Rice v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc.
Decision Date | 12 June 1946 |
Docket Number | 131. |
Citation | 48 A.2d 166,186 Md. 561 |
Parties | RICE v. REVERE COPPER & BRASS, Inc. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; John T. Tucker, Judge.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Evelyn Rice claimant, widow of Leo Rice, deceased, opposed by the Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., employer and self-insurer. Judgment affirming disallowance by the State Industrial Accident Commission of the widow's claim, and the widow appeals.
Affirmed.
Maurice J. Pressman, of Baltimore (Julius P Robinson, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.
Robert E. Coughlan, Jr., and Paul M. Higinbothom, both of Baltimore for appellee.
Argued before MARBURY, Chief Judge, and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON and HENDERSON, JJ.
Leo Rice, the husband of the claimant in this case, died as a result of a blow from a shovel, wielded by a fellow-employee, Tressie Skeeter, which fractured his skull. The widow's claim was disallowed by the State Industrial Accident Commission. On appeal, the case was heard by the Court, without a jury, in the Superior Court of Baltimore City, upon the record taken before the Commission. From its action affirming the Commission the case comes here.
Rice and Skeeter both worked for Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. upon the same shift, from 3 p. m., to 11 p. m., but they did not work together, on in the same gang. Rice was a floorman, or general utility man, and was usually assigned his duties for the particular day when he reported for work. Skeeter's work was in the other end of the building. There was no testimony as to when or where Rice and Skeeter became acquainted. Rice had worked for the Company for about a year prior to his injury.
On August 11, 1944, Rice reported for work and punched the time clock at 2:37 p. m. There was undisputed testimony that employees on the incoming shift were allowed to punch the clock at any time after 2:35 p. m. Rice went to the locker-room, changed his clothes, and entered no. 2 sheet mill, standing some 25 feet from the entrance by the office. An automatic vending machine containing soft drinks stood nearby. Men of the working shift were not far away. The shifts changed at 3 p. m. when the whistle blew. The injury occurred at about 2:55 p. m. according to the testimony of several witnesses. (The death certificate gave the time as 3 p. m.).
Sisson, on the incoming shift, The witness testified he was not near enough to hear what words, if any, were spoken.
Brown, on the outgoing shift, operated a scale about 18 feet from where Rice was standing. He was about 6 feet from the scale waiting for the whistle, and about 12 feet from Rice when he was struck. He testified:
Henderson, on the incoming shift, testified that he was talking to Rice.
Rice died on August 18, 1944, from the effects of the blow. Before he died he told the Assistant Personnel Manager, Gilbert, that 'he had not been in a fight'. Skeeter was indicted and plead guilty to manslaughter. He was sentenced to five years in the penitentiary from whence he was brought to testify before the Commission. His story was that Rice had cursed him and threatened to strike him with a soft-drink bottle at the time the blow was struck. He testified that Rice had rented a room in Skeeter's house, and spent the night there, on Sunday, August 6, with a girl; a few days later, Rice brought around another girl whom he claimed was his wife, but Skeeter told him he 'didn't want that kind of stuff there'. He let the first girl remain, but told Rice and his wife to go. However, the first girl left after two days. Skeeter was asked: Q.
While there is no corroboration of Skeeter's story that Rice initiated the altercation in the factory, there is testimony to support his statement that animosity existed, and arose from a quarrel about the room. Cooper, a fellow employee, testified that there was 'bad blood' between them; that Skeeter told him a day or so before the fatal striking that Rice had asked Skeeter 'to rent a room for him and his girl friend'. Moreover, the claimant herself testified that she had been separated from her husband for some time immediately prior to his injury. She testified that she knew Skeeter, and that her husband had a room with him. She also testified that she and Rice only became reconciled the morning of his injury. This latter statement was corroborated by a witness, Frances Barksdale.
The trial court found that Rice was injured in the course of his employment, and in this we fully agree. 'The words * * * [of the Statute, Code Art. 101, § 14] 'out of,' refer to the cause or origin of the accident, while 'in the course of' refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which it occurs.' Hill v. Liberty Motor and Engineering Corporation, Md., 45 A.2d 467, 471. 'The employment contemplated his entry upon and departure from the premises as much as it contemplated his working there, and must include a reasonable interval of time for that purpose.' Cudahy Packing Co. of Nebraska v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 426, 44 S.Ct. 153, 155, 68 L.Ed. 366, 30 A.L.R. 532. Bristow v. Department of Labor, 139 Wash. 247, 246 P. 573, 574. See also Field v. Charmette Knitted Fabric Co., 245 N.Y. 139, 156 N.E. 642; Spencer v. Chesapeake Paper Board Co., Md., 47 A.2d 385, and cases there cited. We hold that an employee is in the course of his employment where he is injured before the hour of work while on the premises for the purpose of engaging in the day's work. No implication to the contrary is to be drawn from Hill v. Liberty Motor & Engineering Co., supra, as clearly appears from the supplemental statement filed upon motion for reargument in that case.
The trial court denied recovery in the instant case on the...
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...282 Md. 447, 455-57, 385 A.2d 1179 (1978); Pariser Bakery v. Koontz, 239 Md. 586, 589-91, 212 A.2d 324 (1965); Rice v. Revere Copper and Brass, 186 Md. 561, 48 A.2d 166 (1946); Perdue v. Brittingham, 186 Md. 393, 47 A.2d 491 (1946); Montgomery County v. Smith, 144 Md.App. 548, 557-79, 799 A......