Richards v. State
| Decision Date | 02 August 1940 |
| Citation | 197 So. 772,144 Fla. 177 |
| Parties | RICHARDS v. STATE. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Oct. 1, 1940.
Error to Circuit Court, Volusia County; H. B. Frederick, Judge.
Ralph W. Richards was convicted of exacting and accepting a reward compensation, and remuneration other than that to which he was entitled as a city commissioner, and he brings error.
Affirmed.
William Judge, of Daytona Beach, and Roger J Waybright and Edgar W. Waybright, Sr., both of Jacksonville for plaintiff in error.
George Couper Gibbs, Atty. Gen., and William Fisher, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.
Plaintiff in error, a city commissioner of the City of Daytona Beach was tried, and convicted on the charge that he did 'unlawfully and corruptly exact and accept a reward, compensation, and remuneration other than that which he, the said Ralph W. Richard, as such municipal officer was permitted and provided by law to accept and receive'. He was sentenced to pay a fine of one thousand dollars and in default thereof to be confined in the State Penitentiary for one year at hard labor. He seeks relief from that judgment by writ of error.
It is first contended that Volusia County is made up of what is known locally as the 'ring faction' and the 'anti-ring faction', that each of said factions are about equally divided, that in making up the jury list, from which the jury in this case was drawn, the County Commissioners intentionally and arbitrarily discriminated against the anti-ring faction and composed the jury list entirely from the ring faction, that plaintiff in error was a member of the anti-ring faction, and that his conviction was invalid because of such discrimination in the selection of the jury list.
The evidence supports the charge that Volusia County is known as having two political factions by the names stated, though it is admitted that every other legal requirement in the selection of the jury list was complied with. The objection to the instant jury was raised seasonably by a challenge to the array, and while it is shown that many of the names were drawn from the ring faction, it is not shown that the jury selected to try the plaintiff in error belonged to either faction or was in any wise prejudiced to or for any reason disqualified to try him. It is further shown that neither faction had been continually in power, that the balance of power constantly oscillated from one faction to the other and that there was no recognized line of distinction that separated one faction from the other.
To support his contention, plaintiff in error relies on Norris v. State of Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579, 79 L.Ed. 1074; American Sugar Refining Company v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 21 S.Ct. 43, 45 L.Ed. 102; Juarez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 277 S.W. 1091, and other cases of similar import. These cases all grew out of a continued and persistent refusal over a period of years to place names on the jury list because of racial or religious distinctions. Such discriminations were held to be in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution or to provisions in the State Constitutions affecting religious affiliation.
From these and similar cases, we glean the general rule to be that any intentional and persistent discrimination against a race or class of persons in the selection of a jury list to try a criminal case is violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, and that such violation is not excused by the fact that the persons actually selected possess all the qualifications for jury duty prescribed by law. The discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or class must, however, be constant. It can have no relation to classes or factions more or less fanciful, mysterious, or nebulous, bound by no restrictions or common loyalties and who continually shift from one faction to the other unless conclusively shown that the verdict was influenced by that fact.
Plaintiff in error next contends that Section 7486, Compiled General Laws of 1927, the act under which he was convicted embraces the offense of bribery and extortion, that all the evidence elicited against him, if it proved anything, proved bribery, that there was no evidence tending to prove extortion, and being so, he is immunized from prosecution under Section 8311, Compiled General Laws of 1927, because he was called before the grand jury and required to testify concerning the charge against him.
The offense of bribery as punished in this state applies to the one who corruptly offers, gives, or receives anything of value to influence the receiver's official action while extortion consists in demanding an illegal fee or gift to influence official conduct. Section 7486, while infected with the element of bribery, is much broader in scope than the bribery statutes. It reaches only the acceptor of the bribe, but it also includes the crime of extortion and affects the officer, his deputy, or appointee if he exacts or accepts a bribe for the performance, non-performance, or violation of any act, rule, or regulation that he may be called on to perform. It was framed in other words to reach and punish any misconduct on the part of a public officer or his deputy. This Court has recognized the distinction between the two statutes; Johnson v. State ex rel. Fox, 99 Fla. 711, 127 So. 317.
The pertinent evidence against Plaintiff in Error shows in substance that the City Commissioners of Daytona Beach had accumulated what they called a campaign fund by contributions from the officers and employees of the City, that said fund was in charge of Commissioner Couch and was soon to be discontinued, that plaintiff in error was a member of the City Commission and as such, had contributed more than ten thousand dollars to this fund, that the Mayor Commissioner of the City had recently died and that another was to be elected in his place by the other Commissioners, that Commissioner Couch authorized one W. P. Preer to negotiate with Plaintiff in Error for his vote in support of him (Couch) for Mayor Commissioner. It is also shown that Plaintiff in Error was at first offered five thousand dollars for his vote for Couch as Mayor Commissioner, that he haggled and jockeyed over the offer, but later agreed to and did vote for Couch for Mayor Commissioner on condition that he be paid ten thousand dollars from the campaign fund since it was to be discontinued. There is evidence to show that the amount agreed on was paid to the plaintiff in error after he cast his vote. for Couch.
It is not disputed that at the time of these negotiations Commissioner Couch was in charge of, and responsible for the...
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Raines v. State
...corruptly offers, gives, or receives anything of value to influence the receiver's official action, is guilty of bribery. Richards v. State, 144 Fla. 177, 197 So. 722; State v. Potts, 78 Iowa 656, 43 N.W. 534, 5 L.R.A. 814; People v. Jackson, 191 N.Y. 293, 84 N.E. 65, 15 L.R.A.,N.S., 1173; ......
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Younghans v. State
...Miami Shores Village v. Bessemer Properties, Fla. 1951, 54 So.2d 108. The statute under consideration was analyzed in Richards v. State, 144 Fla. 177, 197 So. 772, 774, in which the Supreme Court 'Section 7486 [F.S.A. § 838.06], while infected with the element of bribery, is much broader in......
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State ex rel. Bateman v. O'Toole, 1530
...Peterson v. Weissing, Fla.App.1958, 101 So.2d 433; State ex rel. Marcus v. Pearson, Fla.1953, 68 So.2d 400; and Richards v. State, 1940, 144 Fla. 177, 179, 197 So. 772, 775. Although the motion to quash and the motion to transcribe are not in the record before this court, it appears from th......
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Ewing v. State
...broader than common law bribery, since it punishes an officer for accepting compensation for nonperformance of duty. Richards v. State, 144 Fla. 177, 197 So. 772, certiorari dismissed 312 U.S. 662, 61 S.Ct. 737, 85 L.Ed. 1109; State ex rel. Grady v. Coleman, Fla., 183 So. 25. This court has......