Reiman v. Pacific Development Soc.
Decision Date | 11 February 1930 |
Citation | 132 Or. 82,284 P. 575 |
Parties | REIMAN v. PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT SOCIETY ET AL. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
In Banc.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Clatsop County; H. K. Zimmerman, Judge.
Action by P. Reiman against the Pacific Development Society and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Lamar Tooze, of Portland (Jaureguy & Tooze and G. A Heikkila, all of Portland, on the brief), for appellant.
G. C Fulton, of Astoria (Enoch Mathison and A. C. Fulton, both of Astoria, on the brief), for respondents.
This is a civil action of libel. There are three defendants; one of them is alleged to be the publisher, another the printer, and the third the editor of a newspaper published at Astoria, in the Finnish language, entitled "the Toveri." The complaint avers that this publication has a large circulation in this state among the Finnish people of whom the plaintiff is one. He describes himself as having resided in this state "for many years" and as a "member of the Brotherhood Lodge (Veljeysseura) at Astoria, Oregon, a Finnish fraternal organization." This article, as reproduced in the complaint, was entitled, "Portland, Ore., Contents: Serious matters are discussed in serious tones," and first mentions a motion which the plaintiff had made at a previous meeting of the local Brotherhood Lodge (Veljeysseura) suggesting that support be withdrawn from the Toveri and the action taken by the lodge thereon. Since it is not contended that this portion of the article defamed the plaintiff, we shall postpone quoting from it to the place he declares is defamatory. The following is the portion complained against:
The writer then discusses the "many choirs, orchestras, dramatic clubs, and young people's clubs," which he declares "have been so fervently boosted" lately, and leaves the inference that the activity in behalf of these is intended to destroy the present Finnish organizations. This portion of the article makes no mention whatever of the plaintiff, but possibly leaves the impression that the support given to these new organizations has been prompted by a desire to destroy the existing societies. The article does not recite that any improper methods have been employed in the support of these new organizations. The complaint alleges no special damages, but seeks recovery of $15,000 general damages. The defendant demurred to it on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the demurrer was sustained, and, from the resulting judgment, the plaintiff has appealed.
He frankly concedes: "Since no special damages are alleged by the plaintiff, it may be conceded at the outset that plaintiff's right to recover general damages (and therefore the sufficiency of his complaint) depends upon whether the article is such that the Court may say as a matter of law that it is libelous per se, or more accurately, that it is actionable per se."
He contends that the article " * * * naturally and obviously imputes to the plaintiff the following: (1) That plaintiff is an agitator who is trying to disrupt the Brotherhood Lodge, the S. T. organization, local workers' organization and the workers' communist party. (2) That plaintiff went to the Central States to slander the Western Miners' Union; (3) That plaintiff associated himself with the Industrial Workers of the World in breaking up the Western Miners' Union; (4) That the alleged slander by plaintiff of the Western Miners' Union caused the Western Miners' Union to be broken up and their meeting hall to be destroyed by dynamite; (5) That plaintiff and the Industrial Workers of the World after breaking up the Western Miners' Union and dynamiting their meeting hall were satisfied and 'had time to hunt for new locations and new fields of endeavor where they could carry on similar work of destruction.'
"Plaintiff asserts that the foregoing charges impute to the plaintiff the commission of the crime of criminal syndicalism and sabotage as that crime is defined by § 2025-1, Oregon Laws."
Much space is consumed in the briefs in a discussion of this court's recent decision in Ruble v. Kirkwood, 125 Or. 316, 266 P. 252. The plaintiff seems to be alarmed lest that decision is a holding that we have merged the two actions of slander and of libel into one, and have determined to govern the union of the two by the principles applicable to the action of slander. It seems desirable, therefore, at the outset, to take notice of the fact, that, in the absence of any special damage, an action for libel affords redress for some of the injurious consequences of defamatory words not recognized by an action of slander. Of course, an action for libel must be predicated upon "written" words which includes any printed, painted, or other nontransient method of conveying a thought. Willetts v. Scudder, 72 Or. 535, 144 P. 87. The action of slander dispenses with the necessity for the "writing." But the more important difference between the two actions consists of the fact that libel undertakes to grant redress for all of the injurious consequences inflicted by the defamatory words, whereas one defamed by another's oral communications can secure redress, in the absence of special injury, only in the event the injury can be pigeon-holed into certain well-defined classifications recognized by the action of slander. From Odgers on Libel and Slander (6th Ed.) p. 2, we quote: "If the words, being written and published or printed and published, disparage the plaintiff or tend to bring him into ridicule and contempt," they constitute the foundation for an action of libel, but, if the words are spoken, and occasion no special damage, they constitute the foundation for an action...
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