Reynolds v. State
| Decision Date | 16 November 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 68554,68554 |
| Parties | REYNOLDS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Charles W. Smith, Jr., Gainesville, for appellant.
Bruce L. Udolf, Dist. Atty., Deborah L. Schwind, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Reynolds appeals his conviction of criminal issuance of a bad check.
1. Appellant contends the trial court erred by allowing testimony and bank statements into evidence relating to other dishonored checks issued by appellant. The testimony and exhibits were introduced for the limited purpose of showing appellant's state of mind and knowledge that he had insufficient funds in his account to cover the check issued in this case.
Before evidence of independent crimes is admissible two conditions must be met. First, there must be evidence that the defendant was the perpetrator of the independent crime and second, there must be sufficient similarity or connection between the independent crime and the offense charged that proof of the former tends to prove the latter. Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261, 71 S.E.2d 615 (1952); Hamilton v. State, 239 Ga. 72, 75, 235 S.E.2d 515 (1977). These two conditions were met, and once the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the independent crimes has been proven, testimony concerning the independent crimes is admissible for the purpose of showing identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind, and course of conduct. Davis v. State, 249 Ga. 309, 311(1), 290 S.E.2d 273 (1982). Although appellant argues there was no evidence that the other returned checks were given for present consideration so as to constitute a crime, it was not necessary that the State prove every element of the commission of the independent crimes as a condition of admissibility. Tuzman v. State, 145 Ga.App. 761, 763(1)(B), 244 S.E.2d 882 (1978); Davis, supra. Where the conditions of identity and similarity are met, as they are here, the evidence is admissible. Id. 249 Ga. at 312(1), 290 S.E.2d 273.
2. Appellant contends it was error to deny his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because the State did not prove appellant was given a ten-day notice in which to make the check good, as authorized by OCGA § 16-9-20(a)(2). This enumeration is not supported by the transcript, which discloses that Russ Hinson, the president and general manager of Parks Building Mart to whom the check was payable, testified the company sent appellant a registered letter notifying him his check had been returned for insufficient funds. A receipt showing delivery of the letter was received by Parks Building Mart. OCGA § 16-9-20(a)(2)(A) provides that notice by registered mail evidenced by return receipt shall be deemed sufficient and equivalent to notice having been received by the person issuing the instrument. Accordingly, it was not error to deny appellant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the ground stated, and the evidence was sufficient otherwise to meet the standards of proof required by Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560. Lee v. State, 247 Ga. 411, 412(6), 276 S.E.2d 590 (1981); Humphrey v. State, 252 Ga. 525, 527(1), 314 S.E.2d 436 (1984).
3. Appellant has presented no argument or citation of authority in support of his fourth enumeration of error. Accordingly, it is deemed abandoned pursuant to this court's Rule 15(c)(2).
4. Appellant contends it was error for a judge other than the one who heard the case on its merits to impose sentence in this case. In this regard, this case was tried on the merits by one judge, with a jury, and a second judge imposed sentence. The transcript discloses that after the jury rendered its verdict and was excused, the trial judge directed a pre-sentence investigation and stated that he did not know if he or another judge would sentence appellant on December 9th (1983). Appellant made no objection, and it is well settled that this court will not consider questions raised for the first time on appeal. Scott v. State, 243 Ga. 233, 234-235(2), 253 S.E.2d 698 (1979); Brooks v. State, 165 Ga.App. 115, 116(2), 299 S.E.2d 167 (1983).
5. Lastly, appellant contends the trial court erred by ordering a pre-sentence report and considering the report in aggravation of the sentence. He argues that before prior convictions or pleas may be used by the State in aggravation of...
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...or "intent to defraud" in bad-check cases, see, e.g., Ledford v. State, 184 Ga.App. 556, 362 S.E.2d 133 (1987); Reynolds v. State, 172 Ga.App. 628, 323 S.E.2d 912 (1984); State v. Ricard, 535 So.2d 21 (La.App.1988); State v. Carroll, 41 S.W.3d 878 (Mo.2001); State v. Ben-Neth, 34 Wash.App. ......
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...the trial court did, in fact, consider the Gwinnett County judgment in aggravation of defendant's sentence. See Reynolds v. State, 172 Ga.App. 628(5), 323 S.E.2d 912 (1984). Defendant has thus not borne his burden of showing error in this 3. Defendant's fifth enumeration assigns error to th......
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Williams v. State, 72890
...evidence here challenged meets the requirements of the law, and it was not error to admit such evidence. See also Reynolds v. State, 172 Ga.App. 628(1), 323 S.E.2d 912 (1984); Weaver v. State, 169 Ga.App. 890(2), 315 S.E.2d 467 (1984); Burnette v. State, 168 Ga.App. 578(3), 309 S.E.2d 875 J......