Reurink Bros. Star Silo, Inc. v. Clinton County Road Com'rs
Decision Date | 19 August 1987 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 88010 |
Citation | 409 N.W.2d 725,161 Mich.App. 67 |
Parties | REURINK BROTHERS STAR SILO, INC., a Michigan Corporation, and Harry A. Stark, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CLINTON COUNTY ROAD COMMISSIONERS, Defendant-Appellee. 161 Mich.App. 67, 409 N.W.2d 725 |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[161 MICHAPP 68] Robert G. Chaklos, Sr. and Thomas C. Wimsaty, Saginaw, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Foster, Swift, Collins & Coey, P.C., by James D. Adkins and James B. Doezema, Lansing, for defendant-appellee.
Before MAHER, P.J., and HOLBROOK and STEMPIEN , JJ.
This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, Reurink Brothers Star Silo, Inc., and Harry A. Stark, Jr. (Reurink Brothers), from the trial court's order of summary judgment on their claim for contribution against the Board of County Road Commissioners of the County of Clinton for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The underlying injury occurred on August 2, 1983, at approximately 4 p.m. Harry A. Stark, Jr., was driving south on an unpaved section of Tallman Road at or near its intersection with Herbison Road in the County of Clinton. Stark's vehicle was registered to Reurink Brothers. At the same time, Elizabeth Musat, was driving another vehicle on an unpaved section of Herbison Road, [161 MICHAPP 69] approaching the intersection with Tallman Road. The two vehicles collided and Mary Musat died of resulting injuries.
A wrongful death claim was brought against Reurink Brothers, on behalf of the estate of Mary Musat. Judgment was entered in favor of the estate of Mary Musat in the amount of $706,418.53 on September 11, 1984. A timely appeal was taken by Reurink Brothers. However, on March 29, 1985, that appeal was dismissed by stipulation pursuant to a settlement in the amount of $750,000.
On July 16, 1985, Reurink Brothers filed the instant claim in the Clinton Circuit Court, seeking contribution on the part of the defendant as a joint tortfeasor under Michigan's contribution statute, M.C.L. Sec. 600.2925a et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.2925(1) et seq. In its responsive pleading, on August 12, 1985, the county brought a motion to dismiss, alleging that Reurink Brothers failed to plead that the county was joined in the prior action, failed to plead that the settlement extinguished the county's liability and failed to plead that notice was provided to the county. That motion was granted, resulting in this appeal.
Reurink Brothers argues that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition. The county's motion was brought under MCR 1985, 2.116(C)(8), failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. As we have held on a number of occasions, motions brought under this subrule are decided on the pleadings alone. Haddrill v. Damon, 149 Mich.App. 702, 704-705, 386 N.W.2d 643 (1986).
The right to contribution in Michigan is controlled entirely by statute, since there was no right to contribution at common law. Paisley v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 38 Mich.App. 450, 455, 196 N.W.2d 813 (1972), Wilhelm v. The Detroit Edison Co., 56 Mich.App. 116, 157, 274 N.W.2d 289 (1974), lv. den. 393 Mich. 787 (1975), and Sziber v. Stout, 419 Mich. 514, 527, 358 N.W.2d 330 (1984). Michigan's contribution statute, as amended by 1974 P.A. 318, provides in part:
"(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, when 2 or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to a person or property or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them.
M.C.L. Sec. 600.2925a; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.2925(1).
Here, paragraph 11 of the complaint alleged that the action was brought pursuant to M.C.L. Sec. 600.2925a et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.2925(1) et seq. Paragraphs 5-7 describe the fatal accident at or near the intersection of Tallman and Herbison Roads in Clinton County. Paragraphs 3 and 13 allege that the county had jurisdiction over the crossing and [161 MICHAPP 71] therefore had responsibility for its care and control. Paragraph 8 states that a wrongful death claim was brought against Reurink Brothers on behalf of the deceased. Paragraphs 9 and 10 allege:
Numerous other paragraphs of the complaint allege various contributing acts or omissions of the county.
Nowhere in the complaint does Reurink Brothers allege that it paid more than its pro rata share of the common liability. However, the county's motion alleged only the following deficiencies in Reurink Brother's pleadings:
The errors alleged by the county were intended [161 MICHAPP 72] to refer to the following provision within the contribution statute:
"(d) The settlement was not made in good faith." M.C.L. Sec. 600.2925a(3); M.S.A. Sec. 27A.2925(1)(3).
As the county asserts, Reurink Brothers failed to plead that the settlement it entered into extinguished the county's liability. Reurink Brothers also failed to allege that it had paid its pro rata share of the common liability or that a reasonable effort was made to notify the contributee (the county) of the negotiations.
The statute implicitly sets forth the elements of a claim for contribution by a settling tortfeasor:
(1) There must be joint liability on the part of the plaintiff and defendant;
(2) The plaintiff must have paid more than its pro rata share of the common liability;
(3) The settlement entered into by the plaintiff must extinguish the liability of the defendant;
(4) A reasonable effort must have been made to notify the defendant of the pendency of the settlement negotiations;
(5) The defendant must be given a reasonable [161 MICHAPP 73] opportunity to participate in settlement negotiations; and
(6) The settlement must be made in good faith.
Since the complaint in this instance did not allege either (3) or (4), it fails to state a cause of action. We also note that the complaint fails to allege (2), (5) and (6), though that issue was not raised by the county in the trial court.
Despite its pleading that it "settled" the prior action and despite the fact that the county's motion was filed under MCR 2.116(C)(8), Reurink Brothers argues that this Court should look outside of the pleadings to determine that it in fact "satisfied the judgment." Thus, Reurink Brothers would have this Court conclude that its claim does not fall under paragraph (3) of the statute, M.C.L. Sec. 600.2925a(3); M.S.A. Sec. 27A.2925(1)(3), but under paragraph (5)
M.C.L. Sec. 600.2925a(5); M.S.A. Sec. 27A.2925(1)(5).
Even if Reurink Brother's complaint is read to state a cause of action under paragraph (5), it fails to properly allege that the county was made a party to the prior action and...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
In re Air Crash at Detroit Metro. Airport
...is controlled by, statute because "there was no right to contribution at common law." Reurink Bros. Star Silo, Inc. v. Clinton County Road Commissioners, 161 Mich.App. 67, 70, 409 N.W.2d 725 (1987). The Michigan Contribution Act reads, in relevant Right of contribution among joint or severa......
-
Fishbach-Natkin, Inc. v. Shimizu America Corp.
...Air Crash at Detroit Metro. Airport, 791 F.Supp. 1204, 1225-26 (E.D.Mich.1992), citing Reurink Bros. Star Silo, Inc. v. Clinton County Road Commissioners, 161 Mich.App. 67, 70, 409 N.W.2d 725 (1987). The Michigan Contribution Act reads, in relevant (1) Except as otherwise provided in this a......
-
Miller v. Riverwood Recreation Center, Inc.
...is controlled entirely by statute because there was no right to contribution at common law. Reurink Bros. Star Silo, Inc. v. Clinton Co. Road Comm'rs, 161 Mich.App. 67, 70, 409 N.W.2d 725 (1987). The contribution provisions of the Revised Judicature Act allow a joint tortfeasor "who has pai......
-
Dolinka VanNoord and Co. v. Oppenheimer and Co., 1:94-CV-710.
...is controlled entirely by statute, since there was no right to contribution at common law." Reurink Bros. Star Silo, Inc. v. Clinton Cty. Road Comm'rs, 161 Mich.App. 67, 409 N.W.2d 725, 726 (1987); Isabella County v. Michigan, 181 Mich.App. 99, 449 N.W.2d 111, 112-13 Neither of the parties ......