REYES v. The State of Tex.
| Decision Date | 31 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-09-00286-CR,05-09-00286-CR |
| Parties | ERNESTO PINA REYES, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
AFFIRM; Opinion filed March 31, 2011.
On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Before Justices Moseley, Bridges, and O'Neill
Opinion By Justice Moseley
A jury convicted appellant Ernesto Pina Reyes of the capital murder of Melanie Goodwin, and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(2) (West Supp. 2010). The jury also made a deadly weapon finding. Appellant brings four issues on appeal, complaining of jury charge error, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, and abuse of discretion by admitting certain evidence. We affirm.
The record contains evidence that appellant met Goodwin at a QuickTrip on September 25, 2007. Goodwin was driving her car on her way home from a job as a Red Bull representative and stopped at the store about 1:42 a.m. to buy food for her boyfriend. Appellant, who had arrived at the store on foot about one and one-half hours earlier, asked her for a ride home. A QuickTrip employee saw them leave together at about 1:44 a.m.
At about 3:00 a.m., appellant arrived at the apartment of his friend Donovan Young, in Goodwin's car. Appellant had blood on his shirt, looked scared, and told Young he "had killed someone." Young looked in the car and saw Goodwin's body with her underwear pulled down and her skirt pulled up. Appellant asked Young to help him to dispose of Goodwin's body. Young gave him a gas can and some money and told him to leave. Appellant bought gasoline, drove to a wooded area, threw Goodwin's body in a ditch, and burned it. He abandoned her car in an apartment complex parking lot.
About 5:00 a.m., appellant returned to Young's apartment and went to sleep. About noon, appellant and Young drove to the apartment complex to retrieve Goodwin's car. En route, appellant told Young that he and Goodwin smoked marijuana together and were "messing around like they were going to hookup." They decided to have sex, but Goodwin's boyfriend called while they were in the back seat "having sex," and Goodwin said she had to go home. Appellant wanted to "finish sex," but Goodwin did not. After "he was finished," he tried to get out of the car, but she pulled him back in, telling him she was going to say that he raped her. Appellant told Young he then hit Goodwin in the face, and her nose started bleeding. He was "trying to hold her," but she "stopped moving."
Appellant and Young found Goodwin's car, and Young left. Subsequently, appellant abandoned the car after burning the inside. Goodwin's badly burned body was found the morning of September 25: she was identified by dental records.
The charge instructed the jury that to warrant a capital murder conviction, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of the felony offense of aggravated sexual assault of Goodwin but also during the commission of that offense or attempted commission, if any, that he caused Goodwin's death by asphyxiating or striking her with his hands or his body or an unknown object, a deadly weapon, with the intention of killing her. Further:
Unless you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that [appellant], on said occasion, specifically intended to kill Melanie Goodwin when he asphyxiated or struck her, if [appellant] did asphyxiate or strike her, you cannot convict [appellant] of the offense of capital murder.
In his second and third issues respectively, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually1 insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, he argues the evidence failed to prove intercourse occurred without Goodwin's consent, he caused Goodwin's death, and the offense occurred "during the commission or attempted commission of" aggravated sexual assault, as charged.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view all evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). We consider all evidence, whether properly or improperly admitted. See McDaniel v. Brown, 130 S. Ct. 665, 672 (2010) (per curiam); Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 41-42 (1988); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. It is the responsibility of the fact finder to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The standard of review is the same for direct and circumstantial evidence cases; circumstantial evidence may be as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
As applicable here, a person commits the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual, or intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1), (2) (West 2003). And, as applicable here, a person commits the offense of capital murder if the person commits murder as defined under section 19.02(b)(1) and the person intentionally commits the murder "in the course of committing or attempting to commit" aggravated sexual assault. See id. § 19.03(a) (2); see also id. § 22.021(a) (1) (A) (i), (a) (2) (A) (i), (iv) (West Supp. 2010) (). The element of "in the course of committing or attempting to commit" means "conduct occurring in an attempt to commit, during the commission, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of the offense." See Garrett v. State, 851 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (quoting Riles v. State, 595 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)).
A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a) (West 2003); Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (). Intent is almost always proved by circumstantial evidence. Manrique v. State, 994 S.W.2d 640, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (Meyers, J., concurring) (citing Robles v. State, 664 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)). A jury may infer intent from any facts that tend to prove its existence, including the method of committing the crime and the nature of wounds inflicted on the victim. Id.
A hand is not a deadly weapon per se, but can become a deadly weapon if it is used in a manner that is capable of causing death or serious bodily harm. Turner v. State, 664 S.W.2d 86, 90 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1983); see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(17)(B) (West Supp. 2010). If a deadly weapon is used in a deadly manner, the inference is almost conclusive that the defendant intended to kill. Adanandus v. State, 866 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
Appellant admitted to Young that he and Goodwin had sexual intercourse. On appeal, appellant argues there is no evidence their intercourse was nonconsensual. We disagree. Young testified appellant told him that Goodwin did not want to " finish sex with him" and that she told him she would say he "raped" her.
Appellant argues the evidence fails to prove that he caused Goodwin's death. In light of Young's testimony that appellant told Young he hit Goodwin in the face, she started bleeding, and then she "stopped moving," we construe his argument to be, as does the State, that the evidence failed to prove he intentionally caused her death.
The record includes the testimony of Jeffrey Barnard, M.D., who conducted Goodwin's autopsy. Pertinent to appellant's argument, Barnard said that there were visible injuries on her head:
bruising on the front of the chin, right forehead, right temple, left side of the head near the top, and the back of the head. Barnard said these injuries were the result of blunt force trauma, like those resulting from being struck by a hand, while she was alive. There was also bruising and hemorrhaging in the lower part of the neck, which is common in strangulation. There was bleeding from both eyes, which was "totally consistent with strangulation." Barnard said that "significant force" was applied to cause the injuries, and the injuries were consistent with a person using hands or fists on the victim. He said the injuries were "more consistent with manual strangulation than anything else" and described the conduct and time needed to cause death by manual strangulation.
Barnard also testified that a chest injury showed either a person on top of the victim with that person's knees in the victim's chest while strangling her or a person kicking or punching her, driving "with the body weight with enough speed and force." Barnard agreed that the object used was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury and was therefore a deadly weapon. Over appellant's objections, the jury observed autopsy photographs during Barnard's...
To continue reading
Request your trial