, to run consecutively, making a total of ninety years. He was not given counsel, and there was no cross-examination of any witnesses. We said in that case: 'The sentence of ninety years may well be considered as a sentence for life and the proceedings in these cases seem too superficial and hurried to serve as foundation for life imprisonment.' We reversed the judgments and sent the cases back for a new trial, but this was because we thought that, under all the circumstances, the requirements of due process had been violated by the non-appointment of counsel. The length of the total sentences was only one of the factors influencing us in reaching that conclusion.

In the case before us, we see no occasion to hold that the punishment comes within the exception suggested by Mitchell v. State, supra. The crime was an atrocious one, apparently without any mitigating circumstances, and there is nothing in the record to show that the appellant was imbecilic or moronic, or that there was any need for a psychiatric examination. He contends that such an examination should be made in all sex cases, and cites in support of this theory various Law Review articles. There is, however, no such rule of law in this State. The Legislature has left to the trial judges the right to determine what is the proper punishment within the statutory limits, and, in assessing that punishment, the judges have ample authority, if they think it...