North Coast Air Services, Ltd. v. Grumman Corp.

• Decision Date: 15 July 1988
• Docket Number: No. 54203-1,54203-1
• Citation: 759 P.2d 405,111 Wn.2d 315
• Parties: , 57 USLW 2100, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 11,933 NORTH COAST AIR SERVICES, LTD., a British Columbia Corporation; John N. Anderson, a British Columbia resident; and Thomas E. Jaffe, personal representative of the estate of Robert N. Anderson, deceased, Plaintiffs, v. GRUMMAN CORPORATION, a New York Corporation, Defendant.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 315

111 Wn.2d 315

759 P.2d 405, 57 USLW 2100, Prod.Liab.Rep.

(CCH) P 11,933

NORTH COAST AIR SERVICES, LTD., a British Columbia Corporation; John N. Anderson, a British Columbia resident and Thomas E. Jaffe, personal representative of the estate of Robert N. Anderson, deceased, Plaintiffs, v. GRUMMAN CORPORATION, a New York Corporation, Defendant.

No. 54203-1.

Supreme Court of Washington En Banc.

July 15, 1988.

Karr, Tuttle, Koch, Campbell, Mawer, Morrow & Sax, P.S., F. Lee Campbell, Tracy R. Barrus, Philip A. Talmadge, Seattle, for defendant.

Crane, Stamper, Boese, Dunham & Drury, John A. Drury, Rebecca C. Earnest, Seattle, for plaintiffs.

Bryan P. Harnetiaux, Robert H. Whaley, Spokane, amicus curiae on behalf of Washington Trial Lawyers Ass'n for plaintiffs.

Russell C. Love, Seattle, amicus curiae on behalf of Washington Defense Trial Lawyers for defendant.

BRACHTENBACH, Justice.

The United States District Court for Western Washington certified this question:

Under RCW 7.72.060(3), which requires a claimant to bring a products liability claim within three years "from the time the claimant discovered or in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered the harm and its cause," does the statute of limitations begin to run as soon as an injury occurs in which a product is involved, or is it a question for the trier of fact to determine when "in the exercise of due diligence" the product's relationship to the injury should have been discovered, with the statute of limitations running from that date.

Order, dated Aug. 5, 1987.

The lawsuit in federal district court arose from the crash of a Grumman Mallard amphibious airplane, manufactured by defendant Grumman Corporation. The crash occurred on March 5, 1974. The action was filed July 30, 1986. The plaintiffs are the corporate owner of the crashed airplane, the personal representative of the pilot killed in the crash, and the pilot's father who is also chief executive officer of the corporate owner.

The crash occurred in British Columbia. An undisputed fact submitted to us by the trial court is that an inquest was held and that investigating authorities attributed the crash to pilot error. The plaintiffs' pleadings include an affidavit by the deceased pilot's father stating that the investigating authorities also concluded there was no mechanical defect in the plane, and that he learned nothing to the contrary until more than 11 years later.

Plaintiffs allege that on May 6, 1984, the father learned that a Grumman Mallard belonging to the corporate plaintiff almost stalled on takeoff. It is alleged that a defect in the elevator control assembly could cause the elevator to freeze, leading to a crash. The father allegedly learned of other incidents involving this aircraft in which the plane crashed following a stall. The father alleges that only after these other incidents did he realize that the 1974 crash may have resulted from a similar defect. Therefore, the father began an investigation of the cause of the crash which killed his son. He alleges that he located a piece of the plane's wreckage which contains a defective elevator linkage.

Defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), or alternatively, for judgment on the pleadings or for summary judgment. The district court judge, the Honorable Carolyn R. Dimmick, denied the motion, ruling in part as follows:

Plaintiffs' complaint is not barred by RCW 7.72.060(3). For purposes of this statute of limitations as it relates to the plaintiffs' allegations and claims, the plane crash as "cause" of the "harm" to plaintiffs and the alleged cause of the crash, the design defect, are inseparable. Viewing the material allegations and evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, as here this Court must, the cause of the harm to the plaintiffs is both the crash and the alleged design defect which precipitated it. Consistent with this view of the material allegations and evidence, plaintiffs filed their complaint within three years from the time they "discovered" the cause of their harm. Although the defendant has not filed its answer, the alleged design defect and its discovery are, for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations, material and presumably disputed issues of fact. For all these reasons, dismissal or summary judgment is improper here.

Order, dated Feb. 13, 1987.

Defendant moved for reconsideration, or alternatively, for certification to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982). The federal district court on its own motion then certified to this court the above question. For reasons stated hereafter we agree with the conclusion of the federal district court that the action is not barred as a matter of law.

Defendant's position is that "a product liability claim accrues for purposes of RCW 7.72.060(3) when the claimant knew or should have known the harm and the immediately apparent basis for the harm." Brief of Appellant, at 34. Thus, defendant reasons that the action accrued at the time of the crash because plaintiff knew the harm (death of the pilot) and its cause (crash of the plane). Defendant would substitute the phrase "immediately apparent basis for the harm" for the word "cause," in the statute.

Plaintiffs contend that the statute "requires discovery of a causal connection of a product to an injury, and that it is a factual question whether a claimant has exercised due diligence in discovering that causal connection in cases in which the connection is not immediately obvious." Brief of Respondents, at 30.

The statute in question, RCW 7.72.060(3), provides: "no claim under this chapter may be brought more than three years from the time the claimant discovered or in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered the harm and its cause."

We conclude that the claimant in a product liability case must have discovered, or in the exercise of due diligence should have discovered, a factual causal relationship of the product to the harm.

That means in this case the action did not accrue at the time claimant knew of the harm (death) and knew that the apparent and immediate cause was the crash. At the time of the crash obviously the claimant knew of the harm. Equally obvious is that claimant knew the ostensible cause was the crash. Defendant would have that suffice. For reasons discussed hereafter we hold that the claimant must know or should with due diligence know that the cause in fact was an alleged defect. Whether the claimant knew or should have known will ordinarily be a question of fact. That the causal connection usually is a question of fact is recognized. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. Spray, 55 Or.App. 42, 51, 637 P.2d 182 (1981), review denied, 292 Or. 589, 644 P.2d 1130 (1982); Eisenmann v. Cantor Bros., Inc., 567 F.Supp. 1347, 1355 (N.D.Ill.1983).

Defendant argues that we should examine legislative history which defendant contends shows a legislative intent to: (1) overrule the discovery rule of Ohler v. Tacoma Gen Hosp., 92 Wash.2d 507, 598 P.2d 1358 (1979); (2) accrue the action when the claimant knew or should have known of the "immediately apparent basis" for the harm; and (3) allow statute of limitations questions to be resolved ordinarily as a matter of law. Brief of Appellant, at 21, 34.

Plaintiffs, alternatively, assert that if the statute is ambiguous, legislative history leads to their interpretation. Whether we limit ourselves to an interpretation of the statute or examine legislative history we reach the same conclusion.

Before examining the statute and its history we point out that this case illustrates the difficulties inherent in statutory construction, around which has developed an entire body of rules or canons of interpretation with an accompanying array of literature. The most-cited text comprises four volumes. J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1974-86). Volume 2A, § 45.01 n. 1 cites two pages of literature.

The most often asserted objective of interpretation is to ascertain legislative intent, a generality formulated as early as 1584 by Lord Coke. 2A N. Singer, Statutory Construction § 45.05.

The courts also recite the litany that if the words are not ambiguous, there is no need or authority for judicial interpretation.

However, this rule is deceptive in that it implies that words have intrinsic meanings....

The assertion in a judicial opinion that a statute needs no interpretation because it is "clear and unambiguous" is in reality evidence that the court has already considered and construed the act.

2A N. Singer, Statutory Construction § 45.02 (4th ed. 1984).

An alternative criteria is suggested in the canon that words are to be given their usual and ordinary meaning. State ex rel. Longview Fire Fighters, Local 828 v. Longview, 65 Wash.2d 568, 571, 399 P.2d 1 (1965).

There may be a significant difference between "intent" and "meaning." Holmes went so far as to say that "we do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means." O.W. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 207 (1920). This court has combined these approaches by holding that the Legislature's intention "is to be deduced, if possible, from what it said." Lynch v. Department of Labor & Indus., 19 Wash.2d 802, 806, 145 P.2d 265 (1944); State v. Wilbur, 110 Wash.2d 16, 18, 749 P.2d 1295 (1988). See 2A N. Singer § 45.08.

The immediate case also involves the relevance and weight of committee reports, statements made at committee meetings and in floor debate.

We recognize that the ultimate purpose of interpretation, regardless of what canons are used to assist the analytical methodology, is to determine what the statute means. That usually means ascribing to the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meaning. Intent, if ascertainable, may be of assistance, but cannot override an otherwise discernible, plain meaning.

As discussed above, if we look only to the...