Rentz v. Campbell County

• Decision Date: 21 June 1935
• Citation: 260 Ky. 242
• Parties: Rentz v. Campbell County et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

260 Ky. 242

Rentz v. Campbell County et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Decided June 21, 1935.

1. Counties. — Statute authorizing appointment of commissioners by fiscal court to handle funds to be derived from sale of bonds held not repealed by subsequent statute relating to similar subject where subsequent statute applied only to counties having a second class city, extended powers of such counties, and adopted by reference previous acts on same subject (Ky. Stats., secs. 4307, 4307a-1 et seq.; sec. 938p-1 et seq.).

2. Statutes. — Statute authorizing creation of bridge commission and defining powers of commissioners held not unconstitutional on ground that authority therein given to bridge commissioners was not embraced in title, where title furnished more than clue to contents of section (Ky. Stats., sec. 4307a-2; Constitution, sec. 51).

3. Bridges. — Statute providing for creation of bridge commission held not unconstitutional as permitting exercise of discretionary power over county's fiscal affairs when such powers can be exercised only by fiscal court, or permitting usurpation of fiscal court's functions by administrative board, since Constitution merely creates fiscal court, and its jurisdiction is subject to definition by Legislature (Ky. Stats., secs. 4307a-1, 4307a-2; Constitution, secs. 27, 28, 144).

4. Injunction. — In suit to restrain advertising names of bridge commissioners in connection with election to determine issuance of bonds, plaintiff could not claim that commissioners were not representatives of voters where commissioners were named

before election and voters could say whether or not particular commission was to handle proceeds of bond sale (Ky. Stats., secs. 4307, 4307a-1 et seq.).

5. Constitutional Law. — Statute creating commission for handling bridge bonds held not unconstitutional because of improper delegation of power where commission was created to deal with specific fund, in specific manner and for specific purpose (Ky. Stats., secs. 4307, 4307a-1 et seq.).

6. Bridges. — Statute relating to general powers and jurisdiction of fiscal courts held not to repeal statute granting specific power to bridge commission in view of express provision that counties' corporate powers should be exercised by courts "unless otherwise provided by law" (Ky. Stats., secs. 1834, 1840, 4307a-1, 4307a-2).

Appeal from Campbell Circuit Court.

CHAS. E. LESTER, Jr., for appellant.

L.J. CRAWFORD and ROGER L. NEFF, Jr., for appellees.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE STITES.

Affirming.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Campbell circuit court sitting in equity, whereby the court declined to enjoin the defendants from advertising the names of certain persons appointed to a bridge commission under an order of the fiscal court of the county, in connection with a proposed election to determine whether or not certain bridge bonds would be issued, and wherein the court further declared the rights of the parties in the premises.

On May 27, 1935, the Campbell county court entered an order pursuant to section 4307 of the Kentucky Statutes (Acts of 1914, c. 80, sec. 21), and section 938p-1 et seq. (Acts of 1928, c. 173), calling for an election to be held on August 3, 1935, to determine whether or not bonds in the sum of $1,500,000 should be issued by the county for the purpose of erecting or purchasing a bridge between Hamilton county, Ohio, and Campbell county, Ky. Thereafter, the fiscal court of Campbell county, acting under section 4307a-1 et seq. of the Statutes (Acts of 1916, c. 12), entered an order designating four residents of the county to act as a bridge commission in the handling of the funds to be derived from the sale of the bonds.

Appellant attacked the proceedings outlined above, principally on the ground that sections 4307a-1 and 4307a-2 were repealed by chapter 173 of the Acts of 1928 (Ky. Stats. sec. 938p-1 et seq.). The 1928 act applies only to counties having a city of the second class, relates to the construction of interstate bridges or tunnels, and provides that bonds issued for such construction may be retired by collecting tolls for the use of such bridge or tunnel. The 1928 act plainly gave an additional power to counties wherein was located a city of the second class. It did not repeal, nor is it inconsistent with, the 1916 act. It did not change the method of issuing county bonds already provided for in the other statutes. On the contrary, it referred to and adopted by reference the previous acts on the subject.

Appellant's next contention is that section 2 of the act of 1916 (Ky. Stats. sec. 4307a-2) violates section 51 of the Constitution in that the authority therein given to the bridge commissioners is not embraced within the title to the act. We think the title to the act was broad enough to include the powers given in section 2 to the commissioners selected "for the purposes of handling the proceeds of any bond issue voted by the county to build or reconstruct roads and bridges." The title furnished more than a clue to the contents of section 2. Talbott v. Laffoon, 257 Ky. 773, 79 S.W. (2d) 244. The act related to but...