Rhodes v. Guignard Brick Works

• Decision Date: 09 February 1965
• Docket Number: No. 18301,18301
• Citation: 140 S.E.2d 487,245 S.C. 304
• Parties: Barbara H. RHODES and Jean Lorraine Rhodes, Appellants, v. GUIGNARD BRICK WORKS and Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wausau, Respondents.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 487

140 S.E.2d 487

245 S.C. 304

Barbara H. RHODES and Jean Lorraine Rhodes, Appellants, v. GUIGNARD BRICK WORKS and Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wausau, Respondents.

No. 18301.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Feb. 9, 1965.

Ryan L. Scott, Columbia, for appellants.

Robinson, McFadden & Moore, Columbia, for respondents.

LEWIS, Justice:

This claim for benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act arose out of the death of James David Rhodes from a heart attack while about his duties as an employee of Guignard Brick Works. The South Carolina Industrial Commission denied the claim upon a finding that the employee's death did not result from an accident arising out of his employment. The circuit court affirmed this finding by the Commission as having competent evidentiary support in the record, and claimants have appealed. Whether there was such evidentiary support for the Commission's decision is the basic question to be determined in this appeal. Before reaching this question, however, there is a preliminary issue that must be decided.

The 'Opinion and Award' of the Commission, under its 'Findings of Fact,' stated: 'It is found as a fact that James David Rhodes did not die as the result of an accident arising out of his employment, within the meaning of the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Law.' This finding was preceded by a review of the testimony and was followed by 'Conclusions of Law,' under which the Commission stated the controlling facts and legal principles governing its decision. The claimants take the position that the quoted finding by the Commission was a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact, and therefore not binding on appeal.

In determining whether a specific finding in an order of the Industrial Commission is one of law or fact, such finding must be construed in connection with the entire order in the light of the issues to be decided.

We have held that 'a conclusion by the Industrial Commission by way of reasonable inference from the evidence is a finding of fact.' Windham v. City of Florence, 221 S.C. 350, 70 S.E.2d 553.

The contention of claimants that the foregoing finding was a conclusion of law and not a finding of fact is without merit. Since it was conceded that the deceased was about the duties of his employment when he suffered the fatal heart attack, the basic factual issue before the Commission was whether there was any causal connection between the employment and the heart attack, that is, whether the heart attack constituted an accident arising out of the employment. The finding by the Commission that the employee 'did not die as a result of an accident arising out of his employment, within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law' was a conclusion of fact based upon the inferences which the Commission drew from the testimony. That was the factual issue which the Commission, of necessity, had to decide and did decide by the foregoing finding. This was not a conclusion of law. It was a finding of fact, Murdaugh v. Robert Lee Construction Co., 185 S.C. 497, 194 S.E. 447; and, as such, is conclusive and binding on appeal, if supported by any competent evidence. Black v. Barnwell County, 243 S.C. 531, 134 S.E.2d 753.

Therefore, the issue to be determined is whether there was any competent evidence to support the factual finding by the Commission that there was no causal connection between the employment of the deceased and his fatal heart attack.

The general legal principles which govern the determination here of whether the employee's heart attack constituted a compensable accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as established by our prior decisions, were restated in the recent case of Black v. Barnwell County, supra, 243 S.C. 531, 134 S.E.2d 753, from which we quote:

'The general rule has been adopted in this State that a coronary attack suffered by an employee constitutes a compensable accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act if it is induced by unexpected strain or over-exertion in the performance of the duties of his employment, or by unusual and extraordinary conditions in the employment. Kearse v. South Carolina Wildlife Resources Department, 236 S.C. 540, 115 S.E.2d 183. It has also been held, as stated in Walsh v. United States Rubber Co., 238 S.C. 411, 120 S.E.2d 685, that 'if a heart attack results as a consequence of the ordinary exertion that is required in the performance of the duties of the employment in the ordinary and usual manner, and without any outward untoward event, it is not compensable as an accident. The fact that due to a weakened heart condition, the exertion required for the ordinary performance of the work is too great for the particular employee, who undertakes to perform it, does not make it a compensable accident. Sims v. South Carolina State Commission of Forestry, 235 S.C. 1, 109 S.E.2d 701."

The claimants contend the evidence conclusively showed that the employee's heart attack was induced by over-exertion, or by the unusual and extraordinary conditions in the employment, in that he was required (1) to work unusually long hours during the two week period preceding the heart k, (2) to drive unusually long distances on the day of his death, and (3) to operate the truck on the day of his death in unusually cold weather and heavy traffic conditions for a long period of time.

The deceased was employed on February 18, 1963, the...