Bruno v. Bruno

• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: Before HENNESSEY; WILKINS
• Citation: 422 N.E.2d 1369,384 Mass. 31
• Parties: Mary J. BRUNO v. Robert E. BRUNO et al. 1
• Decision Date: 07 July 1981

Page 1369

422 N.E.2d 1369 384 Mass. 31 Mary J. BRUNO
v.
Robert E. BRUNO et al. ¹ Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester. Argued April 9, 1981.
Decided July 7, 1981.

Page 1370

Joseph C. Cove, Uxbridge, for defendants.

C. A. Peairs, Westboro, for plaintiff.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and BRAUCHER, WILKINS, LIACOS and NOLAN, JJ.

WILKINS, Justice.

On January 10, 1977, the plaintiff, then ninety-nine years old, executed a deed conveying certain property in the town of Douglas to her nephew and his wife, the defendants. The plaintiff commenced this action in the Probate Court for Worcester County, seeking a determination that the deed was null and void and a judgment directing a reconveyance of the property. The judge concluded that the deed was procured by undue influence and declared the deed to be void. ² The Appeals Court concluded,[384 Mass. 32] on the defendants' appeal, that the judge's subsidiary findings did not warrant his ultimate finding that the deed to the property had been procured by undue influence. BRUNO V. BRUNO, --- MASS.APP. ---, 411 N.E.2D 1324 (1980)^A. We granted the plaintiff's application for further appellate review and now express our agreement with the Appeals Court's conclusion. We also consider the plaintiff's argument that we may look to facts not found by the judge which, it is said, were warranted by the evidence and support the judge's ultimate finding of undue influence. We conclude that, even considering certain additional facts, undue influence was not established.

The facts found by the judge did not warrant his finding that the deed was procured by undue influence. He found that Robert, the nephew, had a close family relationship with the plaintiff. At the time of the conveyance, the plaintiff was keeping her own house, was able to take care of herself in all the ways that implies, and was not dependent on others for her livelihood. In late November, 1976, the plaintiff approached Robert and asked him if he would be interested in purchasing the property for $5,000, a price Robert had offered her many years previously and which, at that time, had been the fair market value of the property. Robert retained an attorney who prepared a deed. Together they visited the plaintiff on January 10, 1977. The attorney explained the deed and its consequences to the plaintiff. She was then of sound mind. She did not, however, understand the nature and consequences of her signature on the deed. Robert paid the local real estate taxes on the property for 1977 and 1978.

Page 1371

The judge concluded that, as a result of the plaintiff's advanced age, "a most subtle kind of undue influence was sufficient[384 Mass. 33] to overcome the plaintiff's will and that said undue influence in fact was carried out by the defendant," but without any malice. He further concluded that because of the plaintiff's advanced age, Robert, and perhaps his attorney, should have dealt "with the plaintiff with extraordinary care taking substantial steps in order to insure the fact that the plaintiff knew the full consequences of her act."

We agree with the conclusions of the Appeals Court, based on ample citation of authority unnecessary to repeat, that (1) the deed was valid unless it was procured by fraud or undue influence and (2) the plaintiff's advanced age (in light of her soundness of mind) and her lack of legal representation did not alone make out a case of undue influence. There was no evidence that the defendants exercised any influence over the plaintiff. She initiated the conveyance and selected the price. The factors present in this case "may suggest that the (plaintiff) was susceptible to influence but they show neither 'the fact of ... improper influence exerted' nor 'submission to the overmastering effect of such unlawful conduct.' Neill v. Brackett, 234 Mass. 367, 370, 126 N.E. 93 (1920)." O'Brien v. Wellesley College, 346 Mass. 162, 172, 190 N.E.2d 879 (1963). Compare the O'Brien case and Miles v. Caples, 362 Mass. 107, 113, 284 N.E.2d 231 (1972), with Popko v. Janik, 341 Mass. 212, 215, 167 N.E.2d 853 (1960), Reilly v. McAuliffe, 331 Mass. 144, 148-149, 117 N.E.2d 811 (1954), McDonald v. MacNeil, 300 Mass. 350, 352-353, 15 N.E.2d 460 (1938), and Eddy v. Eddy, 281 Mass. 156, 163-164, 183 N.E. 268 (1932).

We further agree with the Appeals Court that the defendants did not owe any greater duty to the plaintiff because of their relationship. The plaintiff was not dependent on either or both of the defendants in personal or business affairs. No fiduciary relationship or relationship of trust and confidence was found or shown on the evidence. Robert saw the plaintiff two or three times a year. There may have been a relationship of mutual regard, but mere respect for the judgment of another or trust in his character is not enough to constitute a confidential relationship. Meskell v. Meskell, 355 Mass. 148, 151, 243 N.E.2d 804 (1969). Comstock v. Livingston, 210 Mass. 581, 584, 97 N.E. 106 (1912). Contrast the present case [384 Mass. 34] with Samia v. Central Oil Co., 339 Mass. 101, 112, 158 N.E.2d 469 (1959), Stetson v. French, 321 Mass. 195, 199-200, 72 N.E.2d 410 (1947), and Hawkes v. Lackey, 207 Mass. 424, 431-432, 93 N.E. 828 (1911).

We believe that principles of law established by our cases concerning undue influence are substantially in accord with those set forth in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 319(1) (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1977). ³ Clearly, unfair persuasion of one party under the domination of another constitutes undue influence under the law of Massachusetts. The definition of undue influence, which appears in the first portion of § 319(1), is substantially equivalent to the emphasis in our cases on the domination of the will or the destruction of free agency. See Surrender of Minor Children, 344 Mass. 230, 234-235, 181 N.E.2d 836 (1962); Neill v. Brackett, 234 Mass. 367, 369-370, 126 N.E. 93 (1920).

Similarly, the alternative definition of undue influence...