Rice v. Hart

• Decision Date: 02 September 1875
• Citation: 118 Mass. 201
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: Henry A. Rice & others v. William T. Hart & others

118 Mass. 201

Henry A. Rice & others v. William T. Hart & others

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

September 2, 1875

Argued November 10, 1874 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Suffolk. Contract against William T. Hart and others, trustees under a mortgage executed by the Boston, Hartford and Erie Railroad Company, and in possession of and operating the sad railroad, to recover the value of forty-three bags of wool, valued at $ 4692.37, delivered by the plaintiffs to the defendants as common carriers, to be transported from New York to Boston. The case was submitted to the judgment of this court on agreed facts in substance as follows:

The defendants are common carriers, and as such received from the plaintiffs, for transportation over their railroad, the wool in question. The wool reached Boston in one of the rear cars of a long train over the defendants' road on Saturday, November 9, 1872, about half past three o'clock in the afternoon. The train was much longer than the freight station and platform at which the same was to be discharged, and for this reason was broken into sections, which were moved up separately and their contents discharged. The plaintiffs sent a man and wagon to the defendants' yard to receive and carry away the wool, who reached the freight station about a quarter past four in the afternoon, and remained until about five, at which time the cars which contained the wool had not been moved up to the freight station or discharged; and the driver was told by one of the defendants' agents that the wool would not be ready for delivery that day, but that when it was reached it would be put in the freight station near the door on Broad Street, where he could easily get at it and load it into his wagon on Monday. The wool was discharged from the cars into the freight warehouse on Saturday afternoon, but not until too late for its delivery that day to the plaintiffs; and the building and its contents, including the plaintiffs' wool, were totally consumed by fire during the night of Saturday. The yard and freight station of the defendants' road, and of the other railroads in Boston, are closed for the delivery of freight at half-past five in the afternoon on Saturday, and are not again open for business until Monday morning, and were so closed on the Saturday in question. The fire was not occasioned by the fault or neglect of the defendants, nor are they chargeable with neglect for not removing the plaintiffs' wool when it became apparent that the building where it was stored would be destroyed, nor with want of diligence in discharging said wool from their cars on Saturday, other than such as may be implied from the foregoing facts. The value of the plaintiffs' merchandise destroyed by the fire is correctly stated in the declaration.

If in the opinion of the court the defendants are liable for the loss of said merchandise, judgment is to be entered for the plaintiffs for the value of said merchandise, and interest from the date of the writ; otherwise, judgment for the defendants.

Judgment for the defendants.

G. W Baldwin, for the plaintiffs. 1. This case is distinguishable in its facts from that of Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 1 Gray 263. In that case, the plaintiffs' agent consulted his own convenience in going away, and the goods were subsequently stored for his accommodation. In the case at bar the plaintiffs' agent had no choice and exercised no discretion in the matter, and was in no way responsible for what afterwards occurred.

The point decided in the case of the Norway Plains Co. is, that railroad corporations, as common carriers, are not bound to actually deliver the goods to the consignee; and that if upon the arrival of the goods the consignee is not there ready to receive them, "and in consequence of this they are placed in the depot, the transit ceases," "because he must be presumed to have assented thereby to such action on the part of the corporation," and "that delivery by themselves, as common carriers, to themselves, as keepers for hire, conformably to the agreement of both parties, is a delivery which discharges their responsibility as common carriers." The whole reasoning of the court is founded upon this presumed agreement. But this fact does not exist in the case at bar. On the contrary, it appears affirmatively that the plaintiffs were present and ready to receive the goods, and were compelled by the defendants' agents to go away without them, so that the very foundation of the presumption is gone.

The opinion should also be read in the light of the cases referred to by the court in its support. In Thomas v. Boston & Providence Railroad, 10 Met. 472, Hubbard, J., says: "Where such suitable warehouses are provided, and the goods, which are not called for on their arrival at the places of destination, are unladed and separated from the goods of other persons, and stored safely in such warehouses or depots, the duty of the proprietors as common carriers is, in our judgment, terminated." See also Garside v. Trent & Mersey Navigation, 4 T. R. 581; Rowe v. Pickford, 8 Taunt. 83; In re Webb, 8 Taunt. 443. It is submitted that the decision in the Norway Plains Company case was intended to apply and not to extend the doctrine of these cases. This doctrine, with its limitations, has been reaffirmed by this court in the recent case of Bickford v. Metropolitan Steamship Co. 109 Mass. 151. See also Hill Manuf. Co. v. Boston & Lowell Railroad, 104 Mass. 122; Stowe v. New York, Boston & Providence Railroad, 113 Mass. 521.

2. If the doctrine of Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine Railroad leads to any other conclusion, it is submitted that to that extent it is a fit subject for reconsideration, and that it should be brought into harmony with the later English and American authorities. The English rule laid down by Tindal, C. J., in Gatliffe v. Bourne, 4 Bing. N. C. 314, and affirmed by the House of Lords in 11 Cl. & Fin. 45, has met with very general approval, both in that country and this. It holds that carriers are bound to deliver the goods to the consignee, provided the consignee appears within a reasonable time to receive them, and that the consignee is entitled to a fair and reasonable opportunity to receive his goods before the carrier can deliver them over to himself or to another as warehouseman. To the same effect is the rule adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in The Eddy, 5 Wall. 481; and in Richardson v. Goddard, 23 How. 28.

The courts of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa and Pennsylvania are sometimes referred to as sustaining the Massachusetts doctrine. But none of them go so far as to establish the arbitrary rule that the moment the goods are deposited in the carrier's warehouse, that moment his liability as a carrier ends. Porter v. Chicago Railroad, 20 Ill. 407. Chicago Railroad v. Scott, 42 Ill. 132. Bansemer v. Toledo Railway, 25 Ind. 434. The case of Francis v. Dubuque Railroad, 25 Iowa 60, turns upon the presumed assent of the consignee, signified by his failure to receive the goods on their arrival. And McCarty v. New York & Erie Railroad, 30 Penn. St. 247, which is the leading case in Pennsylvania, adopts the rule laid down in Goold v. Chapin, 10 Barb. 612. "It must be implied in every contract of this nature, that if the consignee is not found, or does not immediately accept the goods when offered, the carrier may, if he so elect, keep them as bailee in deposit."

Most of the American cases hold that the liability of the carrier continues until a reasonable opportunity has been afforded the consignee, after the arrival of the goods, to take them away. Moses v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 32 N.H. 523. Wood v. Crocker, 18 Wisc. 345. Wood v. Milwaukee Railway, 27 Wisc. 541. Parker v. Milwaukee Railway, 30 Wisc. 689. Conkey v. Milwaukee Railway, 31 Wisc. 619. McDonald v. Western Railroad, 34 N.Y. 497. Redmond v. Liverpool Steamboat Co. 46 N.Y. 578. Zinn v. New Jersey Steamboat Co. 49 N.Y 442. McAndrew v. Whitlock, 52 N.Y. 40. Ouimit v. Henshaw, 35 Vt. 605. Blumenthal v. Brainerd, 38 Vt. 402. Alabama Railroad v. Kidd, 35 Ala. 209. Mobile Railroad v. Prewitt, 46 Ala. 63. Graves v. Hartford Steamboat Co. 38 Conn. 143. McMillan v. Michigan Railroad, 16 Mich. 79. Richardson v. Goddard, 23 How. 28. Railroad Co. v. Manufacturing Co. 16 Wall. 318. The Mary Washington v. Ayres, 5 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 692. Maignan v. New Orleans Railroad, 24 La. An. 333. The general result has been very well stated by Seymour, J., in Graves v. Hartford Steamboat Co., which is the most recent case upon the subject: "The rule adopted in Massachusetts has the merit of being definite and of easy application, and may, in many cases, avoid a painful controversy as to what, under the circumstances, is a reasonable time within which the consignee must appear and take his goods. But on the other hand, that rule puts an end to the carrier's responsibility, as such, just where that responsibility is of the highest value to the shipper. Between the deposit of the goods on the platform and their delivery to the consignee, they are exposed to theft, depredation and injury by strangers, and by the carrier's employees. In making the delivery, care is needed to avoid mistakes, and attention required to see if the goods are uninjured. During the whole process of delivery, until fully completed, the goods should remain in the care of the carrier, upon the full responsibility pertaining to him as such, and he ought not to be allowed to lay aside that responsibility until the owner of the goods has had a fair and reasonable time and opportunity to receive them." See also an extended analysis and classification of the American cases prior to 1867, by Cooley, C. J., in McMillan...