Reid v. Town of West Hartford
| Decision Date | 26 October 2017 |
| Docket Number | CV156031283S |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Carol Reid v. Town of West Hartford et al |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
The plaintiff, Carol George Reid, executrix for the estate of Thomas George, brings this administrative appeal from two decisions of presiding human rights referees of the Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities (CHRO).[1] The first decision, dated March 24 2011, dismissed George's CHRO complaint alleging that the defendant town of West Hartford (the town) had violated General Statutes § 46a-64. Specifically George claimed that the town had discriminated against him in public accommodation by denying him rear-yard pick up of his trash barrels. The second decision, dated October 1, 2015 dismissed the remainder of George's complaint, brought under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as authorized by General Statutes § 46a-58(a).
The record shows as follows. George was a resident of the town. In a complaint filed with the CHRO on June 3, 2009, George claimed that he was " legally blind and [has] a mobility impairment that substantially limits [his] ability to walk." (Return of Record, ROR, Vol. 4, p. 705.) George also alleged that the town required residents to place their trash barrels at the bottom of their driveway for collection by the town's trash hauler. While the trash hauler offered a service of moving the barrels to the street for a fee, the town also developed a program that provided for free service for residents who were handicapped and below a certain income threshold.
George alleged further that he was denied participation in this program because he refused to provide documentation regarding his income. In his CHRO complaint, George claimed that he should have been included in this program as a reasonable accommodation under § 46a-64(a) and title II of the ADA for his alleged disability, regardless of his income. George never paid for the rear yard collection while the town, for a period in 2008, agreed to place him under the program, and once the town disallowed him, George never paid the trash hauler under the special fee program. (ROR, Vol. 1, p. 38.)
As indicated, in an order dated March 24, 2011, the then-presiding human rights referee dismissed George's § 46a-64(a) claim. He declared: (ROR, Vol. 3, p. 485.)
On October 17, 2011, George passed away. On December 2, 2013 the presiding human rights referee allowed George's daughter, the plaintiff, to be substituted for him as the complainant. (ROR, Vol. 3, p. 374.) On April 25, 2014, the town's motion to dismiss was denied and the complaint was certified for a hearing. The hearing consisted of a stipulation of facts and the filing of memoranda of law. As indicated, the presiding human rights referee ruled on October 1, 2015 that George's complaint should be dismissed. The referee concluded that: " Congress only intended for the ADA to prohibit 'trait-based' discrimination and to require covered entities to provide reasonable accommodations or modifications that minimize or eliminated obstacles which exist separate and distinct from an individual's inherent capabilities." (ROR, Vol. 1, p. 28.) This appeal followed on November 13, 2015.
On April 22, 2016, the town moved to dismiss on grounds of lack of aggrievement. On September 1, 2016, the court denied the motion. The court's rationale was that a complaint filed with the CHRO " may be continued upon the death of the complainant 'so long as the estate of the complainant seeks to pursue a claim for monetary relief to which the complainant may be entitled, '" citing Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Greenwich Catholic Elementary School System, 202 Conn. 609, 610, 522 A.2d 785 (1987). Here, George, in his 2009 complaint, had asked that the CHRO " secure for [him] any remedy to which [he] may be entitled." This would be construed to cover the awarding of damages for emotional distress that the CHRO had the authority to award under § 46a-58(a). Administrative appeals were to be given a strong presumption of jurisdiction. Kindl v. Dept of Social Services, 69 Conn.App. 563, 567, 795 A.2d 622 (2002).
At the hearing of this case on April 6, 2017, the court reviewed the prior ruling regarding aggrievement[2] and stated that the prior ruling, in denying a motion to dismiss, had only addressed the issue of the validity of the pleadings. The plaintiff was also under an obligation to prove " the truth of [the] allegations" as well. Conn. Indep. Util. Workers, Local 12924 v. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control, 312 Conn. 265, 273, 92 A.3d 247 (2014). See also State Library v. Freedom of Information Commission, 240 Conn. 824, 832-33, 694 A.2d 1235 (1997), discussing General Statutes § 4-183(i), permitting the taking of evidence in an administrative appeal. Where the administrative record is not specific on aggrievement, it is appropriate to hold an evidentiary hearing in the Superior Court to determine proof of aggrievement.[3] Accordingly, on May 16, 2017, the plaintiff presented her evidence of aggrievement at a hearing and supplemental briefs were filed by the parties.
The issue becomes whether the plaintiff met her burden to show aggrievement. Missionary Society of Connecticut v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 272 Conn. 647, 650, 866 A.2d 538 (2005). The test for classical aggrievement is as follows: " We next turn to the plaintiffs' claim that the trial court improperly determined that they had not established classical aggrievement in either appeal. Before addressing the plaintiffs' specific claims, we note the following generally applicable legal principles and the relevant standard of review. As indicated previously, the 'fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: [F]irst, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the challenged action], as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specifically and injuriously affected by the [challenged action] . . . Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected . . .
" 'Mindful that it is a fundamental concept of judicial administration that no person is entitled to set the machinery of the courts in operation except to obtain redress for an injury he has suffered or to prevent an injury he may suffer, either in an individual or a representative capacity . . . [a plaintiff is] required to plead and prove some injury in accordance with our rule on aggrievement . . . Accordingly, [i]t [is] the function of the trial court to determine . . . first, whether the [plaintiff's] allegations if they should be proved would constitute aggrievement as a matter of law, and second, if as a matter of law they would constitute aggrievement, then whether [the plaintiff] proved the truth of [the] allegations . . .'" Mayer v. Historic Dist. Comm'n of Groton, 325 Conn. 765, 781-82, 160 A.3d 333 (2017).
It is the plaintiff's burden to prove a New England Rehabilitation Hospital of Hartford, Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 226 Conn. 105, 127, 627 A.2d 1257 (1993). " Although one may establish aggrievement by establishing the possibility of harm, mere speculation that harm may ensue is not an adequate basis for finding aggrievement." Goldfisher v. Connecticut Siting Council, 95 Conn.App. 193, 198, 895 A.2d 286 (2006).
The plaintiff's proof at the hearing and in her brief may be summarized as regards damages as follows:[4] The prior ruling on aggrievement had noted that George's complaint had alleged that the town had denied him services and that he was seeking " any remedy to which I may be entitled" including damages. The plaintiff was also called to the stand to give evidence.[5]
The plaintiff testified that her father lived in his house in town from 1950 to his death in 2011. He lived alone after the death of his wife in 1989. Her father was a tough and independent person, who " soldiered-on" through difficulties. On the barrel issue, she would bring the barrels to the curb when she visited every two or three weeks. He did not have a lot of trash over this time period. He also believed as a town taxpayer who was disabled that he was entitled to an accommodation. He would therefore not complete the financial application. On cross examination, the...
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