Richard, In re
| Decision Date | 16 January 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 40154,40154 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Welfare of Fai RICHARD, a Minor. Frances SIMMONS, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Washington, Respondent. |
Bertram L. Metzger, Jr., Legal Services Center, Seattle, for appellant.
Charles O. Carroll, Pros. Atty., Laurence A. Mosler, Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent.
This cause comes here by way of a writ of certiorari to review an adjudication that a 14-year-old girl was a delinquent child under the provisions of RCW 13.04.010, which reads, inter alia:
The words 'delinquent child' mean any child under the age of eighteen years who violates any law of this state, or any ordinance of any town, city, or county of this state defining a crime or who has violated any federal law or law of another state defining a crime, and whose case has been referred to the juvenile court by any jurisdiction whatsoever.
The charging part of the verified petition filed in juvenile court alleging delinquency reads:
That the said child is delinquent as defined by RCW 13.04.010 in that said child, on or about 11/9/67 in the County of King, State of Washington, did create a disturbance on a city transit bus at 3rd Ave. and Pine St. in that she broke glass in the rear exit door of the bus, she was verbally abusive (profane) to the coach operator, and she struck, kicked, and bit a police officer.
A fact-finding hearing was held in juvenile court at which the minor was represented by counsel. At the conclusion of the evidence, the juvenile court judge, by way of oral opinion, stated:
She broke glass. She was very abusive, and she struck, kicked, and bit at a police officer. She was actually guilty of assault on the officer, at least third degree assault, and she had disturbed the peace.
I am sure that without any mention of it we all know that there is a City ordinance to that effect.
Thereafter, the juvenile court judge entered findings of fact to the effect that the allegations of misconduct were essentially true and that the minor was a delinquent child. She was placed on probation for 6 months and released.
The disturbing of the peace ordinance obviously referred to by the juvenile court judge in his oral decision is Seattle Code § 12.11.020 (Ordinance No. 16046). 1 The relevant assault statutes are RCW 9.11.020 (3), (6), 2 and 9.11.030. 3
Petitioner, by her first two contentions before this court, asserts that the delinquency petition is so vague and indefinite as to deny the juvenile and her parents due process of law. In support of this assertion petitioner argues that the delinquency petition does not adequately notify the juvenile and her parents of the particular violations of law charged because (a) there is no criminal statute or ordinance which specifically makes it a crime to 'create a disturbance on a city transit bus,' and (b) there are numerous statutes and ordinances which might otherwise be applicable. Ergo, petitioner contends, the failure to specify the statute or ordinance alleged to have been violated is fatal to the delinquency petition. In this respect petitioner points to In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).
We find no merit in petitioners's contentions.
Generally speaking, and particularly with reference to criminal charges, there are two types of vagueness that courts are called upon from time to time to consider. First, a criminal charge may be so vague as to fail to state any offense whatsoever. In this event, the charge is constitutionally defective and subject to dismissal. See, for example, Seattle v. Jordan, 134 Wash. 30, 235 P. 6 (1925). Secondly, a criminal charge may state an offense but yet be so vague with regard to particulars as to render it subject to a timely motion for a more definite statement. State v. Bates, 52 Wash.2d 207, 324 P.2d 810 (1958). In this event the charge is not subject to dismissal unless the prosecuting officials refuse to comply with an order calling for greater particularity. State v. Thomas, 73 Wash.Dec.2d 734, 440 P.2d 488 (1968). Comparably speaking, in the area of juvenile delinquency allegations, we are satisfied petitioner's challenge to the delinquency petition in the instant case falls into the second category.
RCW 13.04.060 provides, with regard to petitions alleging juvenile delinquency, that 'Such petition shall be verified and shall contain a statement of facts constituting such * * * delinquency, * * *.'
The requirements of this statute, as well as those of due process, are satisfied when the verified factual allegations of a delinquency petition are specific and definite enough to fairly apprise the juvenile, the parents or guardian, and the juvenile court of the particular acts of alleged misconduct which will be inquired into at a subsequent adjudicatory hearing on the merits. In re Lewis, 51 Wash.2d 193, 316 P.2d 907 (1957); In re Gault, supra. This is essentially the same test applied to a criminal complaint which will be found to satisfy constitutional notice requirements if the allegations are sufficient to apprise a man of common understanding of the nature of the charges against him and enable him to prepare his defense. State v. Bates, supra; State v. Ternan, 32 Wash.2d 584, 203 P.2d 342 (1949). Applying this test to the delinquency petition in question, it appears manifest to us that the allegations set forth therein are fully adequate to advise the juvenile, her parents and the juvenile court that the juvenile was accused of misconduct amounting to disturbing the peace and assault. Particularly does this seem so when it appears that petitioner and the juvenile involved were represented by counsel at all pertinent stages in the proceeding. Had petitioner or the juvenile desired more specifics in connection with the allegations, either could have timely moved to make the petition more definite. This was not done.
We conclude that the juvenile court did not err in refusing to grant petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition.
By her final contention, petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the juvenile court judge's...
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... ... See also State v. Bonds, 98 Wash.2d 1, 16, 653 P.2d 1024 (1982); In re Richard, 75 Wash.2d 208, 449 P.2d 809 (1969); Seattle v. Morrow, 45 Wash.2d 27, 273 P.2d 238 (1954); Seattle v. Jordan, 134 Wash. 30, 235 P. 6 (1925). This court also stated that "the law of this state has long been that a criminal defendant can raise objections to an information which completely ... ...
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State v. Bonds
... ... We disagree. A criminal charge may be so vague as to fail to state any offense whatsoever. In this event, the charge is constitutionally defective and subject to dismissal. In re Richard, 75 Wash.2d 208, 211, 449 P.2d 809 (1969). The charge fails to state an offense if it omits a specified element of a statutory crime. See State v. Ashker, 11 Wash.App. 423, 426, 523 P.2d 949 (1974). In the instant case, the information contained the essential elements of first degree rape ... ...
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... ... A constitutionally defective information is subject to dismissal for failure to ... Page 687 ... state an offense on the face of the charging document by omitting allegations of essential elements constituting the offense charged. Holt, 104 Wash.2d at 320-21, 704 P.2d 1189; In re Richard, 75 Wash.2d 208, 211, 449 P.2d 809 (1969). However, a charging document which states the statutory elements of a crime, but is vague as to some other significant matter, may be corrected under a bill of particulars. A defendant may not challenge a charging document for "vagueness" on appeal if ... ...