Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, Civ. No. 68-287.

• Court: United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Court (Oregon)
• Writing for the Court: James C. Maletis, Cookingham & Maletis and James H. Bruce, Portland, Or., for defendant
• Citation: 300 F. Supp. 338
• Parties: Diana RICHARDS, Plaintiff, v. GRIFFITH RUBBER MILLS, an Oregon corporation, Defendant.
• Decision Date: 05 May 1969
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 68-287.

300 F. Supp. 338

Diana RICHARDS, Plaintiff,
v.
GRIFFITH RUBBER MILLS, an Oregon corporation, Defendant.

Civ. No. 68-287.

United States District Court D. Oregon.

May 5, 1969.

300 F. Supp. 339

Donald S. Richardson, Green, Richardson, Griswold & Murphy, Portland, Or., for plaintiff.

James C. Maletis, Cookingham & Maletis and James H. Bruce, Portland, Or., for defendant.

Russell Specter, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, D. C., for Commission, amicus curiae.

OPINION AND ORDER

SOLOMON, Chief Judge:

Diana Richards claims her employer, Griffith Rubber Mills, discriminated against her because of her sex, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). She exhausted her administrative remedies, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4, and filed this action, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) and (f).

Miss Richards began working for Griffith in January, 1965. On March 27, 1967, while employed as a stock cutter, she applied for one of two openings as a "Press Operator B." The jobs were given to two men who had less seniority. Griffith explained its action by referring to the union contract, which required that all female employees receive two

300 F. Supp. 340

ten-minute rest periods,¹ and to "Manufacturing Order No. 8" of the Wage and Hour Commission of the State of Oregon.²

On November 8, 1968, Miss Richards was given a "Press Operator B" position on a machine that does not require her to lift heavy loads.

In this action, plaintiff seeks $1,598 in back pay plus attorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) and (k).

The union contract's rest period provisions may not be used to deny Miss Richards the rights given her under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Since the union and the employer are both prohibited from discriminating on the basis of sex, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) and (c), they may not override the law's guarantees in the form of a contractual benefit.

Order No. 8 cannot deny Miss Richards her Federal rights. Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, a Federal statute will prevail over a conflicting state regulation. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824). The particular regulation in this case denies Miss Richards the rights guaranteed her by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 293 F.Supp. 1219 (C.D.Cal. 1968). Cf. Longacre v. State, 448 P.2d 832 (Wyo.1968).

Griffith argues that under the Equal Protection Clause the State may constitutionally enforce Order No. 8. This is correct, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 28 S.Ct. 324, 52 L.Ed. 551 (1908), but it is not the issue. Except in rare and justifiable circumstances, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e), the law no longer permits either employers or the states to deal with women as a class in relation to employment to their disadvantage. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a). Individuals must be judged as individuals and not on the basis of characteristics generally attributed to racial, religious, or sexual groups. The particular classification in Order No. 8 may be reasonable under the Equal Protection Clause, but it is no longer permitted under the Supremacy Clause and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7.

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