Richards v. Mena
| Decision Date | 11 May 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-92-100,13-92-100 |
| Citation | 907 S.W.2d 566 |
| Parties | Ann RICHARDS, Governor of Texas, Robert I. Kelly and Debbie Irvine, Appellants, v. Guadalupe MENA, Maria Gomez, Zulema Hernandez, Juan Angel Garcia, Chayo Flores Zaldivar, Robert R. Alonzo, Patricia Roybal Sutton, Jose R. Kennard, El Paso Coalition for Fair Redistricting, Augustin Negrete, Benjamin Menchaca, Richard Arriola, Saul Gonzalez, Marc Campos, Leonardo Camarillo, Lalo Arcuate, Beto Salinas, Ramiro Cavazos, and Edgar Ruiz, Appellees. CV. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Renea Hicks, Special Assistant Attorney General, Austin, Javier Guajardo, Special Assistant Attorney General, Austin, Dan Morales, Attorney General, Austin, Will Pryor, First Assistant Attorney General, Austin, Mary F. Keller, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Austin, for appellants.
Alejandro Moreno, Jr., Edinburg, Travis Hiester, Atlas & Hall, McAllen, James C. Harrington, Austin, Judith Bagley, Austin, Judith Sanders-Castro, San Antonio, Jose Garza, San Antonio, for appellees.
Before McCLOUD, C.J., and BURGESS and ANDELL, JJ. 1
This appeal involves the propriety of attorneys' fees in a redistricting and voting rights case. In a non-jury trial the court permanently enjoined use of the 1991 legislative enactments redistricting the Texas House of Representatives and the Texas Senate. An agreed judgment settled all issues except appellees' attorney fees. By sixteen points of error, the State contends the trial court erred by awarding attorney fees against the State.
Originally, appellees, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), the Texas Civil Rights Project (TCRP), and the Texas Rural Legal Aid Fund (TRLA), on behalf of thirteen Mexican-Americans and the El Paso Coalition for Fair Redistricting, a voting rights community organization, sued to prevent Texas officials from using 1990 census figures for legislative redistricting purposes. Appellees claimed violations of the Texas Constitution's Bill of Rights and other statutory provisions.
The Legislature passed HB-150 and SB-31, Texas House of Representatives and Senate redistricting plans. Appellees then amended their lawsuit claiming the newly enacted legislation illegally and unconstitutionally discriminated against Mexican-Americans.
After a hearing, the trial court entered a temporary injunction, partial summary judgment, and declaratory relief invalidating the House and Senate plans and ordering the State to develop new redistricting plans, adjusting for the census undercount.
Because of the impending March 1992 primaries, a second suit, Quiroz v. Richards, was filed complaining about the Senate redistricting plan. An agreed final judgment was entered enjoining implementation of SB-31 and replacing it with the Quiroz plan, which provided a different method of redistricting. The same Quiroz plan was entered and adopted in this case. Entering the Quiroz plan was only a partial settlement of this case because the House reapportionment plan remained in dispute. Later, in this case, the trial judge signed an agreed final judgment enjoining the appellants from implementing HB-150 and ordering House elections under a different plan.
The Legislature, on January 8, 1992, in special session, passed SB-1 and HB-1, Senate and House redistricting plans identical to those approved in Quiroz and by the trial judge in this case.
The State, through its various points of error, actually raises only two issues; the legal availability of attorneys' fees for the plaintiffs and the evidentiary basis for the award.
The first issue is determined by an interpretation of the scope of the waiver of governmental immunity under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, chapter 106. The State contends the trial court erred because chapter 106 does not waive governmental immunity for the payment of attorney fees.
An officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state who is acting or purporting to act in an official capacity may not, because of a person's race, religion, color, sex, or national origin, impose an unreasonable burden on the person. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 106.001(a)(6) (Vernon 1986). If a person has violated or there are reasonable grounds to believe a person is about to violate section 106.001, the person aggrieved by the violation or threatened violation may sue for preventive relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 106.002(a) (Vernon 1986). Additionally, the court may award the prevailing party, other than the state, reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 106.002(b) (Vernon 1986). Thus, section 106.002(b) provides for an express waiver of the State's governmental immunity to those prohibited acts listed in section 106.001.
Initially, we note the State does not challenge the trial court's finding that the House and Senate bills imposed an unreasonable burden upon appellees. The State argues chapter 106 is not an all-purpose antidiscrimination statute, thus no waiver of governmental immunity for attorney fees and costs in a redistricting cause of action. The State argues that any unintentional racially discriminatory impact of the redistricting legislation is not the type of discriminatory act addressed in section 106.001(a)(6) whereby sovereign immunity is waived in 106.002(b). Without citing authority, the State contends the prohibited acts referred to in section 106.001(a)(6) are only intentional acts, not, as in this case, the unintentional racially discriminatory impact of the Legislature's redistricting legislation.
Appellees respond that the use of HB-150 and SB-31 are within the prohibited acts contemplated by 106.001(a)(6). Appellees contend that because they pleaded and the trial court held the use of HB-150 and SB-31 redistricting plans and their underlying census data imposed an unreasonable burden on the rights of Mexican-American voters because of their race, color, or national origin, chapter 106 applies. They assert, therefore the trial court acted within its discretion when awarding their attorney's fees.
When interpreting statutes we are bound by three principles. The State is immune from liability for attorney's fees except when that immunity is waived by clear statutory language. Lowe v. Texas Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1976); Texas Dept. of Human Services v. Methodist Retirement Services, Inc., 763 S.W.2d 613, 614 (Tex.App.--Austin 1989, no writ). Statutes must be interpreted so as to give effect to legislative intent. Knight v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex.1982). A statute must be read as a whole and interpreted to give effect to every part. Ex parte Pruitt, 551 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex.1977).
The State contends section 106.001 refers primarily to acts of discrimination by the government in employment situations. However, the Austin court of appeals addressed a summary judgment case involving an alleged prohibited act under 106.001(a)(6) which was not related to an employment issue. See Toungate v. Bastrop Indep. School Dist., 842 S.W.2d 823 (Tex.App.--Austin 1992, no writ). The Toungate plaintiff complained about the school district's assessment of in-school suspension for violating the district's hair length policy. The Toungate court reversed the summary judgment concluding that an issue of fact existed about whether the school district's acts placed an unreasonable burden upon the plaintiff.
The Legislature enacted article 6252-16, the predecessor to chapter 106 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, in 1967. In related provisions article 6252-16 read as follows:
Section 1. (a) No officer or employee of the state or of a political subdivision of the state, when acting or purporting to act in his official capacity, may:
(1) refuse to employ a person ...;
(2) discharge a person from employment ...;
....
(5) refuse to permit a person to use facilities open to the public and owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of the state or a political subdivision of the state, ... [or];
....
(7) refuse to grant a benefit to, or impose an unreasonable burden upon, a person, because of the person's race, religion, color or national origin; ....
Former art. 6252-16, § 1(a)(1),(2),(5) & (7) (Vernon 1970). See Acts 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 72, 1967 Tex.Gen.Laws 138.
Former article 6252-16 also provided as a remedy preventive relief specifically including injunctive relief. Former article 6252-16 § 2 (Vernon 1970). Additionally, section two provided that the court, in its discretion, may award the aggrieved party costs and a reasonable attorney fee as part of the costs from the state. Id. In 1971, the Legislature added "sex" as a protected category. Acts 1971, 62nd Leg.R.S., ch. 989, 1971 Tex.Gen.Laws 2994. In 1983, the Legislature passed the Commission on Human Rights Act and repealed article 6252-16 recodifying its provisions as chapter 106 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Acts 1983, 68th Leg., 1st C.S., 1983 Tex.Gen.Laws 32, 57.
When applying the three principles of statutory construction, giving effect to legislative intent and reading the statute as a whole giving effect to every part we conclude that the acts here are within those contemplated by section 106.001(a)(6). The State's actions in this case are prohibited acts such as envisioned in section 106.001(a)(6). The State's immunity is waived under 106.002(b). We overrule appellant's third point of error. Because we conclude that the State waived its immunity under chapter 106, we decline to address appellant's points of error one and two as they are not necessary for disposition of the case. TEX.R.APP.P. 90(a).
By points five through eight, the State asserts that the trial court erred as a matter of law by awarding attorney fees and costs incurred 1) in challenging...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Avco Corp., Textron v. Interstate Southwest
...denied) (holding the trial court erred in making an equitable award of expert witness fees absent statutory authorization); Richards v. Mena, 907 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1995, writ dism'd by agr.) (holding that costs of experts "are incidental expenses in preparation for tr......
-
Power Reps, Inc. v. Cy Cates, Power Reps Indus., LLC
...Oil Co., L.P. v. White, 287 S.W.3d 204, 212 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.); see also Richards v. Mena, 907 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995, writ dism'd) ("Regardless of any good cause shown, costs of experts are incidental expenses in preparation for trial and......
-
Ntreh v. University of Texas at Dallas
...does not waive the State's sovereign immunity. A review of the entire statute makes the State's position insupportable. See Richards v. Mena, 907 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1995, writ dism'd by agr.) ("Thus, section 106.002(b) provides for an express waiver of the State's gov......
-
Jcw Electronics, Inc. v. Garza
...cause shown, costs of experts are incidental expenses in preparation for trial and not recoverable." Richards v. Mena, 907 S.W.2d 566, 571 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1995, writ dism'd) (citing Whitley, 581 S.W.2d at 544). We conclude it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award ......