Rhodes v. Palmetto Pathway Homes, Inc.
| Decision Date | 23 October 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 23309,23309 |
| Citation | 400 S.E.2d 484,303 S.C. 308 |
| Parties | Frances Fulmer RHODES, Respondent, v. PALMETTO PATHWAY HOMES, INC., Appellant. . Heard |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Dennis J. Christensen, Wise & Cole, P.A., and Robertson H. Wendt, Jr., Hollings and Nettles, Charleston, for appellant.
E. Lloyd Willcox, Charleston, for respondent.
Appellant Palmetto Pathway Homes, Inc., appeals from a circuit court order permanently enjoining it from establishing a group residence for mentally impaired adults on property owned by the appellant and located in a subdivision subject to restrictive covenants. We reverse.
Respondent Frances Fulmer Rhodes owns property in the subdivision where appellant, a non-profit corporation, intended to operate the group residence. Respondent instituted this action for a permanent injunction, alleging that appellant's use of the property as a home for unrelated mentally impaired adults was prohibited by the restrictive covenants. The pertinent portion of the restrictive covenants states:
E. The property hereby conveyed shall not be used otherwise than for private residence purposes, nor shall more than one residence, with the necessary outbuildings be erected on any one lot, nor shall any apartment house or tenement house be erected thereon; nor shall any one lot be subdivided or its boundary lines changed from the location as shown on said map without in any one of the cases above enumerated the written consent of the grantor endorsed on the deed of conveyance thereof.
The trial court determined that a group residence would violate the restrictive covenants and granted a permanent injunction against the appellant. In his order enjoining establishment of the home, the trial judge stated: "This court cannot override restrictive covenants unless it finds that the restrictive covenants are in violation of our State or General Law." In its findings, the trial court noted: "The defendant is about to engage in a business or commercial enterprise" based upon the fact that the appellant would receive income as a result of housing the residents, pay employees, pay withholding taxes, keep records and prepare profit and loss statements. The trial judge held that "the group housing as described by the Defendant does not meet the definition of a single family house as intended by the restrictive covenants ..."
First, appellant maintains that the number of handicapped individuals occupying the premises will at no time exceed nine, that the dwelling will be used solely as a residence and no training or treatment will be conducted at the home, and that routine household chores will be performed by the residents with the assistance and round-the-clock supervision of counselors. Second, appellant argues that the functions characterized by the trial court as business activity are incidental to the operation and maintenance of the residence as a home. Finally, appellant contends the right of handicapped individuals to reside in a community setting is protected by public policy and state and federal law, notwithstanding restrictive covenants. We agree.
Courts tend to strictly interpret restrictive covenants and resolve any doubt or ambiguities in a covenant on the presumption of free and unrestricted land use. EDWARDS v. Surratt, 228 S.C. 512, 90 S.E.2d 906 (1956). The historical disfavor of restrictive covenants by the law emanates from the widely held view that society's best interests are advanced by encouraging the free and unrestricted use of land. See Hamilton v. CCM, Inc., 274 S.C. 152, 263 S.E.2d 378 (1980). Thus, to enforce a restrictive covenant, a party must show that the restriction applies to the property either by the covenant's express language or by a plain unmistakable implication. Hamilton v. CCM, Inc., supra.
This Court finds persuasive the reasoning of other jurisdictions which have held that the incident necessities of operating a group home such as maintaining records, filing accounting reports, managing supervising, and providing care for individuals in exchange for monetary compensation are collateral to the prime purpose and function of a family housekeeping unit. Hence, these activities do not, in and of themselves, change the character of a residence from private to commercial. Gregory v. State Department of Mental Health Retardation and Hospitals, 495 A.2d 997 (R.I.1985); J.T. Hobby & Son,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Gittleman v. Woodhaven Condominium Ass'n, Inc.
...to enforce restrictive covenant to preclude establishment of group home for mentally retarded violates FHAA); Rhodes v. Palmetto Pathway Homes, 303 S.C. 308, 400 S.E.2d 484 (1991) (enforcement of discriminatory restrictive covenant would violate strong federal public policy as expressed in ......
-
Welsh v. McNeil
...House Report No. 100–711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in1988 U.S.C.A.N. 2173, 2184–85)); Rhodes v. Palmetto Pathway Homes, Inc., 303 S.C. 308, 400 S.E.2d 484, 486 (1991) ("We conclude that interpretation of the restrictive covenants in such a way as to prohibit location of a group r......
-
Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico for Dist. of Arecibo, s. 91-1053
...see also Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 933, 935 (2d Cir.1988); Rhodes v. Palmetto Pathway Homes, Inc., 303 S.C. 308, 400 S.E.2d 484, 486 (1991). Finally, Casa Marie may qualify as a "dwelling." See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b) ("dwelling" defined as "any building, str......
-
Spur at Williams Brice Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Lalla
...that society's best interests are advanced by encouraging the free and unrestricted use of land." Rhodes v. Palmetto Pathway Homes, Inc., 303 S.C. 308, 311, 400 S.E.2d 484, 485 (1991). The law governing the enforceability of covenants restricting the use of real property is well-established......