Richard v. Detroit Trust Co.

• Decision Date: 10 December 1934
• Docket Number: No. 42.,42.
• Citation: 257 N.W. 725,269 Mich. 411
• Parties: RICHARD v. DETROIT TRUST CO. et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

269 Mich. 411

257 N.W. 725

RICHARD

v.DETROIT TRUST CO. et al.

No. 42.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 10, 1934.

Suit by Frances Richard against the Detroit Trust Company, executor of the estate of Otis K. Richard, deceased, and others. From an adverse decree, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County, in Chancery; Clyde I. Webster, Judge.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

Wallace C. Hall, Justin M. Hannick, and Marshall R. Guidot, all of Detroit, for appellant.

Goodenough, Voorhies, Long & Ryan, of Detroit, for appellees.

BUSHNELL, Justice.

Prior to her marriage on March 12, 1931, to Otis K. Richard, plaintiff executed an antenuptial agreement, which, without aid or advice of counsel for either party, was drawn by her intended spouse, who was killed in an automobile accident on August 24th the same year. Mrs. Richard appeals from an unsuccessful attempt to have the contract declared null and void, and alleges that through fraud and deceit she was induced to sign the instrument by representations that it was to be destroyed after having been used to satisfy Mr. Richard's relatives, and that she received no valid or subsisting consideration.

The agreement dictated by Mr. Richard and written by the plaintiff reads:

‘Agreement.

‘Made this 18th day of Feb., 1931, by and between Frances Cramer and Otis K. Richard of Detroit, Mich., Whereas Frances Cramer and Otis K. Richard seriously considering marriage to one another and both believing marriage should be based on but one thing-that one thing is love-therefore in the event of an actual marriage between the above named parties and in consideration of his O. K. Richard's children by a former wife, I, Frances Cramer, hereby agree to waive all of my lawful rights or claims to any and or all of his O. K. Richard's money, real estate, stocks, bonds, notes, securities, or personal property, and all or any part of the income of appreciation derived therefrom, nor will I, Frances Cramer, interfere with in any way or expect to participate in common until all or any part of the above mentioned tangibles now or any time after our proposed marriage, that he, O. K. Richard has acquired or contracted for either whole or in part or came into possession of prior to the date of an actual marriage between the two parties, Frances Cramer and O. K. Richard. I, Frances Cramer, do however expect to share and participate in all income produced by him, O. K. Richard, from any source other than that mentioned in the foregoing paragraph.

‘Frances Cramer

‘O. K. Richard.

‘Wednesday, Mar. 11th, 1930.

‘C. C. Richard.’

Appellant has no disagreement with appellee's position that ‘marriage alone is sufficient consideration for an antenuptial agreement,’ but argues that because the agreement did not contain a promise to marry on the part of the intended spouse, he was not bound to do so and therefore plaintiff received no consideration for the promise.

Until the marriage, plaintiff had no rights to surrender in Richard's property. There was, until marriage, only an offer by plaintiff to give up certain rights if and at such time as the parties should marry. Marriage constituted an acceptance of the offer, and, having received the benefit of the acceptance, even though such benefit was decreased by her husband's premature death, plaintiff is bound by her promise. In both Graves v. Von Below, 160 Mich. 408, 125 N. W. 379, and Hockenberry v. Donovan, 170 Mich. 370, 136 N. W. 389, the engagement of the parties antedated the agreement. We think there is no merit in plaintiff's contention as to absence of consideration.

Plaintiff also contends that she should be released from her promise because it was obtained through fraud and trickery by one who, though standing in a confidential relationship, used undue influence, and his representatives did not sustain the burden of showing good faith, fair dealings, and an open disclosure on the part of deceased. The principal cases on the subject in this jurisdiction in which similar questions were raised are: In re Estate of Pulling, 93 Mich. 274, 52 N. W. 1116;Koch v. Koch, 126 Mich. 187, 85 N. W. 455; Hockenberry v. Donovan, supra; and Detroit Trust Company v. Baker, 230 Mich. 551, 203 N. W. 154,204 N. W. 773.

Mr. Justice Long in the Pulling opinion quoted at length from Kline v. Kline, 57 Pa. 120, 98 Am. Dec. 206, as to the confidential relationship. The agreement executed before marriage, however, was not the sole evidence of the understanding between the parties, for on the very day of the marriage, Dr. Pulling made a writing under his hand which throws some light upon the transaction and shows that the whole agreement and understanding between the parties was not confined to the papers signed by Mrs. Pulling. It also shows the motives which actuated the parties in making any agreement whatever, and the court concluded that it did not seem probable that it was ever understood that the widow was to be deprived of all participation in the estate and that the probate and circuit courts were right in their interpretation of the contract.

The Koch Case turned on the question of alleged fraud. The contract was drawn by a lawyer of ability and repute who fully explained the matter to the intended wife before she executed agreement, and told her she would obtain more property as his widow, in case of death, than she would by the contract. Mr. Justice Grant wrote his own headnotes for the opinion and held that the defendant (the wife) failed to prove that the contract was obtained by fraud. We must consider the headnote written by the learned justice as a part of an opinion in which the entire court concurred. The case is authority for the proposition that where an antenuptial agreement is alleged to have been obtained by fraud, the burden of proof is on the party charging the fraud.

In Hockenberry v. Donovan, supra, the wife sought cancellation of the contract for alleged fraud. The circumstances are not unlike those in the case at bar except that there were two agreements, both drawn by experienced and reputable counsel, and explained to the parties. Mr. Justice Brooke, speaking for the court, held (page 380 of 170 Mich.,136 N. W. 389, 393):

‘Where the parties entering into an...