Reyes v. Pistone
| Decision Date | 22 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | Index No.: 8250/10 |
| Parties | MARTA J. REYES, Plaintiff, v. PIETRO PISTONE, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Acting Supreme Court Justice
Motion Date: 05/31/11
The following papers have been read on this motion:
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¦ ¦Papers Numbered ¦
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¦Notice of Motion. Affirmation and Exhibits¦1 ¦
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¦Affirmation in Opposition and Exhibits ¦2 ¦
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¦Reply Affirmation ¦3 ¦
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Upon the foregoing papers, it is ordered that the motion is decided as follows:
Defendant moves, pursuant to CPLR § 3212 and Article 51 of the Insurance Law of the State of New York, for an order granting him summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff did not suffer a "serious injury" in the subject accident as defined by New York State Insurance Law § 5102(d). Plaintiff opposes the motion.
The above entitled action stems from personal injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff as a result of an automobile accident with defendant which occurred on September 17, 2009, at approximately 10:55 p.m., on westbound Jericho Turnpike approximately fifty (50) feet east of Wellington Road, in the County of Nassau, Town of North Hempstead, State of New York. The accident involved two vehicles, a 2004 Honda operated by plaintiff and a 2004 Jeep owned andoperated by defendant.
At the time of the accident, plaintiff's vehicle was traveling westbound on Jericho Turnpike. Defendant's vehicle was also traveling westbound on Jericho Turnpike. Plaintiff contends that her vehicle was stopped in traffic in the left lane on Jericho Turnpike when the defendant's vehicle struck her from behind, pushing her car forward approximately one car length. Plaintiff further contends that, as a result of the heavy impact, her body was caused to move forward and backward in her vehicle and said impact caused her neck and back to strike the headrest and seat. As a result of the collision, plaintiff claims that she sustained the following injuries:
Plaintiff commenced th action by service of a Summons and Verified Complaint on or about April 28, 2010. Issue was joined on or about June 21, 2010. See Defendant's Affirmation in Support Exhibit A.
It is well settled that the proponent of a motion for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by providing sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of material issues of fact. See Sillman v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 395, 165 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1957); Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 N.Y.2d 320, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1986); Zuckerman v. City of New York 49 N.Y.2d 557, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1980); Bhatti v. Roche, 140 A.D.2d 660, 528 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (2d Dept. 1988). To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must establish its claim or defense by tendering sufficient evidentiary proof, in admissible form, sufficient to warrant the court, as a matter of law, to direct judgment in the movant's favor. See Friends of Animals, Inc. v. Associated Fur Mfrs., Inc., 46 N.Y.2d 1065, 416 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1979). Such evidence may include deposition transcripts, as well as other proof annexed to an attorney's affirmation. See CPLR § 3212 (b); Olan v. Farrell Lines Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 1092, 489 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1985).
If a sufficient prima facie showing is demonstrated, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with competent evidence to demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact, the existence of which necessarily precludes the granting of summary judgment and necessitates a trial. See Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1980), supra. When considering a motion for summary judgment, the function of the court is not to resolve issues but rather to determine if any such material issues of fact exist. See Sillman v. Twentieth Century- Fox Film Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 395, 165 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1957),supra. Mere conclusions or unsubstantiated allegations are insufficient to raise a triable issue. See Gilbert Frank Corp v. Federal Ins. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 966, 525 N.Y.S. 2d 793 (1988). Further, to grant summary judgment, it must clearly appear that no material triable issue of fact is presented. The burden on the court in deciding this type of motion is not to resolve issues of fact or determine matters of credibility, but merely to determine whether such issues exist. See Barr v. Albany County, 50 N.Y.2d 247,428 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1980); Daliendo v. Johnson, 147 A.D.2d 312, 543 N.Y.S.2d 987 (2d Dept. 1989).
Within the particular context of a threshold motion which seeks dismissal of a personal injury complaint, the movant bears a specific burden of establishing that the plaintiff did not sustain a "serious injury" as enumerated in Article 51 of the Insurance Law § 5102(d). See Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1992). Upon such a showing, it becomes incumbent upon the non-moving party to come forth with sufficient evidence in admissible form to raise an issue of fact as to the existence of a "serious injury." See Licari v. Elliott, 57 N.Y.2d 230, 455 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1982).
In support of a claim that the plaintiff has not sustained a serious injury, the defendant may rely either on the sworn statements of the defendant's examining physicians or the unsworn reports of the plaintiff's examining physicians. See Pagano v. Kingsbury, 182 A.D.2d 268, 587 N.Y.S.2d 692 (2d Dept. 1992). However, unlike the movant's proof, unsworn reports of the plaintiff's examining doctors or chiropractors are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Grasso v. Angerami, 79 N.Y.2d 813, 580 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1991).
Essentially, in order to satisfy the statutory serious injury threshold, the legislature requires objective proof of a plaintiff's injury. The Court of Appeals in Toure v. Avis Rent-a-Car Systems, 98 N.Y.2d 345, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865 (2002) stated that a plaintiff's proof of injury must be supported by objective medical evidence, such as sworn MRI and CT scan tests. However, these sworn tests must be paired with the doctor's observations during the physical examination of the plaintiff Unsworn MRI reports can also constitute competent evidence if both sides rely on thosereports. See Gonzalez v. Vasquez, 301 A.D.2d 438, 754 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1st Dept. 2003).
Conversely, even where there is ample proof of a plaintiff's injury, certain factors may nonetheless override a plaintiff's objective medical proof of limitations and permit dismissal of a plaintiff's complaint. Specifically, additional contributing factors such as a gap in treatment, an intervening medical problem or a pre-existing condition would interrupt the chain of causation between the accident and the claimed injury. See Pommells v. Perez, 4 N.Y.3d 566, 797 N.Y.S.2d 380 (2005).
Plaintiff claims that, as a consequence of the above described automobile accident with defendants he has sustained serious injuries as defined in New York State Insurance Law § 5102(d) and which fall within the following statutory categories of injuries:
See Defendant's Affirmation in Support Exhibit B.
For a permanent loss of a body organ, member, function or system to qualify as a "serious injury" within the meaning of No-Fault Law, the loss must be total. See Oberly v. Bangs Ambulance, Inc., 96 N.Y.2d 295, 727 N.Y.S.2d 378 (2001); Amata v. Fast Repair Incorporated, 42 A.D.3d 477, 840 N.Y.S.2d 394 (2d Dept. 2007).
To meet the threshold regarding significant limitation of use of a body function or system or permanent consequential limitation of a body function or system, the law requires that the limitation be more than minor, mild or slight and that the claim be supported by medical proof based upon credible medical evidence of an objectively measured and quantified medical injuryor condition. See Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N. Y.2d 955, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1992); Licari v. Elliot, 57 N.Y.2d 230, 455 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1982). A minor, mild or slight limitation will be deemed insignificant within the meaning of the statute. See Licari v. Elliot, supra. A claim raised under the "permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member" or "significant limitation of use of a body function or system" categories can be made by an expert's designation of a numeric...
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