Rice v. King Phillip Mills
| Decision Date | 23 March 1887 |
| Citation | 11 N.E. 101,144 Mass. 229 |
| Parties | RICE v. KING PHILLIP MILLS. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Morton & Jennings, for defendant.
The accident was due to a risk which was assumed by the plaintiff, and which was within the scope of her employment. She chose to work with it as it was, with as full means of knowledge as to its danger or safety as the defendant. Gibson v. Erie Ry., 63 N.Y. 453; Malone v. Hathaway, 64 N.Y. 5; De Forest v Jewett, 88 N.Y. 268; Moulton v. Gage, 138 Mass 390; Taylor v. Carew Manuf'g Co., 140 Mass. 150 3 N.E. 21; Russell v. Tillotson, 140 Mass. 201, 4 N.E. 231; Skipp v. Eastern Co. R. Co., 9 Exch. 223; Searle v. Lindsay, 11 C.B.(N.S.) 429; Balleney v. Cree, 11 Ct.Sess.Cas. (3d Ser.) 626; Richardson v. Cooper, 88 Ill. 270; Curran v. Merchants' Manuf'g Co., 130 Mass. 374; Railroad Co. v. Thomas, 51 Miss. 637; Walsh v. St. Paul, etc., R.R., 27 Minn. 367, 8 N.W. 145; Sweeney v. Central Pac. R. Co., 57 Cal. 15; Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Austin, 40 Mich. 247; Stone v. Oregon Manuf'g Co., 4 Or. 52; Ogden v. Rummens, 3 Fost. & F. 751. There was no evidence that the servants of the defendant were incompetent, or that the machine as originally constructed was defective or unsuitable. The defendant, having furnished both materials with which to make repairs, and men to attend to and make them, is not liable for their neglect; and especially in view of the fact that it is clear it was a part of the plaintiff's own duty to assist in looking after the machines. Johnson v. Boston Tow-boat Co., 135 Mass. 209; McGee v. Boston Cordage Co., 139 Mass. 445, 1 N.E. 745; Floyd v. Sugdem, 134 Mass. 563; Holden v. Fitchburg R. Co., 129 Mass. 268. The instructions given, while correct enough as general propositions of law, were not sufficiently adapted to the case on trial. Nourse v. Packard, 138 Mass. 309; Marietta, etc., R. Co. v. Picksley, 24 Ohio, 654. The third instruction asked by the defendant called the attention of the court directly to the effect, upon the plaintiff's right to recover, of her knowledge of the manner in which and the means by which the weight was fastened, and continuing to work, without objection, on the machine, and the attention of the jury should have been especially directed to that point. Upon the subject embraced in the fourth request, the defendant was also entitled to a specific ruling and instruction. The exclusion of testimony offered by defendant to show that the weight was not in fact a part of the machine, and the ruling and instruction that, as matter of law, it was a part of the machine, were erroneous. It certainly cannot be said that any addition to a machine, by whomsoever or for whatever purpose made, will constitute, as against the mill-owner, a part of the machine which he is bound to keep in repair. It should have been left to the jury to determine, as a question of fact, under suitable instructions, whether the weight did or did not constitute a part of the machine.
Cummings & McDonough, for plaintiff.
It was not open to the defendant to show, as matter of fact, that the weight was not a part of the machine. It was a question of law whether the weight, being used as admitted, was a part of the machine. Pierce v. George, 108 Mass. 82; Connolly v. Warren, 106 Mass. 146. Whether the place of ingress is a part of the house charged to have been broken into is a question of law for the court, and not a question of fact proper to be submitted to the jury. Com. v. Bruce, 79 Ky. 560. The fact that the extra weight could be taken off, and used elsewhere, does not make it any less a part of the machine. Pierce v. George, supra; Cowley v. Mayor, etc., 6 Hurl. & N. 565. See Short v. Woodward, 13 Gray, 86. Where the facts are found by uncontradicted testimony or by agreement, their legal effect is a matter of law. Todd v. Whitney, 27 Me. 484. The term "machine" includes every mechanical device, or combination of mechanical devices, to perform some function, and produce a certain effect or result. Corning v. Burden, 15 How. 267; 2 Bouv.Law Dict. (12th Ed.) 86. It is a question of law what is meant by the words "when the wall shall be completed." Worcester Med.Inst. v. Harding, 11 Cush. 288; Smith v. East Branch Min. Co., 54 Cal. 165. It was a question for the jury, upon all the evidence, whether the weight was properly suspended, whether the defendant exercised ordinary care in suspending it, whether the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care, and whether she was injured by the defendant's want of ordinary care. Gilman v. Eastern R.R., 13 Allen, 433; Same v. Same, 10 Allen, 233; Snow v. Housatonic Ry. Co., 8 Allen, 441; Huddleston v. Lowell M. Shop, 106 Mass. 282; Ford v. Fitchburg R.R., 110 Mass. 240; Arkerson v. Dennison, 117 Mass. 407; Wheeler v. Wason Manuf'g Co., 135 Mass. 296; Patrick v. Pote, 117 Mass. 297. The third and fourth rulings asked for were substantially given.
OPINION
The evidence of the manner in which the weight was attached to the machine, of the purpose for which it was attached, and of the effect produced by it in the working of the machine, being undisputed, the court rightly ruled that it was a part of the machine within the meaning of the law, that the defendant was bound to exercise due care in furnishing suitable machines, and in keeping them in proper repair.
There was evidence for the jury that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care. There was evidence that she did not know, and that it was not her duty to know, that the weight was attached to the chain in an unsafe manner, or that the lacing was or had become too weak to support the weight. She knew that the weight was attached to the chain by a rawhide lacing, but it was not necessarily a part of her duty to decide whether this was a suitable or safe means of hanging the weight, and she may have known nothing of the strength of rawhide lacings.
The difficulty in the case arises from the refusal of the court to give to the jury the last instruction requested by the defendant. It is the duty of the master to exercise due care in employing competent servants, in providing suitable machines, and in keeping them in proper repair, and the master cannot wholly escape responsibility by delegating these duties to a servant. If this could be done, a master might escape all responsibility by employing a competent superintendent to perform all these duties. But there are defects in machinery which are of such a character that the master has been held to have performed his duty if he furnished suitable materials, and employed competent servants, and instructed them to keep the machinery in repair, although the servants neglect to make the repairs, or make them in an improper manner. The master must exercise a reasonable supervision over the manner in which his business is done; but the repairs which machines, properly constructed, require to keep them in running order, may be intrusted to competent servants. They are regarded as incidental to the use of the machines; because they are such as machines in substantially good repair must from time to time need.
Perhaps the whole question is whether the master has exercisad reasonable care in employing competent servants, in providing suitable machines and implements, and in doing that part...
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