Rhea v. School Bd. of Alachua County, 93-1414

Decision Date18 May 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-1414,93-1414
Citation636 So.2d 1383
Parties91 Ed. Law Rep. 780, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D1115 Darnell RHEA, Appellant, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF ALACHUA COUNTY, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Joseph W. Little, Gainesville, for appellant.

Thomas L. Wittmer, Gainesville, for appellee.

LAWRENCE, Judge.

Darnell Rhea (Rhea) appeals a summary judgment entered in favor of the Alachua County School Board (Board). The trial court found that the Board's workshop held in Orlando, Florida, on December 3, 1991, did not violate section 286.011, Florida Statutes (1991), commonly known as the "Government in the Sunshine Law." 1 We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Board announced, during its regular November meeting, that it intended to conduct a workshop 2 for Board members in Orlando on December 3, 1991, to take advantage of the fact that all the members already would be in Orlando to attend the semi-annual convention of the Florida School Boards Association. The Board also advertised the meeting by placing a detailed notice in the Gainesville Sun newspaper on November 26, 1991, stating that the meeting was "a public workshop to which all persons are invited." The Board met on the evening of December 3, 1991, as planned, at the Twin Towers Hotel in Orlando.

Rhea filed a complaint on May 29, 1992, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the Board, alleging that the Board violated section 286.011 in holding a Board meeting in a place located outside the geographical boundaries of the Board's district, that is, Alachua County, and more than 100 miles from Gainesville, the Board's headquarters.

Both parties moved for summary judgment. Rhea's affidavit stated that he would have attended the meeting but for the fact it was held outside Alachua County, over 100 miles from him. The Board attached a copy of the minutes of the workshop and two affidavits in support of its motion. One affidavit was from a Board member, who stated that the Orlando workshop was open to the public at all times, that is, the meeting was held in a public meeting room, the room had sufficient space for those in attendance, and the meeting was properly noticed. The second affidavit was from the Board's attorney, who stated that the workshop occurred in a hotel public meeting room, the door to which was left open throughout the session. Moreover, the hotel's staff was advised to direct anyone who inquired about the meeting to the appropriate location.

The Board properly concedes that the school board workshop held in Orlando was a "public meeting" for purposes of the Sunshine Law. Canney v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 278 So.2d 260 (Fla.1973). The Board, however, denies that any violation of that law took place. Section 286.011(1) provides in relevant part:

All meetings of any board ... at which official acts are to be taken are declared public meetings open to the public at all times, and no resolution, rule, or formal action shall be considered binding except as taken or made at such meeting.

(Emphasis added.) The mere fact that a meeting is held in a public room does not make it public within the meaning of the Sunshine Law. Bigelow v. Howze, 291 So.2d 645, 647-48 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). 3 For a meeting to be "public," it is essential that the public be given advance notice and a reasonable opportunity to attend. Id.

The Board argues that it complied with the mandates of the Sunshine Law by publicly advertising the meeting in advance, and providing a reasonable opportunity for the public to attend by holding the meeting in an open and public meeting room at a hotel convention facility. Rhea does not challenge the sufficiency of notice given by the Board, nor does he claim the meeting was conducted in secrecy. Thus, adequacy of notice is not an issue in this case. Rhea challenges instead the scope of the word "public," as contemplated by the Sunshine Law. Rhea contends "public" refers to the constituency of the public entity that is convening. The "public" for the Alachua County School Board, therefore, would be members of Alachua County, as opposed to members of Orange County or the Florida public at large. Rhea argues that by meeting outside Alachua County, at a hotel more than 100 miles from its headquarters, the Board denied reasonable access to its public.

Section 286.011 does not define the word "public." In construing a statute, words that are undefined by the statute should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. State, Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. McTigue, 387 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Included among the various dictionary definitions of "public" are the following: "of, relating to, or affecting the people as an organized community; a place accessible or visible to all members of the community; an organized body of people: community, nation; a group of people distinguished by common interests or characteristics." Webster's 3d New International Dictionary 1836 (1981). Applying the plain and ordinary meaning of the word to the instant case, the relevant "public," the community that would be affected by the Board's official actions, is Alachua County. Review of sections 230.01 and 230.11, Florida Statutes (1991), 4 which provide that the school board represents the entire county, and section 230.17, Florida Statutes (1991), which requires the Board to publish advance notice of the workshop in a newspaper circulated in that county, confirms the fact that the relevant community is Alachua County. Thus, whether the Orlando Board workshop was sufficiently "open to the public" depends on whether Alachua County residents had a "reasonable opportunity" to attend the meeting. See Bigelow v. Howze.

Rhea urges this court to fashion an absolute rule which would prohibit any Board workshop from being held under any circumstances at a site more than 100 miles from the usual meeting place. We can envision...

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7 cases
  • Wiedemann v. Town of Hilton Head Island
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • January 29, 2001
    ...of factors in reaching its decision. In adopting the balancing test in Wiedemann I, this court relied heavily on Rhea v. School Bd., 636 So.2d 1383 (Fla.Dist. Ct.App.1994). In Rhea, the school board conducted a meeting more than 100 miles from its regular meeting place. The board advertised......
  • Wiedemann v. Town of Hilton Head Island
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • April 8, 1997
    ...has received the imprimatur and approbation of our General Assembly in § 30-4-15. Wiedemann cites Rhea v. School Board of Alachua County, 636 So.2d 1383 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994), to support his contention the workshop at Dataw Island violated the FOIA's open meeting requirement and the direct......
  • Wiedemann v. Town of Hilton Head Island
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • May 18, 1998
    ...or delay" requirements of § 30-4-15. The Court of Appeals adopted the balancing test espoused by the court in Rhea v. School Board of Alachua County, 636 So.2d 1383 (Fla.App.1994). Under that test, "the interests of the municipality in conducting the meeting outside the municipal limits [sh......
  • Grapski v. City of Alachua
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • April 1, 2010
    ...the open meeting law requires advance notice and a reasonable opportunity to attend, appellants rely on Rhea v. School Board of Alachua County, 636 So.2d 1383 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). In Rhea, the Alachua County School Board (ACSB) announced its intent to conduct a workshop for board members in......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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