Grapski v. City of Alachua

• Decision Date: 01 April 2010
• Docket Number: No. 1D09-509.,1D09-509.
• Citation: 31 So.3d 193
• Parties: Charles James GRAPSKI and Michael Canney, Appellants, v. CITY OF ALACHUA, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

31 So.3d 193

Charles James GRAPSKI and Michael Canney, Appellants, v. CITY OF ALACHUA, Appellee.

No. 1D09-509.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

January 21, 2010.

Rehearing Denied April 1, 2010.

Joseph W. Little, Gainesville, for Appellants.

Marian B. Rush of Rush & Glassman, Gainesville; Beth M. Coleman of Beth M. Coleman, P.A., St. Petersburg; and Rodney W. Smith of Avera & Smith, LLP, Gainesville, for Appellee.

KAHN, J.

Charles Grapski and Michael Canney appeal a final judgment (on Count One) and a summary final judgment (on Count Two) entered in favor of appellee, City of Alachua (the City), on appellants' amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging violations of chapters 119 and 286, Florida Statutes (2006), and the Florida Constitution. To the extent the trial court concluded the issues of 1) the City's failure to allow appellants to inspect and copy the Board of Canvassers' (Board) April 11, 2006, Minutes (the Minutes) in a timely manner and 2) entitlement to attorney's fees and costs was mooted because appellants belatedly received the Minutes, we reverse the final judgment and summary final judgment and remand for the trial court to award reasonable attorney's fees and costs. We further hold void the action taken by the City in approving the, as of then, undisclosed Minutes. We affirm the trial court's rulings in all other respects relating to the City Commission's (the Commission) actions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The City conducted a Commission election on April 11, 2006. After the polls closed, the Board met to canvass the election, and a city employee prepared Minutes of that proceeding. Appellants attended the meeting and observed what they perceived to be improprieties. The City then promulgated a Regular City Commission Meeting Agenda (the Agenda) for the May 15 Commission meeting. The "Consent Agenda" part of the Agenda included "Minutes: April 11, 2006 Board of Canvassers Meeting." Three days before the May 15 meeting, appellants went to City Hall to obtain a copy of the Minutes. They found out, however, the Minutes were not among the documents available to the public. Neither were the Minutes available on the City's site or at the county public library before the meeting. Appellants then made an oral public records request through Deputy Clerk Alan Henderson to inspect and copy the Minutes. Henderson denied their request, telling them the Minutes would be made available to the public after the Commission approved them at its May 15 meeting. Another request for the Minutes on the morning of May 15 also failed. Thus, under the City's apparent policy, appellants could not determine the contents of the Minutes until after the Commission meeting, during which the Minutes would be taken up on the consent agenda. Appellants subsequently asked to inspect and copy many other purported public records relating to the April 11 Commission election.

In the present action, appellants have raised issues under Florida public records and open meeting laws. Count One, the public records claim, alleges violations of section 119.07, Florida Statutes (2006), and article I, section 24(a) of the Florida Constitution, based on the City's refusal to allow appellants to inspect and copy the Minutes before the May 15 meeting. Appellants claimed the Minutes are a "public record" for purposes of chapter 119. This count alleged other violations of public records law relating to the City's subsequent refusal to permit inspection and copying of additional documents. Appellants sought judgment against the City in the nature of an order declaring a violation of constitutional and statutory rights, enjoining the City either to grant requests for public records or to provide written reasons for its denials, and granting attorney's fees and costs.

In its answer, the City neither admitted nor denied appellants' assertion the Minutes are a public record. Subsequently, at a motion hearing, the City's counsel answered "no" when the trial judge asked her whether the City's position was that the Minutes are not a public record. Conceding the City had not provided appellants with a copy of the Minutes when requested, the City nevertheless argued mootness, relying on the by-then undisputed fact appellants had received a copy of the Minutes many months later, but before bringing this lawsuit. How appellants obtained a copy of the Minutes is unclear in the record.

After a bench trial on Count One, the court asked appellants to provide a list of the public records requested, but alleged to have been unlawfully denied them by the City or its employees. Ultimately, the trial court determined appellants had essentially abandoned their claims except for the City's refusal to allow them to inspect and copy the Minutes. To the extent appellants belatedly listed other records allegedly requested, but not received, the trial court concluded that any documents not introduced at the trial would not be considered in resolving Count One. The court cited certain evidence in the record that voluminous other public records were requested and were provided to appellants. Still other records were destroyed in a fire at City Hall, which thwarted the City's attempts to review some of its computerized records.

Finding the initial complaint was filed nearly nine months after appellants initially requested the Minutes, and that appellants had the Minutes by then, the trial court concluded that public records law, chapter 119, Florida Statutes, cannot be used to compel production of a document already provided to the requesting party before filing the lawsuit. In other words, the court determined the public records claim was moot by the time appellants filed the initial complaint. The court denied any relief to appellants on this claim.

Count Two, the open meeting claim, alleged violations of section 286.011, Florida Statutes (2006), known as the "Government in the Sunshine Law" or "open meetings" law; and article I, section 24(b) of the Florida Constitution. Contemporaneously with the final judgment, the trial court issued a summary final judgment in favor of the City on Count Two. The parties agreed no material factual issues are in dispute in the open meeting claim. The trial court determined the City's use of the consent agenda procedure did not violate chapter 286, Florida Statutes, and denied appellants' claim under section 286.011 seeking an order "rendering the City's approval of the Minutes null and void and of no legal effect."

ANALYSIS

We have de novo review of a question of law. Whether the trial court correctly interpreted and applied the relevant statutes is such a question. See Gilliam v. Smart, 809 So.2d 905, 907 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Rogers v. Hood, 906 So.2d 1220, 1223 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (stating that the issue of what constitutes a public record is a question of law). On their claim under chapter 119, appellants had to prove they made a specific request for public records, the City received it, the requested public records exist, and the City improperly refused to produce them in a timely manner. See Hillier v. City of Plantation, 935 So.2d 105, 106 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Here the Minutes were created immediately following the April 11, 2006, meeting. Appellants made specific requests for the Minutes before the May 15 meeting, and the City's employee represented the Minutes would not be released to the public until after approval by the Commission. Appellants maintained that although they belatedly had received a copy of the Minutes, the violation of Florida public records law reached fruition at the City's unlawful refusal to timely produce a copy of the Minutes, and certainly by the time the primary usefulness of the Minutes passed. Although appellants knew when the Commission would meet and knew the Minutes would be submitted for approval then, they had no opportunity to examine the Minutes until after their approval. This unjustifiable delay and closed procedure, say appellants, is tantamount to denying their request for the Minutes altogether and constitutes an unlawful refusal to comply with chapter 119. See Barfield v. Town of Eatonville, 675 So.2d 223, 224 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (stating that "an unjustified delay in complying with a public records request amounts to an unlawful refusal").

Unquestionably, the City's Minutes are a "public record." That term in Florida law broadly includes any document, paper, or other material "made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency." § 119.011(11), Fla. Stat. (2006); see Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., Inc., 379 So.2d 633, 640 (Fla.1980) (concluding that intra-office or inter-office memos communicating information from one public employee to another, or prepared for filing although not part of the agency's later formal public product, constituted "public records" under section 119.011 because they supplied the final evidence of knowledge obtained in connection with the transaction of public business); Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 91-26 (1991) (concluding that the minutes of a city council meeting are public records once the clerk has performed the duty to prepare them). The Board, a subdivision of the City, is an "agency." § 119.011(2), Fla. Stat. (2006) (defining "agency" to include any municipal board). The City does not assert otherwise. The Minutes were prepared in the course of the official business of the Board's canvassing the municipal election. Although not yet considered by the Commission, the Minutes are the final work product of the Board, not a preliminary draft or note. See Shevin, 379 So.2d at 640 (distinguishing a "public record," which is "any material prepared in connection with official agency business which is intended to perpetuate, communicate, or formalize knowledge of some type," from "drafts or notes, which constitute mere...