Workers v. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control

• Decision Date: 17 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 19009.,19009.
• Citation: 312 Conn. 265,92 A.3d 247
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CONNECTICUT INDEPENDENT UTILITY WORKERS, LOCAL 12924, et al. v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITY CONTROL.

312 Conn. 265

92 A.3d 247

CONNECTICUT INDEPENDENT UTILITY WORKERS, LOCAL 12924, et al.

v.DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITY CONTROL.

No. 19009.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 19, 2014.

Decided June 17, 2014.

Seth A. Hollander, assistant attorney general, with whom were Clare E. Kindall, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellant (defendant).

J. William Gagne, Jr., West Hartford, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js.

McDONALD, J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs, Connecticut IndependentUtility Workers, Local 12924, and The United Steel Workers, Local 12000 Union, pleaded sufficient facts to establish that they are aggrieved by the decision of the defendant, the Department of Public Utility Control (department),¹ denying the plaintiffs' petition for a declaratory ruling. The plaintiffs had requested that the department issue a ruling stating, inter alia, that it had violated the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (act), General Statutes § 4–166 et seq., by failing to promulgate regulations prescribing the rights of persons designated as “participants” in uncontested proceedings before the department. The department now appeals from the trial court's judgment setting aside the department's decision, contending that the trial court improperly concluded that it had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' administrative appeal and that the department is required to promulgate such regulations.² We conclude that the trial court should have dismissed the plaintiffs' administrative appeal for lack of aggrievement.

It is important to emphasize at the outset that the resolution of this appeal turns on the question of whether the plaintiffs were aggrieved by the department's declaratory ruling. Nevertheless, to put the trial court's decision and the parties' arguments in context, it is necessary to describe an earlier proceeding before the department that prompted the plaintiffs to seek the declaratory ruling.

With that framework in mind, the record reveals the following undisputed facts. In late 2009, the department initiated an investigation, pursuant to its authority under General Statutes § 16–11, after it learned that two gas companies ³ had announced layoffs only months after the department approved rate increases based on the gas companies' representations that certain staffing levels were necessary for the safe and efficient operation of their gas distribution systems. The department designated the investigatory proceedings as “Docket No. 09–09–08” and elected to conduct public hearings on the matter. The plaintiffs requested party status and the right to cross-examination, which the department denied.⁴ The department instead designated the plaintiffs as participants and allowed them to submit material, present oral argument and file written exceptions to its draft decision. In a February 11, 2010 decision regarding the results of its investigation, entitled “[DEPARTMENT] INVESTIGATION INTO THE CONTEMPLATED WORKFORCE REDUCTIONS BY [THE GAS COMPANIES],” the department concluded that it “will not prevent the [gas companies] from prudently managing their workforce levels.... [T]here is insufficient evidence presented in this proceeding to indicate that the [gas companies] will not be able to meet their obligations to provide safe and reliable gas distribution services or to provide for the safety of their employees.” ⁵

In July, 2010, the plaintiffs filed with the department a petition for a declaratory ruling pursuant to General Statutes § 4–176, which is the subject of this appeal. The plaintiffs' petition sought a declaratory ruling that would establish that: (1) the department's failure to promulgate regulations regarding its use of “participant” status in uncontested proceedings and the rights attendant to such status violated the act; and (2) the department's designation of the plaintiffs in the 2009 investigatory proceedings as “participants,” rather than as parties, and its selective limitations on the plaintiffs' rights therein, violated the act and the plaintiffs' due process rights.⁶

Prior to issuing its decision, the department informed the plaintiffs that it would issue a ruling only with regard to those aspects of the plaintiffs' petition that applied generically to the use of “participant status” in department proceedings. The department indicated that the conduct in Docket No. 09–09–08 would not be considered because the declaratory ruling process under § 4–176 is not an available conduit to review procedural rulings made in previous proceedings. Thereafter, the department denied the petition as to the remaining matters. It concluded that its use of the participant designation did not need to be promulgated as a regulation because such a designation neither bestows rights nor yields a substantive result, and it is not a rule of practice. Rather, the designation is an internal, routine procedure for managing dockets in uncontested proceedings, and any such rights and limitations are subsequently determined by the officer presiding over the uncontested proceeding. The department further distinguished its obligations under the act to promulgate regulations governing procedures in contested cases versus uncontested proceedings.

The plaintiffs appealed from the department's decision to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 4–183. The department thereafter filed a brief in opposition to the appeal in which it asserted, inter alia, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had failed to plead or prove aggrievement.⁷ The court heard oral argument but conducted no evidentiary hearing, after which it sustained the plaintiffs' appeal. In setting forth the background to the issues presented, the trial court stated in its memorandum of decision that the record reflected the following facts: “The [plaintiffs] collectively represent some 400 Connecticut residents employed in the natural gas industry. As a result of two rate case decisions rendered by the [department] ... the [gas companies] were authorized to lay off a number of employees, including approximately thirty-five individuals represented by the [plaintiffs].” ⁸ In rejecting the department's jurisdictional argument, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs “have a bona fide interest in the ability to advocate for the personal and legal interests of their members through meaningful participation in proceedings before the [department]. As an example, [the] plaintiffs cite the denial of the right to cross-examine witnesses upon being named ‘participants' during an uncontested hearing before the [department] in 2009 as evidence of the manner in which that interest has been and will likely continue to be adversely impacted by the absence of an established rule concerning the use of participant status in uncontested hearings, and by the refusal of the [department] to adopt and make available to the public such regulations.” On the merits, the court concluded that the department was required under the act to promulgate regulations setting forth the nature and requirements of its informal proceedings to avoid vesting administrative officers with unbridled discretion in the conduct of such hearings. Accordingly, the court set aside the declaratory ruling and ordered the department to grant the plaintiffs' petition insofar as necessary to ensure compliance with the court's decision.

On appeal to this court, the department renews its claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' appeal because the plaintiffs neither pleaded nor proved that they are aggrieved by the department's ruling on their petition. The department further contends that the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief because they failed to demonstrate prejudice to their substantial rights as required under § 4–183(j). We agree with the department's jurisdictional claim.

“If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause.... A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. When ... the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record....

“Standing is established by showing that the party claiming it is authorized by statute to bring suit or is classically aggrieved.... The fundamental test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: [F]irst, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in [the subject matter of the challenged action], as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second,the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the [challenged action].” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, 270 Conn. 133, 153–54, 851 A.2d 1113 (2004).

Thus, “[m]indful that it is a fundamental concept of judicial administration that no person is entitled to set the machinery of the courts in operation except to obtain redress for an injury he has suffered or to prevent an injury he may suffer, either in an individual or a representative capacity ... the plaintiffs were required to plead and prove some injury in accordance with our rule on aggrievement.” (Citation omitted.) Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 495, 400 A.2d 726 (1978). Accordingly, “[i]t was the function of the trial court to determine ... first, whether the [plaintiffs'] allegations if they should be proved would constitute aggrievement as a matter...