Reynolds v. Cunningham
| Decision Date | 29 December 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-003,88-003 |
| Citation | 131 N.H. 312,556 A.2d 300 |
| Parties | Dwight T. REYNOLDS v. Michael CUNNINGHAM, Warden, New Hampshire State Prison. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
James E. Duggan, Appellate Defender, Concord, by brief and orally, for petitioner.
Stephen E. Merrill, Atty. Gen. (David S. Peck, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief and orally), for the State.
The State appeals from an order of the Superior Court (Murphy, J.) awarding the petitioner, an inmate at the New Hampshire State Prison, credit for pre-trial confinement from May 23, 1986, the date his parole was revoked, to August 12, 1987, the date of his conviction on the charges which arose out of the alleged parole violation.
The trial court ruled that the adult parole board's failure to grant the petitioner use immunity for his testimony at the parole revocation hearing denied him due process because it may have deterred him from testifying at that hearing in an attempt to preserve his right against self-incrimination at the impending trial on criminal charges. The State argues that the court should not have considered the self-incrimination question because the petitioner did not meet his burden of showing that he had raised that question at the revocation hearing. We agree, and therefore vacate the superior court's order.
The petitioner, Dwight T. Reynolds, was convicted in 1981 for the felonious use of firearms and receiving stolen property. He was sentenced to three and one-half to seven years in the New Hampshire State Prison, and was paroled in 1985. On April 18, 1986, he was arrested and charged with burglary, possession of burglary tools, and receiving stolen property. See State v. Reynolds, 131 N.H. 291, 556 A.2d 298 (1988). This last charge was later dismissed. Id. The adult parole board (the board) held a revocation hearing on May 23, 1986, to determine whether the petitioner had violated his parole. See RSA 651-A:17 (Supp.1988). The board heard testimony from police officers and reviewed police reports of the indictments and complaint; the petitioner neither testified nor presented any evidence. The hearing was recorded and, pursuant to standard board procedure, the tape was erased after 180 days. See Rules of the Adult Parole Board, p 103.01. The board revoked petitioner's parole.
On August 12, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of burglary and possession of burglary tools. He was sentenced to three and one-half to seven years on the burglary charge, with credit for pre-trial confinement from April 23, 1986, to May 23, 1986, and to twelve months on the possession of burglary tools charge, to be served concurrently, with credit for pre-trial confinement from April 18, 1986, to May 23, 1986. The record does not indicate a reason for the discrepancy between the lengths of credit for pretrial confinement.
Approximately sixteen months after the parole board decision, in September, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a petition for declaratory judgment. He argued that the board had erred when it revoked his parole "on a presumption that indictment ... was indicative of [his] misbehavior," and that the revocation therefore deprived him of pre-trial credit for confinement from the date of his arrest in April, 1986, until his conviction in August, 1987, in violation of his due process rights. As noted above, he had been allowed credit only for confinement from the date of arrest until the date on which his parole was revoked. The State moved to dismiss the petition. The petitioner then filed an objection to the motion to dismiss, asserting for the first time that the board had "advised him that anything he said in defense would be used against him in future prosecutions," jeopardizing the exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination.
During the hearing held on the petition in the superior court, the petitioner reiterated that he had not been able to defend himself at the revocation hearing because he had desired to preserve his right against self-incrimination. After the hearing, both parties submitted supporting memoranda, and the petitioner, for the first time, specifically alleged that he had stated during the revocation hearing "that he would not and could not say any thing (sic) concerning the indictment because of the...
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Frost v. State
...contentions without any way of ascertaining whether the Parole Commission had the opportunity to address them. See Reynolds v. Cunningham, 131 N.H. 312, 556 A.2d 300 (1988) (holding that habeas corpus petition should have been dismissed where the petitioner delayed action approximately 16 m......
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State v. Dushame
... ... Reynolds, 131 N.H. 291, 295, 556 A.2d 298, 300 (1988), RSA 500-A:13 touches upon the integrity of the deliberative process of the jury and therefore requires ... ...
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State v. Blomquist
...those grounds. Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250, 855 A.2d 564 (2004) ; see Sup.Ct. R. 13(2) ; Reynolds v. Cunningham, Warden, 131 N.H. 312, 314, 556 A.2d 300 (1988) ("[T]he petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that he objected in the appropriate forum ....").Here, we h......
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State v. Brodowski, 90-273
...the contemporaneous objection requirement is not relaxed simply because the defendant appears pro se. Reynolds v. Cunningham, Warden, 131 N.H. 312, 315, 556 A.2d 300, 302 (1988). In Brien v. Wiley, 124 N.H. 573, 474 A.2d 1015, however, we pronounced a narrow exception to the rule, holding "......