Renteria–Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty.

• Decision Date: 04 October 2012
• Docket Number: No. M2011–02423–SC–R23–CQ.,M2011–02423–SC–R23–CQ.
• Citation: 382 S.W.3d 318
• Parties: Daniel RENTERIA–VILLEGAS et al. v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

382 S.W.3d 318

Daniel RENTERIA–VILLEGAS et al.

v.METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY et al.

No. M2011–02423–SC–R23–CQ.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville.

June 14, 2012 Session.

Oct. 4, 2012.

Elliott Ozment and Andrew Free, Nashville, Tennessee; Trina Realmuto, Boston, Massachusetts; William L. Harbison and Phillip F. Cramer, Nashville, Tennessee; Thomas Fritzsche and Daniel Werner, Atlanta, Georgia, for the plaintiffs, Daniel Renteria–Villegas, David Ernesto Gutierrez–Turcios, and Rosa Landaverde.

Saul Solomon, Director of Law; Keli J. Oliver and Derrick C. Smith, Assistant Metropolitan Attorneys, Nashville, Tennessee, for the defendant, Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County.

Jerry Martin, United States Attorney; Matthew M. Curley, Assistant United States Attorney; Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; David J. Kline, Director; Jeffrey Robins, Assistant Director; Craig A. Defoe, Trial Attorney, for the defendant, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

Scott P. Tift, Nashville, Tennessee, for the amici curiae, George E. Barrett, C. Dewey Branstetter, Jr., and Hon. Marietta M. Shipley.

Tricia Herzfeld, Nashville, Tennessee, for the amici curiae, The Tennessee Immigrant and Refugee Rights Coalition, The American Civil Liberties Union of Tennessee, ASISTA Immigration Assistance, The National Center for Victims of Crime, and The National Crime Victim Law Institute at Lewis & Clark Law School.

OPINION

SHARON G. LEE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GARY R. WADE, C.J., JANICE M. HOLDER, CORNELIA A. CLARK, and WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JJ., joined.

SHARON G. LEE, J.

We accepted a question of law certified by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee to determine whether the October 2009 Memorandum of Agreement between the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, by and through the Davidson County Sheriff's Office, violates the Charter of Nashville and Davidson County or other state law. We conclude that the Memorandum of Agreement does not violate the Charter or any other state law cited by the plaintiffs.

We accepted this case pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 23, which allows this Court to answer questions of Tennessee law certified by any federal court when “there are questions of law of this state which will be determinative of the cause and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.” Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 23, § 1. As head of this state's judiciary and as part of our inherent judicial power under Article VI, section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution, we are authorized to answer certified questions of law. Seals v. H & F, Inc., 301 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tenn.2010). Rather than requiring a federal court to make the law of this state or to abstain from deciding the case until the state courts resolve the point of law, answering certified questions from federal courts promotes judicial efficiency and comity and also protects this state's sovereignty. Haley v. Univ. of Tenn.-Knoxville, 188 S.W.3d 518, 521 (Tenn.2006). Under Rule 23, we only answer questions of law, not questions of fact or controversies as a whole. Seals, 301 S.W.3d at 241.

We address the question of whether the October 2009 Memorandum of Agreement between the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, by and through the Davidson County Sheriff's Office, violates the Charter of Nashville and Davidson County or other state law. This issue of law arises out of litigation filed by the plaintiffs Daniel Renteria–Villegas, David Ernesto Gutierrez–Turcios, and Rosa Landaverde against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) and the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).¹ Plaintiffs Renteria–Villegas and Gutierrez–Turcios allege that Davidson County Sheriff's officers arrested and wrongfully interrogated and detained them while the officers investigated the plaintiffs' immigration status pursuant to the October 2009 Memorandum of Agreement (“MOA”) entered into between the Davidson County Sheriff's Office (“DCSO”) and ICE. Plaintiff Landaverde, a property owner and taxpayer in Davidson County, alleges that removal proceedings were instituted against her son after he was processed by Davidson County Sheriff's officers pursuant to the MOA. In addition to injunctive relief and damages, the plaintiffs seek declaratory relief regarding the validity of the MOA entered into between the DCSO and ICE under the Metropolitan Charter of Nashville and Davidson County (the “Charter”).

According to the stipulated facts presented with the certified question, the MOA was entered into under the Immigration and Nationality Act, § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006). The MOA authorizes selected DCSO personnel to perform certain immigration officer duties after being trained and certified by ICE. Those duties include interrogating any person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or remain in the United States; processing any removable alien or those aliens who have been arrested for violating a federal, State, or local offense for immigration violations; serving arrest warrants for immigration violations; administering oaths, taking and considering evidence, and preparing affidavits and sworn statements for ICE supervisory review; preparing charging documents for signature of ICE supervisors; issuing immigration detainers for processing aliens in categories established by ICE supervisors; and detaining and transporting arrested aliens subject to removal to ICE-approved detention facilities. DCSO officers perform their duties subject to the limitations contained in the Standard Operating Procedure in Appendix D ² to the MOA; provide notification within twenty-four hours to an ICE supervisor of any detainees placed under authority; obtain authorization from an ICE supervisor or designee prior to initiating transfer of § 287(g) detainees into ICE custody; submit a plan to ensure that steps are taken to correct, modify, or prevent the recurrence of errors when informed by ICE of any error in the records; and make individualized custody recommendations to ICE.

We are guided in our interpretation of the Charter by the principles of statutory construction. Jordan v. Knox Cnty., 213 S.W.3d 751, 763 (Tenn.2007). We must give full effect to the intent and purpose of the drafters, seeWaldschmidt v. Reassure Am. Life Ins. Co., 271 S.W.3d 173, 176 (Tenn.2008), without unduly broadening or restricting the Charter. Seals, 301 S.W.3d at 242. We must look to the language of the Charter, and if the language is “clear and unambiguous, ... we must simply enforce it as written.” Waldschmidt, 271 S.W.3d at 176. However, if the language is ambiguous, then we may refer to the broader statutory scheme, the history of the Charter, and other sources to discern its meaning. See Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 836 (Tenn.2008).

When the Charter was adopted in 1962, it consolidated the functions of the DCSO and the Nashville Police Department. The stated purpose of the constitutional amendment authorizing consolidation was to “eliminate duplication and overlapping of duties and services” to realize “economic savings to taxpayers.” Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. v. Poe, 215 Tenn. 53, 383 S.W.2d 265, 277 (1964). It is not likely that the Charter framers envisioned that decades later, a sheriff would be performing immigration functions for the federal authorities and, accordingly, there are no Charter provisions that directly address the DCSO's authority to perform these duties.

Consistent with its purpose of consolidation, the Charter delineated the separate duties of the Sheriff and Police Chief. Charter section 16.05 provides that the Sheriff shall have such duties prescribed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 8–8–201 or by any other provisions of general law. Pursuant to section 8–8–201 (2011), the Sheriff has broad general powers, includingthe power to enforce the ordinances of the municipality, Tenn.Code Ann. § 8–8–201(34), and “such other duties as are, or may be, imposed by law or custom.” Tenn.Code Ann. § 8–8–201(36)(b)(2). Section 8–8–201(36)(b)(1) references over 100 code sections which also set forth the Sheriff's duties. Tennessee Code Annotated section 38–3–102 (2010) is among the code sections listed, and it provides

(a) The sheriff is the principal conservator of the peace in the sheriff's county. It is the sheriff's duty to suppress all affrays, riots, routs, unlawful assemblies, insurrections, or other breaches of the peace, to do which the sheriff may summon to such sheriff's aid as many of the inhabitants of the county as such sheriff thinks proper.

(b) It shall be the duty of the sheriffs, in their respective counties, by themselves or deputies, to patrol the roads of the county, to ferret out crimes, to secure evidence of crimes, and to apprehend and arrest criminals.

Contrary to section 38–3–102, however, section 16.05 of the Charter expressly provides that within the area of the metropolitan government, the Sheriff shall not be the “principal conservator of the peace.” This function is assigned to the Metropolitan Chief of Police. As between the Sheriff and the Police Chief, Charter section 16.05 gives the Sheriff custody and control of the metropolitan jail, and designates the Police Chief as the “principal conservator of the peace.” Charter section 2.01 provides that when any power is vested by the Charter in a specific officer, that officer shall be deemed to have exclusive jurisdiction within the particular field.

The Charter marks the boundary between the duties of the Sheriff and the Police Chief. There is no dispute, however, between the Sheriff and the...