Reliant Energy, Inc. v. Gonzalez

• Citation: 102 S.W.3d 868
• Decision Date: 29 April 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01-02-00679-CV.,No. 01-02-01054-CV.,01-02-00679-CV.,01-02-01054-CV.
• Parties: RELIANT ENERGY, INC., Appellant, v. Jannete GONZALEZ, as Dependent Administrator of the Estate of Guadalupe Gonzalez, Jr., Deceased, Appellee. Jannete Gonzalez, as Dependent Administrator of the Estate of Guadalupe Gonzalez, Jr., Deceased, Appellant, v. Reliant Energy, Inc., Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas

Page 868

102 S.W.3d 868

RELIANT ENERGY, INC., Appellant, v. Jannete GONZALEZ, as Dependent Administrator of the Estate of Guadalupe Gonzalez, Jr., Deceased, Appellee.

Jannete Gonzalez, as Dependent Administrator of the Estate of Guadalupe Gonzalez, Jr., Deceased, Appellant, v. Reliant Energy, Inc., Appellee.

No. 01-02-00679-CV.

No. 01-02-01054-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

April 29, 2003.

John V. Anaipakos, Stephen G. Tipps, Katherine Traverse Vukadin, Baker & Botts, L.L.P., Houston, for Appellant.

Miguel J. Chapa, Anthony F. Constant, Constant & Vela, Corpus Christi, for Appellee.

Panel consisted of Justices MIRABAL,^* TAFT, and SMITH^** on original submission of cause number 01-02-00679-CV.

EN BANC OPINION ON REHEARING

TERRY JENNINGS, Justice.

We deny the motion for rehearing filed in cause number 01-02-00679-CV by Jannete Gonzalez (Gonzalez), as dependent administrator of the estate of Guadalupe Gonzalez, Jr., deceased. See TEX.R.APP. P. 49.3. We withdraw our en banc opinion of September 6, 2002, substitute this opinion in its place, and vacate our previous judgment.

These are accelerated, interlocutory appeals¹ concerning an application by Reliant Energy, Inc. (Reliant) for an anti-suit injunction.² In its sole issue presented in our cause number 01-02-00679-CV, Reliant argued that the Harris County district court abused its discretion in originally denying Reliant's application for the anti-suit injunction because (1) Gonzalez engaged in inequitable conduct that vested dominant jurisdiction in the Harris County court, (2) Gonzalez's conduct poses a threat to the dominant jurisdiction of the Harris County court, and (3) Gonzalez's conduct violates Texas's public policy against forum shopping. In cause number 01-02-01054-CV, Reliant asserts the same arguments in support of the trial court's September 6, 2002 order granting Reliant's application for an anti-suit injunction.

Under its last point, Reliant argues that "[t]he plain language of Section 15.007 of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code³ trumps the applicable venue provision of the Probate Code." We agree. We hold that section 15.007 controls over section 6 of the Probate Code,⁴ which established venue for the underlying probate proceeding and, consequently, all suits and actions "appertaining to and incident to" the deceased's estate.

We affirm, in cause number 01-02-01054-CV, the trial court's September 6, 2002 order granting Reliant's application for an anti-suit injunction, and accordingly, we dismiss Reliant's interlocutory appeal in cause number 01-02-00679-CV as moot.

Background

The deceased, Guadalupe Gonzalez, Jr., was killed in an accident while working at a Reliant⁵ power plant near Houston in Harris County. He lived with his wife Jannete Gonzalez, and their children in Hidalgo County. Upon the death of Mr. Gonzalez, an administration was created in the Hidalgo County statutory probate court, and Jannete Gonzalez was appointed as the administrator of his estate.

Gonzalez, as the administrator of the estate, relying on section 5A of the Probate Code,⁶ filed wrongful death and survival claims against Reliant in the Hidalgo County statutory probate court. When Reliant unsuccessfully moved to transfer venue of these claims to Harris County, Gonzalez then filed the instant case in Harris County, asserting identical claims. Gonzalez immediately requested the Hidalgo County statutory probate court to transfer this Harris County suit to itself under section 5B of the Probate Code.⁷ Reliant then applied to the Harris County district court for an anti-suit injunction enjoining Gonzalez from prosecuting this suit and identical claims in Hidalgo County.

On June 26, 2002, the Harris County district court initially denied Reliant's application. Subsequently, in accordance with our previous en banc opinion, the trial court granted Reliant's application for an anti-suit injunction on September 6, 2002.

Anti-Suit Injunctions

Texas state courts have the power to restrain persons from proceeding with suits filed in other courts of this state by granting an "anti-suit injunction," abating proceedings in a second forum. Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. 1986). The general rule is that, when suit is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, that court is entitled to proceed to judgment and may protect its jurisdiction by enjoining the parties to a suit filed in another court of this state. Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 252 (Tex.2001); Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 305-06.

It is well established that a trial court has the power to issue an anti-suit injunction and that an interlocutory appeal lies from the decision to grant or deny the injunction. See Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Harper, 925 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex.1996). An anti-suit injunction is appropriate to (1) address a threat to a court's jurisdiction, (2) prevent the evasion of important public policy, (3) prevent a multiplicity of suits, and (4) protect a party from vexatious or harassing litigation. Id. The party seeking the injunction must show that "a clear equity demands" the injunction. Id. The trial court's decision is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 305. A trial court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law to the established facts of the case. See Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985).

Jurisdiction and Venue

This case turns on questions of jurisdiction and venue. Jurisdiction concerns the power of a court, under the Constitution and laws, to determine the merits of an action as between the parties and to render a judgment. Nat'l Life Co. v. Rice, 140 Tex. 315, 167 S.W.2d 1021, 1024 (1943); see also 2 MCDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE, § 6:2 (1992). Venue concerns the propriety of prosecuting a suit involving a given subject matter and specific parties in a particular county. Nat'l Life, 167 S.W.2d at 1025; see also 2 McDONALD at § 6:2.

Both parties focus their arguments on "dominant jurisdiction."⁸ Gonzalez argues that sections 5A and 5B of the Probate Code establish dominant jurisdiction in the Hidalgo county statutory probate court and, therefore, section 15.007 does not preempt these "jurisdictional" provisions of the Probate Code. To understand why this argument fails, a review of the pertinent statutory provisions is necessary.

Statutory Construction

Matters of statutory construction are questions of law for the court to decide. Johnson v. City of Fort Worth, 774 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Tex.1989). We liberally construe statutes to achieve their purposes and to promote justice. Maley v. 7111 Southwest Freeway, Inc, 843 S.W.2d 229, 231 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied). Our objective in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the intent of the lawmaking body. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garrison Contractors, Inc., 966 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex.1998). In so doing, we look first to the plain and common meaning of the statute's words. Id.; see also Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex. 1999). We also consider the statute's legislative history, the objective sought, and the consequences that would flow from alternate constructions. Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 383 (Tex. 2000).

The Probate Code

Because the deceased actually resided in Hidalgo County, venue to administer his estate was proper there. TEX. PROB.CODE ANN. § 6 (Vernon 2003).

Section 5A of the Probate Code, entitled "Matters Appertaining and Incident to an Estate and Other Probate Court Jurisdiction," confers jurisdiction on statutory probate courts to hear wrongful death cases such as the instant case. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5A(b) (Vernon 2003); see Palmer v. Coble Wall Trust Co., Inc., 851 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Tex.1992). Section 5A provides, in part, as follows:

All statutory probate courts may, in the exercise of their jurisdiction ... hear all suits, actions, and applications filed against or on behalf of any heirship proceeding or decedent's estate, including estates administered by an independent executor; all such suits, actions, and applications are appertaining to and incident to an estate.

TEX. PROB.CODE ANN. § 5A(b).

However, section 5A also recognizes that a statutory probate court "has concurrent jurisdiction with the district court in all actions ... by or against a person in the person's capacity as a personal representative." TEX. PROB.CODE ANN. § 5A (c)(1) (Vernon 2003) (emphasis added). Here, the Hidalgo County statutory probate court and the Harris County district court have concurrent jurisdiction over Gonzalez's wrongful death claim against Reliant.

Section 5A further provides:

In situations where the jurisdiction of a statutory probate court is concurrent with that of a district court, any cause of action appertaining to or incident to an estate shall be brought in a statutory probate court rather than a district court.

TEX. PROB.CODE ANN. § 5A(b) (emphasis added). Recognizing concurrent jurisdiction, and assuming proper venue, this provision confers predominance on the statutory probate courts over district courts to hear such cases. However, section 5A does not, as Gonzalez's argument seems to imply, confer "exclusive" jurisdiction on statutory probate courts to hear such cases. First State Bank of Bedias v. Bishop, 685 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Nor does section 5A dispense with the requirement that proper venue must lie for a statutory probate court to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction.

Also, Gonzalez's argument that section 5B of the Probate Code is a jurisdictional statute that trumps section 15.007 is erroneous. Gonzalez points out that intermediate appellate courts have held that the transfer authority of section 5B, and other provisions like it, applies notwithstanding the venue provisions of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See In re Ramsey, 28 S.W.3d...