Rice v. State, No. 5D99-1513 to 5D99-1515
Decision Date | 14 April 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 5D99-1513 to 5D99-1515, No. 5D99-1746., No. 5D99-1535, No. 5D99-1704 |
Citation | 754 So.2d 881 |
Parties | Donna Jean RICE, et al., Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and John M. Selden, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.
In this consolidated appeal, six separate criminal defendants challenge the constitutionality of paragraph 893.13(1)(e) of the Florida Statutes (1997) which enhances the penalties imposed upon defendants convicted of selling, manufacturing, delivering or possessing a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a place of worship. In asserting this challenge, the defendants claim the statute 1) violates the establishment clause, 2) is void for vagueness, and 3) violates their rights to receive due process and equal protection of the law. For the following reasons, we uphold the constitutionality of the statute and thus affirm the judgments and sentences entered by the trial court.
Paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of subsection 893.13(1) of the Florida Statutes (1997) provide enhanced penalties for drug offenses committed in proximity to child care facilities; private and public elementary, middle, and secondary schools; private or public colleges, universities, or other post-secondary educational institutions; public housing facilities; public parks; convenience businesses; and places of worship. Paragraph (e) of the statute specifically relates to drug offenses committed in proximity to places of worship:
(Emphasis added). The defendants first assert that paragraph (e) of the statute violates the establishment clauses set forth in our federal and state constitutions.
rev. denied, 658 So.2d 992 (Fla.1995).
In Easley v. State, 755 So.2d 692 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999),rev. denied, 751 So.2d 1251 (Fla.2000), the fourth district applied these tests to paragraph 893.13(1)(e) and found no violation of either establishment clause. Upon consideration, we agree. The primary purpose and effect of the enhancement provision set forth in paragraph 893.13(1)(e) is the deterrence of drug sales and drug use in proximity to places where people gather. The deterrence of drug sales and use is a secular purpose which neither promotes nor advances any religious cause. Furthermore, the expenditure of public money to enforce the statute is too remote to aid any sectarian purpose. We note that, although visitors to places of worship may indirectly benefit from the state's enforcement of the statute, such benefit neither evidences an improper legislative motive nor demonstrates an excessive entanglement between church and state.
The defendants next contend that the statute is unconstitutionally void for vagueness. A challenge to a statute on grounds of vagueness turns initially to the nature of the behavior the statute seeks to regulate. For example, if the statute purports to regulate constitutionally protected conduct, such as speech or assembly, the statute must be examined in the abstract in order to analyze a vagueness claim. See Travis v. State, 700 So.2d 104, 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997),
rev. denied, 707 So.2d 1128 (Fla.1998). In contrast, a statute like paragraph 893.13(1)(e) which does not purport to regulate constitutionally protected conduct can be struck down as being unconstitutionally vague only if the statutory language is so vague that it fails to give adequate notice of any conduct that the statute proscribes. See id. at 106. Thus, when addressing the instant vagueness claim, the first question is whether the defendants engaged in conduct that is clearly proscribed by the statute. If so, the defendants cannot prevail on their claim of vagueness. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982).
The instant record reveals that all of the defendants admitted that they had violated the statute by either selling cocaine or possessing cocaine with the intent to sell within 1000 feet of a church building. The defendants also conceded that the buildings in question were ordinary, traditional churches. Based on these concessions, the trial court properly ruled that the defendants could not prevail on their claim that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. In so ruling, we recognize that in Jean v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1392, ___ So.2d ___, 1999 WL 393477 (Fla. 4th DCA June 16, 1999), the fourth district addressed this exact issue and on similar facts upheld the constitutionality of paragraph 893.13(1)(e).
Finally, we address the defendants' argument that sentencing under paragraph 893.13(1)(e) violates both the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth...
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