Rice v. ISI Mfg., Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 December 1994
• Docket Number: Docket No. 143981
• Citation: 525 N.W.2d 533,207 Mich.App. 634
• Parties: Lawrence RICE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ISI MANUFACTURING, INC., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 533

525 N.W.2d 533

207 Mich.App. 634

Lawrence RICE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ISI MANUFACTURING, INC., Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 143981.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Feb. 16, 1994, at Detroit.

Decided Dec. 5, 1994, at 9:00 a.m.

Released for Publication Jan. 24, 1995.

Mallon & McNealy, P.C. by Connie Skinner McNealy, Troy, for plaintiff.

Kerr, Russell & Weber by James R. Case and Janice A. Furioso, Detroit, for defendant.

Before MICHAEL J. KELLY, P.J., and BRENNAN and HOWARD, ^* JJ.

BRENNAN, Judge.

Defendant appeals as of right from a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff and from orders denying its motions for summary disposition, a directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and a new trial. We affirm.

A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Fisher, 192 Mich.App. 371, 374, 481 N.W.2d 743 (1991); Lepp v. Cheboygan Area Schools, 190 Mich.App. 726, 730, 476 N.W.2d 506 (1991). When ruling on such a motion, the court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence available to it and grant summary disposition if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Marrero v. McDonnell Douglas Capital Corp., 200 Mich.App. 438, 441, 505 N.W.2d 275 (1993); Kreager v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 197 Mich.App. 577, 579, 496 N.W.2d 346 (1992). When deciding a motion for a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court must review the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether reasonable minds could differ on an issue of fact. Teodorescu v. Bushnell, Gage, Reizen & Byington (On Remand), 201 Mich.App. 260, 264, 506 N.W.2d 275 (1993); Clemens v. Lesnek, 200 Mich.App. 456, 461, 505 N.W.2d 283 (1993). If reasonable jurors could differ, a motion for a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict should not be granted. Id. at 461, 505 N.W.2d 283. We will not disturb the trial court's decision unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Howard v. Canteen Corp., 192 Mich.App. 427, 431, 481 N.W.2d 718 (1992).

Defendant claims in this case that the trial court erred in denying its motions for summary disposition and a directed verdict because plaintiff was employed pursuant to an at-will employment contract. Contracts for permanent employment are for an indefinite period and are presumptively construed to provide employment at will. Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 437 Mich. 627, 636, 473 N.W.2d 268 (1991). This presumption, however, may be overcome by proof of an express contract for a definite term or a provision forbidding discharge in the absence of just cause, or it may be overcome by proofs that permit a promise implied in fact of employment security. Id. at 636-637, 473 N.W.2d 268. After reviewing the record in this case, we are convinced that the evidence presented, including the supervisor's oral assurances that plaintiff could return to his engineering position if the sales position did not work out, was sufficient for the jury to find that plaintiff could not be discharged without just cause. We conclude, therefore, that the court did not err in denying defendant's motion for summary disposition. Moreover, we believe that the trial court correctly denied defendant's motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a new trial. A motion for a new trial may be granted when the jury's verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The trial court's decision with regard to the motion will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Snell v. UACC Midwest, Inc., 194 Mich.App. 511, 516, 487 N.W.2d 772 (1992). In light of evidence contained within the record, including the oral assurances by plaintiff's supervisor and the written reprimand wherein plaintiff was informed that his performance would be reviewed monthly, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. A jury could properly find that plaintiff could only be discharged by defendant with just cause and that in this case the defendant did not have just cause to discharge plaintiff.

Defendant further contends that the court erred in denying its motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial because the verdict was based on erroneous instructions given by the trial court. We disagree. The determination whether an instruction is accurate and applicable to a case is in the sound discretion of the trial court. There is no error requiring reversal if, on balance, the theories and the applicable law were adequately and fairly presented to the jury. Williams v. Coleman, 194 Mich.App. 606, 623, 488 N.W.2d 464 (1992). After considering the record, we are of the opinion that both sets of instructions were warranted under the circumstances of this case.

Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in denying its motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial because the plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case on damages and the award was excessive. A trial court should deny a request for remittitur where the jury award is supported by the evidence. Clemens, supra 200 Mich.App. at 464, 505 N.W.2d 283; Snell, supra at 517, 487 N.W.2d 772. We conclude that the jury's award of damages was supported by the evidence and was not excessive. In addition, we believe that the trial court did not err in allowing plaintiff to argue the issue of future damages to the jury. Future damages are permissible in a case of this kind. Renny v. Port Huron Hosp., 427 Mich. 415, 439, 398 N.W.2d 327 (1986); Ritchie v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., 163 Mich.App. 358, 374, 413 N.W.2d 796 (1987).

Affirmed.

HOWARD, J., concurred.

MICHAEL J. KELLY, Presiding Judge (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent.

In support of the existence of a just-cause employment contract, plaintiff relies primarily on the statement by his supervisor that he could return to his old job if his new job did not work out. Plaintiff also relies on a statement to the effect that, as long as he continued to remain the kind of employee that he was, he would have a job. I do not think that these statements can be construed to establish a just-cause contract in light of their context and in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Rood v. General Dynamics Corp., 444 Mich. 107, 507 N.W.2d 591 (1993), consolidated with Schippers v. SPX Corp. In Schippers, the plaintiff had consulted with his supervisors about job security before deciding whether to transfer to another division and was told by his employer that "unless something was really wrong, [he] would be there for retirement" and that "as long as [the defendant] had a truck, [he] would be the driver." Id. at 122-123, 507 N.W.2d 591. The Court held that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of employment at will:

Only by taking the statement completely out of context could a reasonable juror interpret them in the manner that Mr. Schippers asserts--as promises to terminate "only if something was really wrong," i.e., for just cause. The record shows discussion concerning job security in the sense of Hy-Lift's resolve in maintaining its trucking function, but there is no evidence whatsoever that...