Talbott, Auditor of Pub. Accts. v. Laffoon, Gov.

• Citation: 257 Ky. 773
• Parties: Talbott, Auditor of Public Accounts, et al. v. Laffoon, Governor, et al.
• Decision Date: 14 December 1934
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (Kentucky)

257 Ky. 773

Talbott, Auditor of Public Accounts, et al. v. Laffoon, Governor, et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Decided December 14, 1934.

1. Statutes. — Title of act does not violate constitutional provision requiring statute to relate to but one subject expressed in its title because containing multiplicity of subjects, provided body of act relates only to one subject (Constitution, sec. 51).

2. Statutes. — Title of act, to conform to constitutional provision requiring statute to relate to but one subject expressed in its title, need not contain detailed index of everything that body contains, but need only furnish general notification of general subject upon which body may legislate (Constitution, sec. 51).

3. Statutes. — Where title of act begins with generally designated subject, followed by restrictive language curtailing scope of general designation, and in such form as to confine title to legislation within restrictions only, body of act may go no further than what is authorized by restrictions (Constitution, sec. 51).

4. Statutes. — Constitutional provision requiring statute to relate to but one subject expressed in its title must be liberally construed (Constitution, sec. 51).

5. Statutes. — Title of act must be construed with reference to language used in it alone, and not in light of what body of act contains (Constitution, sec. 51).

6. Constitutional Law. — Validity of Administrative Reorganization Act must be tested by limitations imposed by Constitution on power to enact it, regardless of motives that prompted its enactment (Acts 1934, c. 155; Constitution, sec. 51).

7. Statutes. — Codifying statutes, purpose of which is consolidation of existing laws with rearrangement of supervision in execution of governmental functions to be performed, together with enactment of new measures incidental thereto, are not inhibited by constitutional provision requiring statute to relate to but one subject expressed in its title, if title is broad enough to indicate purpose intended to be accomplished and body of act does not depart therefrom (Constitution, sec. 51).

8. Constitutional Law. — All doubts should be resolved in favor of validity of an act (Constitution, sec. 51).

9. Statutes. — Administrative Reorganization Act providing for reorganization and simplification of executive department of state government through enactment of administrative code held not violative of constitutional provision requiring statute to relate to but one subject expressed in its title (Acts 1934, c. 155; Constitution, sec. 51).

10. Statutes. — Statute will not be annulled as violating constitutional provision requiring statute to relate to but one subject expressed in its title because statute is not as expansive as its title would have permitted so long as provisions of statute are within and are germane to broader subject stated in its title (Constitution, sec. 51).

11. Statutes. — Purpose of constitutional provision requiring statute to relate to but one subject expressed in its title was to provide general barrier against duplicitous legislation (Constitution, sec. 51).

12. Constitutional Law. — Administrative Reorganization Act held not invalid because not applying to constitutional offices, since power of Legislature is confined to statutory departments and agencies (Acts 1934, c. 155).

13. Statutes. — Administrative Reorganization Act held not invalid as being incapable of construction or administration, where provisions of act were reasonably plain and unambiguous (Acts 1934, c. 155).

Appeal from Franklin Circuit Court.

CLIFFORD E. SMITH, CLYDE E. REED, SAMUEL M. ROSENSTEIN and JAMES BREATHITT, Jr., for appellants.

BAILEY P. WOOTTON, Attorney General, and F.M. BURKE and S.H. BROWN, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellees.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE THOMAS.

Affirming.

At its regular 1934 session the General Assembly of the commonwealth of Kentucky enacted chapter 155, p. 679, Session Acts for that year, and which is sections 4618-1 to and including 4618-67, of Baldwin's 1934 Supplement to Carroll's Kentucky Statutes. This action, filed in the Franklin circuit court by J. Dan Talbott, auditor of public accounts for the commonwealth, and Frank Dacher, as deputy insurance commissioner in charge of securities of the commonwealth, in their official capacities and as taxpayers, against Hon. Ruby Laffoon, Governor, and other officials of the commonwealth having duties to perform in administering and carrying out the provisions of the chapter, seeks to annul it upon various grounds set forth in the petition; but practically the only one seriously argued in this court is that the act was passed in violation of the provisions of section 51 of our Constitution, mainly, if not chiefly, because its title is not in conformity with that section, and that the body of the act departs from its alleged defective title. The learned trial judge of the Franklin circuit court concluded that such contention, and other less important ones made in the petition as amended, were unsound and dismissed the petition, to reverse which plaintiffs prosecute this appeal.

At the outset of this opinion, we cannot refrain from expressing our admiration for the great earnestness as well as seriousness of counsel for plaintiffs as manifested in their brief filed in this court in presenting the contentions made in the petition, and especially so as to the argued invasions of the provision of the constitutional section 51. Such labor on the part of counsel no doubt emanates from the commendable quality of loyalty to clients by attorneys representing them and for the cause that they represent; but which, though made and done in all sincerity and in the best of faith, cannot be sustained when tested by declared and approved applicable rules governing the question. Therefore we conclude that the arguments and points made in briefs of appellants' counsel and contentions so extensively discussed do not reach the question involved, and are therefore nonconvincing. For that reason we shall not undertake in this opinion to follow counsel, or endeavor to answer in detail their exhaustive brief, which we are confident is due to a misconception of the intended scope and limitations of the constitutional provisions referred to, and of a misinterpretation of the attacked title.

The entire title to the act is in these words: "An act to reorganize and simplify the executive department of the state government for the purpose of providing for better service and economy, through the enactment of an administrative code providing for the administrative departments and independent agencies therein specified; redistributing the powers and duties of the existing offices, departments, boards, commissions, institutions, and other agencies among them; abolishing certain offices, departments, boards, commissions, institutions, and other agencies; creating certain others; continuing certain others; transferring certain others; defining the organization, powers and duties of officers, departments, boards, commissions, and other agencies that are hereby created or retained and providing for their coordination; fixing and providing for the fixing of certain salaries; fixing terms of office, methods of appointment, and election to, duties of, qualifications for, and methods of removal from offices and positions; and repealing all laws and parts of laws in conflict herewith." The body of the act is divided into articles and sections, the first one declaring that it shall be known as the "Administrative Reorganization Act," and to undertake to set out in detail what it contains from its beginning to its ending would require more time and space than we deem necessary for the disposition of the appeal. We will therefore make references to its provisions only in a general way and as we conceive is proper for the purposes of the case.

Section 51 of our Constitution, and like provisions in Constitutions of other states, is of comparatively modern origin, and the purpose of the people in incorporating it as a part of their fundamental law was to prevent the evil that had grown up of legislating in one act upon as many distinct and wholly disconnected subjects as the legislative body saw fit, without any indication in the title of the act as to what its contents might be. Prior to the adoption of such a provision, the title to an act might clearly indicate that it related to a specifically named subject, or to a number of named subjects, with the body of it containing provisions for a wholly distinct and unconnected subject or subjects than what was mentioned in the title. It was then competent for the Legislature to legislate upon a multiplicity of unrelated subjects which were neither remotely germane to, or in any wise connected with, the one or ones named in the title, and which, as we are advised, is yet true with reference to congressional legislation. To circumvent such deceptive practices resulting in deceitful, selfish, and other baleful consequences, the provision was inserted in the Constition requiring, inter alia, that no statute "shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." Naturally and inevitably it became the practice that those who were adversely affected by a statute, and who desired to annul it, became extremely critical in their interpretation of the constitutional provision so as to, if possible, employ it in a manner to accomplish their desired result. Therefore the cases abound in contentions and argument seeking interpretations of the section that its language does not warrant and which the convention adopting it never intended. Such arguments and contentions assume many forms, prominent among which is that detailed provisions of an act which are not mentioned or in any wise expressed in the title, though germane to the general subject stated therein, are fatal to the validity of the entire statute. In...