Renteria v. Curry, 1:07-CV-00161 AWI DLB HC

• Decision Date: 24 August 2011
• Docket Number: 1:07-CV-00161 AWI DLB HC
• Parties: DON A. RENTERIA, Petitioner, v. B. CURRY, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

DON A. RENTERIA, Petitioner,

v.B. CURRY, Respondent.

1:07-CV-00161 AWI DLB HC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dated: August 24, 2011

FINDING AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS

Petitioner Don A. Renteria, ("Petitioner") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Procedural History

On April 3, 2002, a jury convicted Petitioner of one count of second degree murder (Cal. Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)¹ ), and a second count of assault on a child under the age of eight by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury resulting in death (§ 273ab). The jury also found true the allegations that Petitioner had suffered two prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subd. (b). See Respondent ("Resp't") Lodged E at 1. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a total of 27 years to life, consisting of a term of 15 years to life for Count I, stayed pursuant to section 654, 25 years to life for Count II plus a two-year enhancement consisting of a one-year term for each of the two prison prior enhancements. See Clerk's Transcript ("CT") at 710-12, 714-15.

On May 10, 2002, Petitioner appealed the judgment to the California Court of Appeal. See Resp't Lodged Doc. A, Opening Brief (Case F0450534). In his opening brief, Petitioner's claimed,inter alia, that the trial court had improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the result of allegedly unlawful search. Id. at 33-37. The trial court determined that as a parolee subject to parole search, Petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his home. See Resp't Lodged Doc. G, Court of Appeal Unpublished Opinion of September 28, 2005. While the state appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Sanders, 31 Cal.4th 318 (2003) which potentially impacted Petitioner's then-pending search and seizure claim. In light of Sanders, the Court of Appeal reversed and ordered the matter remanded to the trial court to allow the parties to relitigate the motion to suppress. Id. at 2-3. On May 12, 2004, the trial court on remand, again denied Petitioner's motion to suppress and reentered judgment against Petitioner. Id. at 3. On September 28, 2005, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgement. Id. Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court on November 5, 2005. See Resp't Lodged Doc. E at 1. The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review on January 4, 2006. See Resp't Doc. Lodged I.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court, Northern District of California on January 9, 2007, but on January 22, 2007, the matter was transferred to the Eastern District of California as the state court convicting Petitioner is within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Eastern District. Respondent filed an answer on November 25, 2008. See Doc. 21.

Factual Background

The Court adopts the California Court of Appeal's summation of the facts surrounding Petitioner's crime and conviction:

A police officer responding to a child-in-distress call saw [Petitioner] Don Anthony Renteria's 2 1/2-year-old stepdaughter Samantha lying unconscious on the floor of his home. [Petitioner] told the officer that he had fallen on top of her, that she had hit her head on something, and that she had collapsed right after saying, "I'm okay, daddy," and taking a few steps. Comatose on arrival at the hospital, Samantha died of devastating head trauma that the forensic pathologist and other medical experts attributed to shaken baby syndrome. [ ^FN2]

FN2. An expert witness testified that the term "shaken baby syndrome" and the term "shaken impact syndrome" both require shaking but that only the latter requires impact. The two terms reflect two schools of thought, one that shaking alone suffices to cause "the severe damage we see in babies with evidence of shaking," the otherthat both shaking and impact are necessary. The record shows both syndromes were causes of death, so as a linguistic lowest common denominator our opinion will use only the former term to refer to both syndromes.

On the rationale that as a parolee subject to parole search conditions, [Petitioner] had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his home-whether or not the police were aware of his status at the time of the search-the court denied his motion to suppress. At trial, a jury found [Petitioner] guilty of second degree murder and assault resulting in the death of a child under eight years of age. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 273ab. [ ^FN3]) After briefing was complete in his original appeal, the Supreme Court held that "an otherwise unlawful search of the residence of an adult parolee may not be justified by the circumstance that the suspect was subject to a search condition of which the law enforcement officers were unaware when the search was conducted." (People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 335, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630, 73 P.3d 496 (Sanders).) On the state of the law before Sanders, the failure of the parties to litigate that issue is understandable . . . [given] the court's finding that the evidence was irrelevant. (See, e.g., In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 85-86, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519.)

FN3. All statutory references not otherwise noted are to the Penal Code. Section 273ab provides: "Any person who, having the care or custody of a child who is under eight years of age, assaults the child by means of force that to a reasonable person would be likely to produce great bodily injury, resulting in the child's death, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years to life. Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting the applicability of subdivision (a) of Section 187 or Section 189."

With no evidence of whether the police were aware at the time of the search that [Petitioner] was on parole, the record of the hearing on his motion was inadequate to enable us to determine, on the state of the law after Sanders, whether the court's ruling was sustainable on the Fourth Amendment rationale that the parties litigated. Likewise, the record was inadequate to enable us to determine whether, had the court and counsel not justifiably relied on the state of the law before Sanders, the parties might have litigated, and the court might have adjudicated, other Fourth Amendment rationales that might have affected the admissibility of some or all of the evidence subject to the court's ruling.

Consequently, we reversed the judgment solely for the parties to litigate anew the motion to suppress and for the court to make findings, issue rulings, and proceed as just under the circumstances. (See People v. Dachino (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1429, 1434, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 691; People v. LeBlanc (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 157, 167-168, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 195.) Pursuant to the doctrine of ripeness, we deferred adjudication of all of [Petitioner's] other issues. (Alameda County Land Use Assn. v. City of Hayward (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1716, 1722, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 752, citing California Water & Telephone Co. v. County of Los Angeles (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 16, 22, 61 Cal.Rptr. 618; cf. People v. Superior Court (Marks) (1991) 1 Cal.4th 56, 65, fn. 6, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 389, 820 P.2d 613.) On remand, the court heard and denied his motion to suppress and again entered judgment against him. In his pending appeal, he argues not only his Fourth Amendment issue on the basis of the record of the hearing after remand but also his original issues on the basis of the record of trial and the briefing in his original appeal. We will affirm the judgment.

See Resp't Lodged Doc. G, Court of Appeal Unpublished Opinion of September 28, 2005.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375, n. 7, (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises out of the Kern County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, (1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

II. Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which applies to all petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed after the statute's enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of AEDPA and is consequently governed by its provisions. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003). Thus, the petition "may be granted only if [Petitioner] demonstrates that the state court decision denying relief was 'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)), overruled in part on other grounds, Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 555 (9th Cir....