Rice v. Froehling & Robertson, Inc., 20259

Decision Date15 July 1976
Docket NumberNo. 20259,20259
Citation226 S.E.2d 705,267 S.C. 155
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesRonald E. RICE, Jr., Respondent, v. FROEHLING & ROBERTSON, INC., and American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, Appellants.

Horton, Drawdy, Marchbanks, Ashmore, Chapman & Brown, Greenville, for appellants.

Watkins, Vandiver, Kirven, Long & Gable, Anderson, for respondent.

NESS, Justice:

The Industrial Commission awarded respondent medical benefits to be paid by appellants, respondent's former employer and its insurance carrier. Respondent applied for continued medical treatment performed and to be performed after his employer had paid the maximum income compensation recoverable under applicable Workmen's Compensation coverage. The Single Commissioner's recommendation was adopted by the Full Commission and sustained by the Circuit Judge.

The employer contends: that the Commission was without jurisdiction because (1) its authority was terminated when the employer completed payment of income compensation; (2) that the medical treatment will not tend to lessen the respondent's period of disability; and (3) that the award should not have authorized continued and unspecified treatment on an indeterminate basis. We reject the appellants' contentions, except that we agree the general terms regarding future treatment are inadequate and require a remand to the Commission.

Respondent sustained a compensable injury in September, 1966, which rendered him a quadriplegic. Appellants paid the maximum income compensation by July, 1972, and voluntarily paid all medical expenses through October, 1972. On July 1, 1971, respondent became a patient at the Durham Rehabilitation Center and has remained there continuously through March, 1974, the time of the hearing before the Industrial Commissioner. Respondent has incurred medical expenses since October, 1972, and desires to have two operations. The Commission held appellants liable for certain medical treatment received from November 1, 1972, the proposed operations, and any future care rendered by the Durham Rehabilitation Center.

Initially, appellants argue the Industrial Commission lacks jurisdiction because appellants have paid the maximum income compensation. In effect, appellants argue liability for medical treatment is derivative of liability for income compensation, and, even then, an employer is not responsible for medical treatment beyond ten weeks unless it lessens the employee's period of disability. Appellants define 'period of disability' as that period in which the employer is obligated to provide income compensation.

Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, an employer is not responsible for medical treatment for an injured employee which extends beyond ten weeks from the date of the injury unless the treatment 'will tend to lessen the period of disability.' S.C.Code § 72--305 (1962). 1 Disability is statutorily defined as 'incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.' S.C.Code §§ 72--2, 72--10 (1962). The statute does not by its terms equate an employer's liability for medical treatment to any other period of liability, for income compensation or otherwise. It specifically defines the period of disability in terms of the time period in which the employee is statutorily incapacitated. The employer is liable for medical treatment which will tend to lessen the time in which injury renders an employee incapable 'to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or other employment.' See Williams v. Boyle Construction Company, 252 S.C. 387, 166 S.E.2d 550 (1969).

In Williams the court sustained an award for an incurable paraplegic. It stressed that treatment need not bear a direct and highly correlative relationship to economic rehabilitation; treatment must only 'tend' to reduce the period of disability. The court adopted the following definition of 'tend' from Black's Law Dictionary 'To have a leaning; serve, contribute, or conduce in some degree or way, or have a more or less direct bearing or effect; to be directed as to any end, object, or purpose; to have a tendency, conscious or unconscious to any end, object or purpose.'

Williams v. Boyle Construction Co., supra; see also Dykes v. Daniel Construction Co., 262 S.C. 98, 202 S.E.2d 646 (1974).

The respondent is a quadriplegic with no use of his legs or feet and little use of his arms and hands. He cannot load himself into a wheelchair, but is mobilized by use of a motorized wheelchair, and can perform hunt and peck typing, among other minor activities.

Prior to the accident, claimant had completed some work toward a baccalaureate degree. During the period of restorative care, respondent enrolled in a number of undergraduate courses and recently has maintained almost a straight 'A' average. He is majoring in mathematics and aspires to be a mathematician or statistician, or a teacher of the same.

Appellants assert that respondent's physical restrictions are so severe that he could never be employable and, therefore, no medical treatment could 'tend' to lessen the period of disability. In Williams v. Boyle Construction Co., supra, the court observed:

'The extent to which a Paraplegic can be restored to his former earning capacity admittedly depends to a large extent upon the particular individual involved. While the present claimant is somewhat handicapped by his prior educational opportunities, we cannot say under this record that there is no basis for a reasonable expectation that the period of claimant's disability will be lessened if the additional medical treatment is afforded.' At p. 392--393, 166 S.E.2d at 552. (Emphasis added).

Appellants argue that in Williams the Court...

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4 cases
  • Dodge v. Bruccoli, Clark, Layman, Inc.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • February 16, 1999
    ...receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment." S.C.Code Ann. § 42-1-120 (1985); Rice v. Froehling & Robertson, Inc., 267 S.C. 155, 159, 226 S.E.2d 705, 706 (1976) (interpreting S.C.Code of 1962 § 72-305, the precursor to section 42-15-60). Section 42-15-60 "does not b......
  • Rose v. JJS Trucking
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • August 10, 2022
    ...treatment. We respectfully reject Appellants' argument that the award here is similar to the award in Rice v. Froehling &Robertson, Inc., 267 S.C. 155, 163, 226 S.E.2d 705, 708 (1976) (holding an employer and insurance carrier were entitled to a more definite order to protect an argument th......
  • Adkins v. GEORGIA-PACIFIC, CORP.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • April 15, 2002
    ...and for such time as in the judgment of the Commission will tend to lessen the period of disability"); Rice v. Froehling & Robertson, Inc., 267 S.C. 155, 159, 226 S.E.2d 705, 706 (1976); see also Dykes v. Daniel Constr. Co., 262 S.C. 98, 110, 202 S.E.2d 646, 652 (1974) (holding a claimant w......
  • Munn v. Nucor Steel
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • May 24, 1999
    ...condition is not causally related to the workers' compensation injury he suffered in 1986. Munn relies on Rice v. Froehling & Robertson, Inc., 267 S.C. 155, 226 S.E.2d 705 (1976) and Smith v. American & Efird Mills, 51 N.C.App. 480, 277 S.E.2d 83 (1981) to support his position that he is en......

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