Rhoades v. Penn-Harris-Madison School Corp.

Decision Date05 August 2008
Docket NumberNo. 3:05 CV 586.,3:05 CV 586.
Citation574 F.Supp.2d 888
PartiesTeresa RHOADES and Michael Allen Rhoades, individually and as parents and next friends of Chelsea Rhoades, a minor, Plaintiffs, v. PENN-HARRIS-MADISON SCHOOL CORPORATION, an Indiana Political Subdivision, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

John R. Price, John R. Price and Associates, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiffs.

Anthony W. Overholt, Marsha Volk Bugalla, Thomas E. Wheeler, II, Locke Reynolds LLP, Indianapolis, IN, D. Andrew Spalding, Robert J. Palmer, Georgianne M. Walker, May Oberfell Lorber, Mishawaka, IN, for Defendants.

OPINION and ORDER

JAMES T. MOODY, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation ("PHMSC") and five individuals employed by PHMSC at Penn High School: school principal David R. Tydgat; associate principals Dave Risner and Steven Hope; and guidance counselors Marni Cronk and Vickie Marshall. The complaint names these individuals in both their official and individual capacities, and the motion for summary judgment addresses both. For convenience, and because official-capacity claims really are claims against the employing governmental entity, Guzman v. Sheahan, 495 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir.2007), references to PHMSC or "the school defendants" should be understood to include both PHMSC and the individual defendants in the official capacities. When the court addresses claims made against the individual defendants in their individual capacities, it will use either their names or the collective reference "the individual defendants."

The plaintiffs are Chelsea Rhoades,1 who at the time of the incident involved in this suit was a 15-year-old sophomore at Penn High School, and her parents, Teresa and Michael Allen Rhoades, individually and as Chelsea's parents and next friends. In the complaint they filed initiating this action, plaintiffs claimed that a number of their state and federal constitutional and statutory rights were violated when a "TeenScreen" psychological assessment2 of Chelsea (and other students) was conducted at school without first obtaining Teresa and Michael Rhoades' written consent.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(c). "[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(c)). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the record and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. Popovits v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 185 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 1999). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the non-movant fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element for which it bears the burden of proof. In short, if the court concludes a fair-minded jury could not return a verdict in favor of the non-movant based on the record, the court should enter summary judgment.

FACTUAL OVERVIEW

A brief summary of the dispute as gleaned from the plaintiffs' amended complaint and the parties' memoranda supporting and opposing summary judgment provides context for the discussion that follows. Although this summary is largely based on facts that are undisputed, it nevertheless should not be taken as a statement of undisputed facts.3 In the analysis and ruling that follows, the court will refer to material facts as necessary that are either undisputed or, if in dispute, taken to exist in th version most favorable to the Rhoades, the non-movants.

In January 2003 a popular student at Penn High School committed suicide. Community reaction to this tragedy included the forming of a "task force," composed of leaders in the community in the business, education and health fields, to research programs and services for the detection and prevention of adolescent suicides, members of the task force included a former superintendent of PHMSC,4 and the director of Madison Center, Inc., a mental healthcare provider also named as a defendant in this action. Risner Aff.5 ¶ 3. The task force identified the Teen-Screen as a "voluntary mental health check-up" that could be used as a screening tool to identify adolescents posing a potential suicide risk. The task force also recommended that a "Yellow Ribbon Suicide Prevention Program" be implemented. Penn High School followed this recommendation and integrated the program into its health education curriculum taught in the tenth grade.

While that integration was taking place, the task force asked Penn High School if it would allow the Madison Center to conduct a "pilot" administration of the Teen-Screen to students at the School in the fall of 2003. The School consented, but PHMSC maintains that it provided no funding for administration of the test, "merely a conference room at Penn High School, permission for Madison Center personnel to come on site to administer the test, and coordination with parents and students who would be taking the test." Risner Aff. ¶ 7. This assertion is contradicted, however, by PHMSC's admission that Penn High School staff mailed a letter and consent form for the TeenScreen to students' parents, which is at least a form of indirect funding. Risner Aff. ¶ 7.

Only nine parents returned the form consenting to having their children take the TeenScreen. The task force was disappointed with that result, and proposed to Penn High School that when the test was given in the fall of 2004, a "passive consent" form be used. That meant that a form would be mailed to the parents and if the parents did not return the form to indicate that they did not want their children to take the TeenScreen, the Teen-Screen would be administered. Penn High School agreed to this passive consent procedure, with an additional requirement, however, that each student sign a form at the time of testing indicating that they were taking the test voluntarily. Risner Aff. at ¶¶ 8-11.

In late October the November issue of the "Kingsman Notes: The Penn High School Newsletter" was mailed to each student's home. The newsletter mentioned that the Madison Center would be administering the TeenScreen to 10th grade students, and attached to the newsletter was a separate letter/opt-out form explaining that the TeenScreen would be administered unless the parents returned the opt-out form by November 8. Id. at ¶ 13. Although 23 opt-out forms were returned, Id. at ¶ 14. the court believes that a fact finder could conclude that the "Kingsman Notes" would be treated as "junk mail" in many households and quickly thrown out. The Rhoades deny ever seeing any notice from Penn High School regrading the TeenScreen. Teresa Rhoades Aff. ¶ 9.6

The TeenScreen was administered in November and December, 2004. Associate principal/defendant Hope, and guidance counselors/defendants Cronk and Marshall prepared the testing protocol, that is, arranging the schedule for students to be released from class for testing, and requiring that each student sign an "assent form" before taking the TeenScreen. Id. at ¶ 15-16. Chelsea was released from class on December 7, 2004, to take the TeenScreen.

Chelsea's version of that day is that her home room teacher, Mrs. Troyer, announced that all students in the room, with one exception, would be going in groups to Conference Room C to take a test. Chelsea Aff. at ¶ 3. Students asked Mrs. Troyer what the test was and she told them she didn't know. Id. A memorandum dated November 3, 2004, prepared by guidance counselors/defendants Cronk and Marshall for the home room teachers stated, "[p]lease do not explain what this is to your students. They will receive the letter of explanation in the mail this week." Risner Aff., Ex. M, p. 2.

After Chelsea reported to the conference room, a woman read something about the test while Chelsea was helping a wheelchair-bound friend get situated. Chelsea Aff. at ¶ 4. Then Chelsea signed the assent form, which was laying on the desk. However, she did not read it, because the woman told her "you need to sign this" and that they all needed to be as quick as possible because many other students needed to take the test. Id.; Chelsea Dep. at 37.7 The woman did not tell Chelsea that the test was voluntary and that she could refuse to take it. Chelsea Aff. at ¶ 4. Chelsea signed the form, thinking it was simply an acknowledgment that she was taking the test. Id. Her impression was that she had to sign the form, and that she had to take the test. Chelsea dep. at 38.8

After signing the form she was told to sign on to the computer and answer the questions truthfully. Id. ¶ 5. Chelsea did so, and after she and the other students completed the test, they were told to wait outside in the hallway. Id. After about five minutes a woman came out of the testing room, called Chelsea's name, and walked Chelsea several steps away from the other students. Id. ¶ 6. The woman told Chelsea that she had "Obsessive Compulsive Disorder for cleaning and social anxiety disorder," and that she could speak with a counselor, or have her mother call the Madison Center for treatment. Id. Chelsea was very "upset and confused" by this information and dwelled on it all day, becoming more upset the more she thought about it. Id. ¶ 7. When she arrived at home she asked her mother to...

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