Richardson v. Langley, 53584

• Decision Date: 26 January 1983
• Docket Number: No. 53584,53584
• Citation: 426 So.2d 780
• Parties: Pauline Parks RICHARDSON, et vir. v. Betty J. LANGLEY & Sara Blankenship, Sole & Only Heirs at Law of Georgia Pauline Boykin Parks, Deceased.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 780

426 So.2d 780

Pauline Parks RICHARDSON, et vir. v. Betty J. LANGLEY & Sara Blankenship, Sole & Only Heirs at

Law of Georgia Pauline Boykin Parks, Deceased.

No. 53584.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Jan. 26, 1983.

Hathorn & Hathorn, J. Hoy Hathorne, Louisville, for appellants.

Fair & Mayo, James C. Mayo, Louisville, Hardy R. Stennis, Macon, for appellees.

Before WALKER, P.J., and BROOM and DAN M. LEE, JJ.

BROOM, Justice, for the Court:

Mental capacity of a grantor (Georgia Pauline Boykin Parks) to execute a warranty deed is the sole issue in this case appealed from the Chancery Court of Winston County, the Honorable Edward C. Prisock, Chancellor, presiding. The lower court found that grantor Georgia Pauline Parks lacked the requisite mental capacity to execute the deed because of medication she had been taking. Since the trial below, grantor Parks died and her action was revived in the name of her heirs at law, the appellees now. Upon the record before us, the decree must be reversed.

Grantor Parks, at the time of the events in question, was a sixty-five-year-old woman suffering from severe rheumatoid arthritis. She had other health problems including a broken femur. Grantor Parks was admitted to the hospital on June 29, 1980, and was placed on various medications, including Iberet 500, Clinoril, Macrodantin P-200, and Flexeril. These medications were administered to Parks on a regular basis during her ten days in the hospital. In addition to the aforementioned medications, Parks was also prescribed on a "PRN" (as needed) basis, Phenaphen, and Codeine, Stadol, and Phenergan, and Dalmane.

On July 1, 1980, the appellants, Mrs. Pauline Parks Richardson and her husband, Speed Richardson, came to see Parks. Parks' daughter, Betty Langley, was present in the room. Their testimony is that at that time they discussed the possibility of Parks selling them her one-third interest in a sixty-eight-acre tract of land originally owned by grantor Parks' father-in-law, who was Mrs. Richardson's father.

After the Richardsons left the hospital, they went to their attorney's office and had the deed in question prepared. Next day, July 2, 1980, they returned to Parks' hospital room where her daughter, Betty Langley, was again present. On this occasion the uncontradicted evidence establishes that grantor Prks executed the deed with the assistance of her daughter who held the pen and made her (grantor's) mark for her due to her severe arthritic condition. Her mark was witnessed by her daughter, Betty Langley, and a registered nurse, Mrs. Beverly Holdiness, who was on duty at the time. The deed was immediately carried by the Richardsons for notarization to a notary in the next building, and was filed that same morning.

About six weeks later Mrs. Parks brought this chancery action to set aside the conveyance upon the sole grounds that she was without "the mental or physical capacity to execute" the deed because of her severe pain and her medication. Other facts will be stated as needful in this opinion.

First argument of the appellants Richardson (grantees) is their contention that the lower court erred in overruling the general demurrer which they filed to the amended bill of complaint. We think the lower court correctly overruled the demurrer because the complaint charged lack of mental capacity which is sufficient to withstand attack by demurrer.

Secondly, they argue that the lower court erred in unduly restricting the testimony of Nurse Beverly Holdiness, a subscribing witness to the grantor's mark. Our study of the record and briefs reveals that the chancellor was not in error because he did not sustain the objections until the nurse had testified that she did not remember the specifics surrounding the execution of the deed. The thrust of the objection was that the nurse should not be permitted to testify about the grantor's capacity to sign the deed because the nurse had already stated that she could not recall the specifics of the event. In sustaining the objections it is clear that the chancellor did not base his action upon Nurse Holdiness' capacity as a subscribing witness but was merely sustaining an objection to a question about which the witness had already testified she had no further recollection.

Third argument is the contention that the lower court erred in overruling the appellants' (grantees') motion, at the conclusion of the evidence presented by the grantor, to exclude the evidence and find for appellants. We find no error in this regard in view of our rule that in acting upon the motion to exclude and enter a decree for the appellants, the lower court was bound to consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the grantor along with reasonable inferences to be drawn from such testimony. Applying this rule to the case before us causes us to conclude that the lower court did not err in overruling appellants' motion to exclude and find for them at the close of the presentation of the grantor's (Parks') proof.

The fourth and fifth arguments rest essentially upon the contention that the lower court's decision setting aside the deed executed by Parks in favor of the Richardsons was manifestly wrong and against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. In dealing with these arguments it is to be noted that the only issue at the trial was whether the grantor, Mrs. Parks, was mentally incompetent to execute the deed at the time it was signed on the occasion in question. Fraud, undue influence, confidential relationship, or overreaching was not pleaded, and there is no averment that Mrs. Parks was non compos mentis. Likewise, there is no charge that the consideration for the deed was inadequate.

Well established in this jurisdiction is the long-standing rule that the burden of proving lack of mental capacity rests squarely on the party seeking to have such deed set aside. Thigpen v. Payton, 391 So.2d 629 (Miss.1980); Williams v. Wilson, 335 So.2d 110 (Miss.1976); Herrington v. Herrington, 232 Miss. 244, 98 So.2d 646 (1957); Gillis v. Smith, 114 Miss. 665, 75 So. 451 (1917). Clear and convincing evidence is necessary to establish this lack of mental capacity. Unless the proof put on by the party seeking to set aside a deed establishes that the grantor was permanently insane up to and beyond the time of the execution of the deed, the test of the grantor's mental capacity is to be applied as of the time of the execution of the deed. Moore v. Stone, 208 So.2d 585 (Miss.1968); Texaco, Inc. v. Musgrove, 253 Miss. 209, 175 So.2d 490 (1965).

We have traditionally made a distinction between "weakness of intellect" and a total lack of capacity to execute a deed. Such a "weakness of intellect" when coupled with another factor, such as grossly inadequate consideration, or the existence of a confidential relationship may be sufficient to warrant the granting of equitable relief. Absent such a confidential relation, or grossly inadequate consideration, a "weakness of intellect" in and of itself, which does not rise to the standard of a total lack of capacity to execute a deed is an insufficient basis upon which to set aside a deed. Kemp v. Kemp, 254 So.2d 876 (Miss.1971); McElveen v. McElveen, 233 Miss. 672, 103 So.2d 439 (1958); Puryear v. Austin, 205 Miss. 590, 39 So.2d 257 (1949); Nubby v. Scott, 186 Miss. 309, 190 So. 911 (1939); Wall v. Wall, 177 Miss. 743, 171 So. 675 (1937); Cresswell v. Cresswell, 164 Miss. 871, 144 So. 41 (1932); Gillis v. Smith, supra; Clark v. Lopez, 75 Miss. 932, 23 So. 648 (1898). This rule allowing an equity court to set aside a deed upon a finding of a weakness of intellect, plus another factor such as grossly inadequate consideration was even more clearly defined in Cunningham v. Lockett, 216 Miss. 879, 63 So.2d 401 (1953). Cunningham held that a weakness of intellect when coupled with grossly inadequate consideration did indeed constitute grounds for setting aside a deed. Nonetheless, we held that "weakness of intellect" required evidence of more than age and sickness on the part of the grantor. Such weakness must be a weakness of the mental faculties. In summary, a party seeking to set aside a deed solely on the grounds of the mental incapacity of the grantor, has the burden of establishing such incapacity by clear and convincing proof focused upon the grantor's incapacity at the time execution was attempted. Moreover, in the absence of one of the aforementioned additional elements, this "mental incapacity" which must be proven requires proof of more than a "mere weakness of intellect" but rather a total lack of mental capacity on the part of the grantor.

We now will analyze and evaluate the evidence in the instant case mindful of the legal requirements set forth above. When the deed in question was executed in Parks' hospital room, the evidence indicates that six persons were present: Georgia Parks, the grantor; Betty Jane Langley, her daughter who witnessed her mark; Pauline Richardson, the grantee; Speed Richardson, the grantee's husband; Betty Shinn, a neighbor and friend; and Beverly Holdiness, a registered nurse who was the other witness to the grantor's mark. All six of these persons testified at trial. Also introduced was the deposition of Dr. Morris who was not present at the time of the deed's execution. Two other witnesses testified as to collateral matters at the trial, not specifically involving the events surrounding the execution of the deed.

As previously indicated, Dr. Morris was not present at the time of the deed's execution, and specifically testified that he could not give an evaluation of grantor...