Yardley v. Hosp. Housekeeping Sys., LLC

• Decision Date: 21 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. M2014-01723-SC-R23-CV,M2014-01723-SC-R23-CV
• Citation: 470 S.W.3d 800
• Parties: Kighwaunda M. Yardley v. Hospital Housekeeping Systems, LLC
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

470 S.W.3d 800

Kighwaunda M. Yardley

v.Hospital Housekeeping Systems, LLC

No. M2014-01723-SC-R23-CV

Supreme Court of Tennessee, AT NASHVILLE.

May 27, 2015 Session Heard at Cookeville¹

Filed August 21, 2015

David L. Cooper, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Kighwaunda M. Yardley.

Fred C. Statum III and Thomas W. Whitworth, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Hospital Housekeeping Systems, LLC.

Wade B. Cowan and Douglas B. Janney III, Nashville, Tennessee; Justin S. Gilbert, Jackson, Tennessee; Jennifer B. Morton, Knoxville, Tennessee; and Bryce W. Ashby and William B. Ryan, Memphis, Tennessee, for the amicus curiae, Tennessee Employment Lawyers Association.

Dale Conder Jr., Jackson, Tennessee, for the amicus curiae, Tennessee Defense Lawyers Association.

Opinion

Sharon G. Lee, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Cornelia A. Clark, Gary R. Wade, Jeffrey S. Bivins, and Holly Kirby, JJ., joined.

OPINION

Sharon G. Lee, C.J.

We accepted a question of law certified by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee to determine whether a job applicant has a cause of action under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Act against a prospective employer for failure to hire if the prospective employer failed to hire the job applicant because that applicant had filed, or is likely to file, a workers' compensation claim against a previous employer, and if such a cause of action exists, what standard should apply. We hold that there is no cause of action for failure to hire under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation Act.

Factual and Procedural Background

Beginning in 1998, Kighwaunda M. Yardley worked as a housekeeping aide at the University Medical Center (“the Hospital”) in Lebanon.² In 2010, Ms. Yardley was hurt on the job and began receiving workers' compensation benefits. Between June 2010 and September 2012, she received medical treatment for her injury. As of July 1, 2012, she was performing light duty work for the Hospital's materials management group with the expectation that when released to full duty, she would return to her job as a housekeeping aide.

On January 1, 2012, the Hospital entered into a contract with Hospital Housekeeping Systems (“the Company”), whereby the Company agreed to provide housekeeping services for the Hospital beginning July 1, 2012. As part of its contract, the Company agreed to interview the Hospital's current housekeeping employees and, at the Company's discretion, hire the employees to continue in their positions. The Company hired most of the Hospital's housekeeping staff. As of July 1, 2012, Ms. Yardley had neither been interviewed nor hired because she was still on light duty. When Ms. Yardley was released to full duty, she sought to return to work in the housekeeping department. The Hospital referred her to the Company for employment. In August 2012, she spoke with the Company's Division Vice President, Michael Cox, who, according to Ms. Yardley, told her that the Company would not hire anyone receiving workers' compensation benefits. In an email to the Company, Mr. Cox said that Ms. Yardley had “been out on Workers['] Comp with the hospital long before [the Company's] arrival,” that her shoulder was hurting her again, and that “[b]ringing her on board with [the Company] would seem to be a Workers['] Comp claim waiting to happen.” Mr. Cox said he “would advise against [hiring Ms. Yardley] IF we have that option.” After she was not hired, Ms. Yardley sued the Company in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.

We accepted the following certified question of law from the federal district court: If a prospective employer refuses to hire a job applicant because that applicant had filed, or is likely to file, a workers' compensation claim incurred while working for a previous employer, can that applicant maintain a cause of action under the Workers' Compensation Act (“the Act”) against the prospective employer for failure to hire, and if such a claim exists, should courts apply the motivating factor standard of causation, as they do with retaliatory discharge claims?

Analysis

Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 23 allows this Court to answer questions of Tennessee law certified by any federal court when “there are questions of law of this state which will be determinative of the cause and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 23, § 1. As head of this state's judiciary and as part of our inherent judicial power under article VI, section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution, we are authorized to answer certified questions of law. Renteria–Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 382 S.W.3d 318, 320 (Tenn. 2012) (citing Seals, 301 S.W.3d at 241 ). We may “accept and answer a question of state law certified ... by the federal court to assist the federal court in deciding a question of state law.” Haley v. Univ. of Tenn. – Knoxville, 188 S.W.3d 518, 521 (Tenn. 2006). Rather than requiring a federal court to make the law of this State or to abstain from deciding the case until the state courts resolve the point of law, answering certified questions from federal courts promotes judicial efficiency and comity and protects this State's sovereignty. Id. at 523.

This is a case of first impression. In Tennessee, there is no statutory or common law cause of action for retaliatory failure to hire. Ms. Yardley asks this Court to create this cause of action. Relying on public policy grounds and retaliatory discharge cases from this and other jurisdictions, Ms. Yardley argues that if employers can lawfully refuse to hire job applicants because applicants have filed, or are likely to file, workers' compensation claims, this action by employers will have a chilling effect on workers' decisions to file claims and obtain their rightful remedies under the Act. She also asserts that if employers are allowed to refuse to hire applicants on such a basis, it would frustrate the purpose of the Second Injury Fund, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 50–6–208 (2014), which the Legislature established to encourage the hiring of workers who have suffered previous injuries. Amicus curiae Tennessee Employment Lawyers Association argues that an employer's failure to hire a job applicant because the applicant asserted a claim for compensation against a previous employer constitutes a device that would relieve an employer of an obligation under the Act; such devices are prohibited by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50–6–114 (2014).

The Company and amicus curiae Tennessee Defense Lawyers Association oppose the creation of a cause of action for retaliatory failure to hire. They argue that there was no employer-employee relationship between Ms. Yardley and the Company and, therefore, the retaliatory discharge cases cited by Ms. Yardley are distinguishable. They contend that Tennessee's employment-at-will doctrine should be protected, that employers should be free to hire and fire as they choose, and that an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine should not be made in this case.

Workers' compensation laws have been in effect in the United States for more than a century. See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 197, 37 S.Ct. 247, 61 L.Ed. 667 (1917). These laws “were conceived as a means of providing prompt, dignified, and certain financial relief for workers who suffered employment-related injuries or diseases[,]” Joseph H. King, Jr., The Exclusiveness of an Employee's Workers' Compensation Remedy Against His Employer, 55 Tenn. L.Rev. 405, 406 (1988) (footnote omitted), and were necessary because of the “difficulty of proving fault in the industrial setting and the availability of the [defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow servant rule, which] more often than not defeated the worker's hope for recovery,” Clanton v. Cain–Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441, 442 (Tenn. 1984). Since the Act was passed in 1919, it has provided compensation for injured employees, eliminated employers' potential defenses, set attorney's fees, provided for a system of adjudication, abrogated the right of employees to pursue common law negligence actions, and capped employees' potential recovery. See Act of Feb. 5, 1919, ch. 123 § 2, 1919 Tenn. Pub. Acts 369; see also Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50–6–101 to –921. Thus, the Act is a “comprehensive [legal] system that reflects a compromise between the interests of employers and employees.” Clanton, 677 S.W.2d at 443.

Workers' compensation laws necessarily interact with the State's employment laws. Tennessee recognizes the employment-at-will doctrine as “the fundamental principle controlling the relationship between employers and employees.” Mason v. Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Tenn. 1997). Under this doctrine, either the employer or the employee may terminate the employment relationship with or without cause. Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tenn. 1992) (citing Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 509 (1884) ). “[A]n employer's ability to make and act upon independent assessments of an employee's abilities and job performance as well as business needs is essential to the free-enterprise system.” Mason, 942 S.W.2d at 474 (quoting Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 419 Mich. 356, 353 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Mich. 1984) ). Thus, the doctrine “recognizes that employers need the freedom to make their own business judgments without interference from the courts.” Williams v. City of Burns, 465 S.W.3d 96, 108 (Tenn.2015) (quoting Mason, 942 S.W.2d at 474 ). Both job applicants and prospective employers may freely choose whether to enter into the employer-employee relationship. See id.

One exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is that an at-will employee may not be fired for taking an action encouraged by public policy. Id. (citing Chism v. Mid–South Milling Co. , 762 S.W.2d 552, 556 (Tenn...