Reiterman v. Westinghouse, Inc., Docket No. 45897
Decision Date | 03 June 1981 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 45897 |
Citation | 106 Mich.App. 698,308 N.W.2d 612 |
Parties | Linda REITERMAN, Administratrix of the Estate of Thomas A. Reiterman, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WESTINGHOUSE, INC., a foreign corporation, and J. L. Hudson Co., a Michigan corporation, Defendants, and General Electric Company, a New York corporation, Jointly and severally, Defendant-Appellant. 106 Mich.App. 698, 308 N.W.2d 612 |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[106 MICHAPP 700] Boleslaus I. Stanczyk by John P. Jacobs, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
David D. Kohl, Southfield, for Linda Reiterman.
[106 MICHAPP 701] Before BASHARA, P. J., and T. M. BURNS and WALSH, JJ.
ON REHEARING
Defendant General Electric Company (G.E.) filed a hybrid motion for summary/accelerated judgment asserting that plaintiff had failed to commence an action against it within the three-year statutory limitation for wrongful death actions. The trial court denied the motion, and G.E. was granted leave to appeal. On June 20, 1980, this panel affirmed the trial court's ruling in an unpublished per curiam opinion, Docket No. 45897. The cause is again before us by way of our August 26, 1980, order granting G.E.'s petition for rehearing.
On June 22, 1975, plaintiff's decedent received an electrical shock when he attempted to plug a Westinghouse electric clothes dryer into an electrical outlet. On September 24, 1975, he died as a result of injuries sustained in the accident.
Plaintiff filed the instant wrongful death action on May 2, 1977, against Westinghouse. On January 25, 1978, plaintiff filed her first amended complaint against Westinghouse, alleging a breach of warranty in the manufacture of the electrical cord on the clothes dryer. Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, again alleging a breach of warranty, against the J. L. Hudson Co., the seller of the clothes dryer, on August 27, 1978.
In October, 1978, plaintiff discovered that the electrical motor in the clothes dryer was also defective. This motor had been manufactured by the General Electric Company. On November 14, 1978, plaintiff filed her third amended complaint, adding General Electric as a defendant and alleging a breach of warranty with respect to the manufacturer of the motor.
It is well established that the statute of limitations[106 MICHAPP 702] in a wrongful death action is 3 years from the decedent's death. M.C.L. § 600.5805(7); M.S.A. § 27A.5805(7), 1 Ruhle v. Armstrong, 20 Mich.App. 573, 174 N.W.2d 292 (1969), aff'd 384 Mich. 709, 187 N.W.2d 223 (1971); Coury v. General Motors Corp., 376 Mich. 248, 137 N.W.2d 134 (1965).
Plaintiff asserts, however, that since her claim alleges breach of warranty the accrual date established in M.C.L. § 600.5833; M.S.A. § 27A.5833 is controlling. It states:
"In actions for damages based on breach of a warranty of quality or fitness the claim accrues at the time the breach of the warranty is discovered or reasonably should be discovered."
Plaintiff therefore argues that the claim did not accrue until October, 1978, when she learned of the alleged breach of warranty by G.E. through the discovery process.
The case most germane to the issue at bar is Stoneman v. Collier, 94 Mich.App. 187, 288 N.W.2d 405 (1979). Plaintiffs' decedent in Stoneman had died as the result of carbon monoxide asphyxia while operating a General Motors Corporation vehicle. A timely action was commenced against the manufacturer and installer of the exhaust system. Over three years after the death, plaintiffs attempted to add General Motors as a party defendant. Plaintiffs claimed that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until discovery of the existence of a possible cause of action. The trial [106 MICHAPP 703] court ruled that the discovery rule 2 in products liability cases is not applicable in wrongful death cases.
In affirming the trial court's decision, the Court distinguished Dyke v. Richard, 390 Mich. 739, 213 N.W.2d 185 (1973), where it was held that the statute of limitations for medical malpractice cases did not begin to run until the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the existence of the claim.
The Court stated:
" ' " Id., 192-193, 288 N.W.2d 405.
Also see, Szlinis v. Moulded Fiber Glass Co., Inc., 80 Mich.App. 55, 263 N.W.2d 282 (1977), appeal dismissed 407 Mich. 893 (1979).
Stoneman can arguably be distinguished. This plaintiff did not know that G.E. was one of the manufacturers of the machine until two months before adding it as a party defendant. In Stoneman, plaintiffs immediately knew the decedent died in a General Motors car.
However, we find the distinction to be without significance. Plaintiff knew at the date of decedent's death that the faulty machine caused his injury. At that time, it was incumbent upon her to discover, within three years, the various manufacturers of the possible faulty mechanisms. There is a plethora of case law holding that the statute of limitations is not tolled pending discovery of the identity of the alleged tortfeasor where all the other elements of the cause of action exist. See Thomas v. Ferndale Laboratories, Inc., 97 Mich.App. 718, 296 N.W.2d 160 (1980), and the cases cited therein.
Today's complex marketing and manufacturing systems commonly result in consumer products bearing one brand name although the components of the product have been manufactured by several enterprises. Our considered judgment is that the public is generally aware of this fact.
By holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of death, it is not necessary to hold void the discovery rule established in the breach of warranty statute. 3 Rather, we find as a [106 MICHAPP 705] matter of law that where a product is the instrumentality of death the fact that the product may have been defective has been manifested. It is then incumbent upon the survivors to investigate the product to determine liability.
The result reached today is in agreement with an analogous line of cases addressing the question of which of two possible statutes of limitation is applicable. In Rach v. Wise, 46 Mich.App. 729, 731-732, 208 N.W.2d 570 (1973), the general rule in those cases was succinctly stated:
"(W)hen choosing which of several statutes of limitations is applicable to a particular case(,) * * * the nature of damages sought, rather than the form of the action plaintiff has proceeded under is determinative."
In accord, State Mutual Cyclone Ins. Co. v. O & A Electric Cooperative, 381 Mich. 318, 161 N.W.2d 573 (1968).
The Court in Rach concluded that the three-year statute of limitations for personal injury cases controlled even though the action was premised on an express contract.
In the case at bar, the wrongful death of Mr. Reiterman establishes the nature of the damages sought. Hence, application of the wrongful death accrual results in consistency with the rule cited in Rach.
Our previous decision relied heavily upon two cases which hold that the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations is applicable in wrongful death actions. Weiss v. Bigman, 84 Mich.App. 487, 270 N.W.2d 5 (1978), and Olijnyk v. Harrison Community Hospital, Inc., 80 Mich.App. 366, 263 N.W.2d 33 (1977). Upon further reflection, we find that line of cases not persuasive in this case. We agree with the Stoneman opinion where it [106 MICHAPP 706] distinguishes between medical malpractice and products liability cases due to the notice differences inherent in each type of action. Stoneman, supra, 94 Mich.App. 192, 288 N.W.2d 405. Furthermore, accrual was not the issue in those cases, which turned upon conflict between two statutory periods.
Finally, we find that the cases holding that the more specific statute controls where there is a conflict between a general and a specific statute are also not germane to this controversy. Mayor of Port Huron v. City Treasurer of Port Huron, 328 Mich. 99, 43 N.W.2d 77 (19...
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