Renforth v. Staff Right Personnel Services, LLC

• Decision Date: 30 June 2021
• Docket Number: 20 MA 0007
• Parties: ANTHONY J. RENFORTH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STAFF RIGHT PERSONNEL SERVICES, LLC, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

2021-Ohio-2335

ANTHONY J. RENFORTH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STAFF RIGHT PERSONNEL SERVICES, LLC, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 20 MA 0007

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Seventh District, Mahoning

June 30, 2021

Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County Ohio Case No. 2019 CV 598

Patrick J. Moro, Heller, Maas, Moro & Magill, Co. L.P.A., for Plaintiff-Appellant Anthony J. Renforth

Elizabeth A Crosby, Buckely King, for Defendant-Appellee Staff Right Personnel Services, LLC

Craig Pelini and Atty. Kristen Campbell Traub, Pelini, Campbell & Williams, LLC, for Defendants-Appellees Custom Blended Soils, Inc., Christopher T. Altiere and David C. Altiere.

BEFORE: Cheryl L. Waite, Gene Donofrio, Carol Ann Robb, Judges.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

WAITE J.

{¶1} Appellant Anthony J. Renforth appeals the decision of the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees, Staff Right Personnel Services, LLC ("Staff Right"); Custom Blended Soils, Inc. ("CBS"); Christopher T. Altiere ("Christopher); and David C. Altiere ("David") collectively referred to as "Appellees." We conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees, and the decision of the trial court is affirmed.

Factual and Procedural History

{¶2} CBS is a landscaping business located in Boardman, Ohio. Christopher is the primary owner and President of CBS. David is a partial owner and Vice President. Appellant worked as summer help for CBS beginning in 2013 through the date of the incident in 2015. Appellant was hired to work at CBS through Staff Right. Appellant's duties included watering plants, cleaning the parking lot, moving rocks and mulch, splitting wood, and loading customer cars.

{¶3} The following facts are derived from the record, including Appellant's deposition taken during an earlier action filed in 2017. The incident at the heart of this matter involved a gas-powered log splitter owned by CBS. At approximately 4:00 p.m. on June 17, 2015, Appellant arrived at work for CBS. At approximately 5:00 p.m., another CBS adult employee, Joe, was operating the log splitter and Appellant assisted by placing logs on the splitter. (Renforth Depo., pp. 41, 54.) After Appellant placed the log on the splitter, Joe hit the press of the splitter causing the log to split and then a third employee would remove the split log from the splitter. At some point, Appellant placed a log on the splitter and Joe hit the press apparently too soon, causing Appellant's left index finger to be partially amputated. (Renforth Depo., p. 55.)

{¶4} Appellant sought medical help and filed a claim with the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation ("BWC") and received medical payments and compensation. Appellant filed a complaint against Appellees on June 19, 2017 alleging: (1) a workplace intentional tort pursuant to R.C. 2745.01; (2) negligence; and (3) negligence per se. Appellant subsequently voluntarily dismissed the action. On March 25, 2019, Appellant refiled his complaint, raising the same claims. On April 9, 2019, BWC filed a motion for leave to intervene as a party plaintiff, claiming a subrogation interest pursuant to R.C. 4123.93 and R.C. 4123.931. The trial court granted the motion to intervene on April 17, 2019. On April 17, 2019, BWC filed a complaint pursuant to R.C. 4123.93 and R.C. 4123.931 seeking judgment from Appellees for medical benefits and other compensation paid to Appellant in the amount of $26, 676.96, plus the estimated future costs of Appellant's claim.

{¶5} On May 16, 2019, CBS and the Altieres filed a motion for summary judgment. On September 30, 2019, Staff Right also filed a motion for summary judgment. Appellant filed in opposition to CBS and the Altieres' motion on September 30, 2019. Appellant did not oppose Staff Right's motion for summary judgment. On December 10, 2019, the trial court granted both Staff Right's unopposed motion for summary judgment and the CBS/Altieres' motion for summary judgment. The trial court concluded that: Appellant had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Appellees' conduct fell within the statutory criteria necessary to find an employer committed an intentional tort pursuant to R.C. 2745.01 and that Appellant's workers' compensation claim precluded recovery as to his allegations of negligence and negligence per se.

{¶6} Appellant filed this timely appeal.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT-APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

{¶7} This appeal is from a trial court's decision resolving a motion for summary judgment. An appellate court conducts a de novo review of a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment, using the same standards as the trial court as set forth in Civ.R. 56(C). Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). Before summary judgment can be granted, the trial court must determine that: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing the evidence most favorably in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, the conclusion is adverse to that party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977). Whether a fact is "material" depends on the substantive law of the claim being litigated. Hoyt, Inc. v. Gordon & Assoc, Inc., 104 Ohio App.3d 598, 603, 662 N.E.2d 1088 (8th Dist.1995).

{¶8} "[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party's claim." (Emphasis deleted.) Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 296, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). If the moving party carries its burden, the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 293. In other words, when presented with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must produce some evidence to suggest that a reasonable factfinder could rule in that party's favor. Brewer v. Cleveland Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio App.3d 378, 386, 701 N.E.2d 1023 (8th Dist.1997).

{¶9} The evidentiary materials to support a motion for summary judgment are listed in Civ.R. 56(C) and include the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact that have been filed in the case. In resolving the motion, the court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Temple, 50 Ohio St.2d at 327.

{¶10} Although the trial court granted summary judgment to both Staff Right and CBS and the Altieres, Appellant did not oppose Staff Right's summary judgment motion in the trial court and does not raise any arguments relative to Staff Right on appeal. Thus, he has waived this issue on appeal. We will address only the court's decision to grant summary judgment as to CBS and the Altieres.

{¶11} Appellant's complaint raises claims of: (1) workplace intentional tort pursuant to R.C. 2745.01; (2) negligence; and (3) negligence per se.

R.C. 2745.01

{¶12} As a general rule, under Ohio law, employees are generally limited to remedies provided under the Workers' Compensation Act for injuries sustained in the workplace. R.C. 4123.74. A limited exception exists for intentional tort claims against employers. These are governed by R.C. 2745.01, which provides:

(A) In an action brought against an employer by an employee, or by the dependent survivors of a deceased employee, for damages resulting from an intentional tort committed by the employer during the course of employment, the employer shall not be liable unless the plaintiff proves that the employer committed the tortious act with the intent to injure another or with the belief that the injury was substantially certain to occur.

(B) As used in this section, "substantially certain" means that an employer acts with deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer an injury, a disease, a condition, or death.

(C) Deliberate removal by an employer of an equipment safety guard or deliberate misrepresentation of a toxic or hazardous substance creates a rebuttable presumption that the removal or misrepresentation was committed with intent to injure another if an injury or an occupational disease or condition occurs as a direct result.

(D) This section does not apply to claims arising during the course of employment involving discrimination, civil rights, retaliation, harassment in violation of Chapter 4112. of the Revised Code, intentional infliction of emotional distress not compensable under Chapters 4121. and 4123. of the Revised Code, contract, promissory estoppel, or defamation.

{¶13} Raising and sustaining an employer intentional tort involves an extremely high threshold. An employee can only recover damages under R.C. 2745.01 if the employer acts "with specific intent to cause an injury." Houdek v ThyssenKrupp Materials NA., Inc., 134 Ohio St.3d 491, 2012-Ohio-5685, 983 N.E.2d 1253, ¶ 11. Absent an employer's deliberate intent to injure the employee, the employer is not liable under R.C. 2745.01 and the employee's "exclusive remedy is within the workers' compensation system." Id. at ¶ 25. As applied in this case, "deliberate" intent has been defined as," 'characterized by or resulting from careful and thorough consideration-a deliberate decision.'" Forwerck v. Principle Business Ents., Inc., 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-10-040, 2011-Ohio-489, ¶...