Reinmiller v. State

• Decision Date: 09 March 1927
• Citation: 93 Fla. 462,111 So. 633
• Parties: REINMILLER v. STATE.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

111 So. 633

93 Fla. 462

REINMILLER v. STATE.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

March 9, 1927

Error to Criminal Court of Record, Duval County; James M. Peeler Judge.

H. P Reinmiller was convicted of maintaining a gambling place, and he brings error.

Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Evidence held to show that association of which defendant was manager conducted contests of speed of dogs on which money was wagered (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 5514). The evidence considered and construed to show plainly the wagering of money upon the result of the contests of speed of dogs, which contests are conducted by the association of which the plaintiff in error was manager.

Horse racing and dog racing are not prohibited by statute, and neither is gambling or a game of chance per se. Horse racing and dog racing are neither prohibited by statute of this state, and neither is the one or the other gambling or a game of chance per se.

Selling certificates entitling purchaser of ticket on dog winning race to participate in purse, created by buying certificates on dogs, results in wager (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, §§ 5499 5514). Held, that the procedure which is shown by the evidence in this case in the selling of certificates which entitle the holder to participate in a purse, in the event that the ticket purchased is on the winning dog, which purse is created by other persons buying like certificates on the same dog and other dogs in the race, when indulged in by the so-called investors in the so-called certificates, results in the actual wager of money or other thing of value that the purchaser of the ticket will be successful in selecting the winner of the race.

Purpose of statute held prevention of keeping house or other place for gaming or gambling; house kept for wagering of money or other thing by game prohibited or not falls within inhibition of statute (Rev. Gen. St. 1920, § 5499). The purpose and intent of the section of the statute under discussion was to prohibit, not the gaming or gambling itself, but the keeping of a house or other place for any manner of gaming or gambling. If money or other thing of value is staked or wagered therein, upon any result or event whatsoever, such house falls within the inhibition of this statute, whether the means adopted for the decision of the question as to who is the winner or loser of the amount wagered be a game prohibited by law or not.

COUNSEL

Marks, Marks & Holt, Wm. A. Hallowes, Jr., and Miles W. Lewis, all of Jacksonville, for plaintiff in error.

Shutts & Bowen, of Miami, amici curiae.

J. B. Johnson, Atty. Gen., and Roy Campbell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

BUFORD J.

In this case plaintiff in error was informed against in the criminal court of record of Duval County, Fla., the information containing two counts, and being as follows:

'In the name and by authority of the state of Florida, L. D. Howell, county solicitor for the county of Duval, prosecuting for the state of Florida in the said county under oath, information makes that H. P. Reinmiller, of the county of Duval and state of Florida, on the eleventh day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hunderd and twenty-six, in the county and state aforesaid, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously have, keep, exercise, and maintain a certain place commonly known as the Jacksonville Kennel Club in Duval county, Fla., which said place was then and there kept, exercised, and maintained by him, the said H. P. Reinmiller, for the purpose of gaming and gambling on races run by dogs, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Florida.

Second Count.

'And for a second count of this information your informant aforesaid upon his oath aforesaid further information makes that H. P. Reinmiller, of the county of Duval and state of Florida, on the eleventh day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred twenty-six, in the county and state aforesaid, being then and there the president of the Jacksonville Kennel club, a corporation, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously have, keep, exercise and maintain a certain place commonly known as the Jacksonville Kennel Club, in Duval county, Fla., for the purpose of gaming and gambling for money and other things of value, on the result of contests of speed of certain animals, to wit, dogs, contrary to the form of the statute in case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state of Florida.'

The accused was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty to the information. He was tried before a jury, and found guilty in the general verdict, and sentenced under the first count of the information to pay a fine of $150 and costs, and in default thereof to be confined in the county jail at hard labor for a period of five months; and under the second count he was sentenced to pay a fine of $100 and costs. From this judgment and sentence writ of error was taken. There were five assignments of error, as follows:

'(1) The trial court erred in refusing to grant the motion of the plaintiff in error, H. P. Reinmiller, to instruct the jury to find the defendant not guilty on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient to support a verdict of guilty.

'(2) The trial court erred in refusing to set aside the verdict rendered in this case, and to grant plaintiff in error, H. P. Reinmiller, a new trial upon the ground that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.

'(3) The trial court erred in refusing to set aside the verdict and grant plaintiff in error a new trial on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the law.

'(4) The trial court erred in refusing to set aside the verdict and grant plaintiff in error a new trial on the ground that the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence.

'(5) The trial court erred in denying the motion of the defendant for a new trial.'

The assignments of error are addressed to the sufficiency of the evidence. If it may be said that there was a lack of sufficient evidence to show the guilt of the defendant at the close of the state's case, the defendant voluntarily took the stand and supplied the deficiencies which existed in testimony up to that time. The probative force of the testimony, when taken as a whole, shows that the defendant managed and operated what is known as a dog race track in Duval county, Fla., and that, in connection with this track, he directed and managed the operation of certain booths where pools were made on the races run by the dogs, and that for this service he and his associates took compensation in the sum of 10 per cent. of the amount received at the booths. As we understand the testimony, it shows that the manner of operating the business was as follows: The accused and his associates constructed or procured a race track built for the purpose of racing dogs that in each race a number of dogs are entered, and a prize is posted by the association to be awarded to the owner of each the first, second, and third dog in the order of running the race....