Richardson v. Levi

• Decision Date: 11 February 1887
• Citation: 3 S.W. 444
• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Parties: RICHARDSON and others <I>v.</I> LEVI and others.

3 S.W. 444

RICHARDSON and others

v. LEVI and others.

Supreme Court of Texas.

February 11, 1887.

Appeal from Victoria county.

A. B. Peticolas, for appellants. Stockdale & Proctor and Scott & Levi, for appellees.

WILLIE, C. J.

This was an action of trespass to try title to a block of ground in the town of Victoria. It was brought by M. Richardson and her husband, John W. Richardson, against the appellees, G. A. Levi, A. Lowe, and Marion Wheeler, each of whom set up the following defenses, viz.: Not guilty; limitation of 3, 5, and 10 years; innocent purchaser for value, without any notice of any adverse claim to the land; equitable estoppel; and laches and stale demand. Levi and Lowe pleaded also improvements in good faith, with prayer for judgment for their value. The case was tried by the judge without a jury, who found against the defendants upon all their defenses except that of laches and stale demand. He found, however, in favor of Levi and Lowe upon their suggestion of improvements in good faith.

The plaintiffs and defendants all derived title from Robert H. Bradley. He had exchanged the block in controversy, together with other property in Texas, for some property in Tennessee, which is claimed in this suit to have been the separate property of Mrs. M. M. Richardson. Deeds were passed between the parties, but it was not shown whether the deed from Bradley for the Victoria property was made to Mrs. Richardson or to her husband. It was never recorded; and, so far as the record shows, neither Richardson nor his wife set up any claim to this block for perhaps 30 years after the deed was executed. Some 18 months after the date of the deed, James Park obtained a judgment against John W. Richardson, and an execution issued thereon, was levied upon this block, and at execution sale it was bought in by Park, who credited the purchase money upon the execution, and received from the sheriff a deed for the property. Some four years afterwards Park sold the block to John C. Moody for $200, and executed to him a deed of which the following is a copy:

"Know all men that I, James Park, of Williamson county, state of Tennessee, for the sum of two hundred dollars, received, to my full satisfaction, of John C. Moody, of Victoria county, in the state of Texas, do by these presents grant, bargain, sell, demise, release, and forever quitclaim unto the said Moody, his heirs and assigns, the following lots of land situated and being in the town of Victoria, county of Victoria, and state of Texas, and known upon the map, and according to the plan of said town, as building lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, in block 131 and range 9.

"Witness my hand and scroll for seal, this twenty-first day of July, 1858.

                      [Signed]                                     "JAMES PARK."   [Seal.]
                

Moody conveyed by quitclaim deed, November 4, 1858, to J. O. Wheeler for the consideration of $500. Marion Wheeler, one of the defendants, inherited one-third of one of the lots in the block from J. O. Wheeler, and the remainder of the block passed by mesne conveyances, all of which were warranty deeds, to the several defendants in this cause.

Among other conclusions of fact found by the judge was the following: "That all of the purchasers of the premises since the sale under the execution in 1854 purchased without notice of any claim or right of Mrs. Richardson, and that they each and all paid value for the parcels of land by them respectively bought." This conclusion is not questioned here by any proper assignment of error. It is true that there is an assignment that the court erred in each and every finding of fact from fourth to tenth, inclusive, because said findings are not just and fair deductions or conclusions from the evidence in the case to be found in the record. The above-recited conclusion of fact is the ninth, and would therefore be embraced in the assignment; but this general manner of assigning errors has been often held by this court to be insufficient. It does not bring to our attention the particular finding of the court claimed to be unwarranted by the evidence. Moreover, the appellants virtually abandon any objection to the ninth conclusion of fact by specifying in their brief the particular points upon which they take issue with the court below as to its findings of fact, omitting the point embraced in the foregoing conclusion.

As one of his conclusions of law from the foregoing facts, the learned judge below held that, as all of the defendants derived title through a quitclaim deed executed by the purchaser under execution sale, who himself had paid the purchase money by crediting it upon his execution, not one of them could be considered an innocent purchaser. This conclusion presents the question to which we propose to direct our attention. It may now be regarded as the settled law of this state that a party receiving a quitclaim deed to land cannot be deemed a bona fide purchaser, without notice, of any greater interest therein than his grantor had at the date of the execution of the deed. This doctrine was first authoritatively announced in Rodgers v. Burchard, 34 Tex. 442, and has been adhered to ever since as to all deeds of quitclaim in the strict sense of that term. In the case cited, the deed conveyed "all the right, title, and interest" of the grantors; and in all the authorities relied on to sustain the decision, the deeds under consideration made use of similar language. The extent of the decision of Rodgers v. Burchard therefore is that a deed which purports to convey only the right, title, and interest of the grantor will not protect the grantee against prior unregistered instruments. The question as to the rights of purchasers under quitclaim deeds has since been before this court on several occasions, and the decision in Rodgers v. Burchard has been limited to the precise case then before the court, and has been held to have gone no further than to establish the principle as above formulated. Harrison v. Boring, 44 Tex. 255; Taylor v. Harrison, 47 Tex. 460.

In Harrison v. Boring, Chief Justice ROBERTS, in delivering the opinion of the court, noticed the distinction between a deed which purports to convey the right, title, and interest of the grantor in the land, and one which purports to convey the land itself. He distinctly recognized the principle announced in Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 322, that when the deed contains evidence that the absolute right to the land, and not the title or chance of title is sought to be sold and bought, the grantee may be a bona fide purchaser, notwithstanding the deed may have in some respects the qualities of a quitclaim deed in form. The opinion in Harrison v. Boring warrants the conclusion that one who has in good faith purchased the absolute right to land, in contradistinction to that of the title or claim of title of the grantor, and by outside proof has shown that he paid a valuable consideration therefor, may claim, as an innocent purchaser, against any adverse title or equities of which he had no notice. This was the construction placed upon the decision by Judge MOORE in Taylor v. Harrison, supra; and this court in that case approved the decision in Rodgers v. Burchard in so far only as it was qualified by the opinion in Harrison v. Boring. Judge MOORE said, in effect, that the...