Rheb v. Bar Ass'n of Baltimore City

• Decision Date: 15 March 1946
• Docket Number: 98.
• Citation: 46 A.2d 289,186 Md. 200
• Parties: RHEB v. BAR ASS'N OF BALTIMORE CITY.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

46 A.2d 289

186 Md. 200

RHEB v. BAR ASS'N OF BALTIMORE CITY.

No. 98.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

March 15, 1946

Appeal from Supreme Bench of Baltimore City; W. Conwell Smith, Chief Judge, and J. Abner Sayler, Emory H. Niles, John T. Tucker Joseph Sherbow, and E. Paul Mason, Judges.

Proceeding by the Bar Association of Baltimore City against Charles Fulton Rheb. From an order of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City disbarring respondent, he appeals.

Order affirmed.

Hilary W. Gans, of Baltimore (Leo M. Alpert, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Nathan Patz and Clater W. Smith, both of Baltimore, for appellee.

Before DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, and HENDERSON, JJ.

HENDERSON, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, passed July 10, 1945, disbarring the appellant, Charles Fulton Rheb, from the further practice of law. The appeal comes to this court under Section 17, Art. 10 of the Code providing: 'the Court of Appeals shall have the right to review the entire proceedings and affirm, modify, alter or reverse the order from which said appeal is taken as the substantial merits of the cause and the ends of justice may require.'

On May 4, 1944, the appellant plead guilty, in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, to an indictment charging him with wilfully, knowingly and unlawfully failing to make income tax returns to the Federal Government for the years 1940, 1941 and 1942, and failing to keep records for the same periods, in violation of section 145(a), title 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Code. He was sentenced to six months imprisonment and a fine of $2,500. On March 15 1945, the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City cited Rheb to show cause why he should not be disbarred for 'the misconduct as shown in the records of the case of United States v. Charles Fulton Rheb.' The appellant filed an answer admitting the conviction and sentence but contending that the Federal crime did not involve moral turpitude, was not based on any acts or omissions in his capacity as an attorney at law, did not involve such conduct as required or warranted disbarment under sections 12 to 21, inclusive, of Art. 10 of the Maryland Code, and that the citation was not in compliance with the Code.

Thereafter, on April 23, 1945, the Bar Association of Baltimore City, by the order and leave of the Supreme Bench, filed a petition for the disbarment of Appellant, alleging misconduct, in the evasion of income tax payments 'wilfully and deliberately done for the purpose of deceiving the Government of the United States of America and for the purpose of defrauding it of his known income tax liability.' An answer was duly filed to this petition. On June 2, 1945, the Bar Association filed a petition asking leave to amend its original petition, because of information received subsequent to its filing, setting up in detail misconduct of the appellant in connection with other transactions, notably, his organization of a Maryland corporation known as 'Lloyds Acceptance & Discount Corporation,' fraudulent sale of stock therein, and the fraudulent obtention of property and moneys from a Mrs. Beatrice A. Doing. Leave was granted by order of court, the appellant filed an answer to these additional charges, and the matter came to trial, resulting in the disbarment order from which this appeal is taken.

Section 16 of Art. 10 of the Code (as enacted by ch. 370 of the Acts of 1929) sets forth the statutory grounds of disbarment as follows: 'professional misconduct, malpractice, fraud, deceit, crime involving moral turpitude, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.' The appellant contends that (1) the power of the Supreme Bench to disbar attorneys is limited to these grounds, (2) the facts and circumstances upon which the appellant was convicted in the Federal Court do not establish his guilt of a crime involving moral turpitude, and (3) the facts and circumstances as to the Lloyds corporation and the separation of Mrs. Doing and her money, do not sufficiently connect the appellant with deceit or misrepresentation, and thereby establish grounds for his disbarment.

We need not consider the question whether, in the abstract, the power to disbar or discipline attorneys is inherent in the courts. The case comes here on appeal based only upon the statute. This Court pointed out in Re Williams, 1941, 180 Md. 689, 23 A.2d 7, that there was no right of appeal in disbarment cases prior to the Act of 1929. Since the adoption of the Constitutional amendment, Art. IV, Section 18A, effective January 1, 1945, conferring or confirming the power of this Court 'to regulate and revise the practice and procedure in that Court and in the other courts of this State, which shall have the force of law until rescinded, changed or modified by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law,' it may be that matters relating to disbarment or discipline could be covered by rules. But it should be noted that regulation 'otherwise by law' is not excluded, and it appears that since the comprehensive and remedial Act of 1929, neither this Court nor the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City has adopted any rules upon the subject. Moreover, the action of the Supreme Bench was not predicated upon the assertion of powers independent of the statute above quoted, the for the purposes of this case we shall assume that the Court's action is sustainable only upon one or more of the broad grounds therein set forth. 'The statute has done but little, if anything, more than enact the general rules upon which the courts of common law have always acted.' Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L.Ed. 565.

The appellant contends that the crime for which he was convicted in the Federal Court involved private, personal misconduct, and not misconduct as an attorney. It is true that the courts generally recognize that indulgence in what might be termed the minor vices, of a purely personal character, does not amount to professional misconduct. See note 36 Yale L.J. 875. We have no quarrel with this principle, but it can hardly be applied in the case at bar. The appellant testified that he had been practicing law since 1932, but that he had never filed an income tax return of his personal income, Federal or State. He admitted that he made $6,500 in 1939 (as to which limitations prevented indictment), that he made from $7,500 to $10,000 in each of the years 1940 and 1941, and 'a top of $7,500 in 1942.' He admitted knowing the requirements of law in regard to returns, testified that he made returns for others, attributed his own failure to 'just pure neglect.' These admissions, coupled with his admitted failure to keep adequate records, justify a finding that he deliberately failed to make returns or keep records, for the purpose of cheating the Federal Government and the State of Maryland out of taxes justly due. We think it is immaterial whether the federal crime is to be classed as a misdemeanor or a felony, an act of omission or commission. Such conduct might properly be characterized as fraud or deceit, even if it did not involve moral turpitude.

However, the authorities support the proposition that a crime of this character, even though not a felony, involves moral turpitude. It is generally recognized that crimes in the category crimen falsi involve moral turpitude. See Bradway, 'Moral Turpitude as the Criterion of Offenses that justify Disbarment.' 24 Cal.L.R. 9. In Re Diesen, 173 Minn. 297, 215 N.W. 427, 217 N.W. 356, an attorney was disbarred on the strength of a conviction of the misdemeanor of making a false income tax return. See also In re Wiltsie, 109 Wash. 261, 186 P. 848, and In re Peters, 73 Mont. 284, 235 P. 772, involving false reports.

In Board of Dental Examiners v. Lazzell, 172 Md. 314, 320, 191 A. 240, this Court held that a dentist, who had been convicted of indecent exposure, was properly deprived of his license to practice dentistry under a statutory provision authorizing revocation of license for a crime involving moral turpitude, although it was contended that this was a personal, not a professional, offense. This Court cited a number of cases relating to the disbarment of lawyers, by way of analogy, particularly In re Coffey, 123 Cal. 522, 56 P. 448, 449, where it was held that attempted extortion was a crime involving moral turpitude, 'not an act innocent in itself, and only wrong because prohibited by the statute law.'

The Maryland Statute relating to the disbarment of lawyers, which contains not only the phrase 'crime involving moral turpitude' but also the phrase 'conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,' delegates or confirms to the courts the power and duty to consider particular conduct of one who is an officer of the court, in relation to...